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Introduction
This is the story of two avant- gardes and their brief moment of asymmetric 
convergence. Each emerges out of the American experience of World War II 
and each is international in scope, including a contingent of Germans, and re-
sponsive to the altered economic, po liti cal, and technological circumstances of 
the world  after 1945. Each has its roots in an  earlier encounter with modernity 
and each, in diff er ent ways, seeks a purchase on the  future. The first is the post-
war American artistic avant- garde, infused with the legacy of radical experi-
mentation brought from Eu rope by  those able to extract themselves from the 
conflagration. The second is the so- called military- industrial complex, the net-
work of private and government institutions held together with Federal dollars 
and fortified, again, with Eu ro pean brains in flight from, or smuggled out of, 
tyrannous regimes and their defeated remnants.
The point of convergence is the late 1960s, when a loose confederacy of 
artists now referred to as the neo- avant- garde (a term we  will have cause to 
return to  toward the end of this book), including, most prominently and influen-
tially, John Cage and Robert Rauschenberg, participated in a number of collab-
orative, interdisciplinary proj ects aimed at plugging American art into the power 
grid driving US scientific, technological, and industrial innovation. At leading 
universities, corporations, and museums, finding ways of bringing advanced 
art and cutting- edge technology together was conceived of as a way of unleash-
ing the creative capacities of artists, scientists, and engineers, of sparking as- yet 
unimagined inventions of form and function, and of initiating new modes of 
inquiry unfettered by conventional distinctions based on professional loyalties, 
prejudices, or habits of mind. For the artists, informed by an ongoing investiga-
tion of the unfinished proj ects of Dada, Surrealism, Constructivism and other 
aspects of early twentieth- century avant- garde, the fusion of art and technology 
was not only an intrinsic aspect of con temporary practice but was bound up 
with the avant- garde’s broader utopian challenge to the compartmentalized 
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and administered lifeworld of modernity. For Cage and Rauschenberg, design-
ers and educators like R. Buckminster Fuller and the Eames Office, and artists 
working closely with emerging computational and audiovisual technologies 
such as György Kepes, Jack Burnham, and Stan VanDerBeek, experiments in 
art, technology, and science presaged not merely a new aesthetic but a new so-
cial order based on collective experimentation within the richest and most ad-
vanced science and tech infrastructure the world had ever seen. Imagine Marcel 
Duchamp, Vladimir Tatlin, or El Lissitzky supported by ibm and mit. What 
happens when the possibility of such improbable pairings is taken seriously is 
the subject of this book.
The collectivist dimension of art- and- technology collaborations is a vital 
part of their utopian promise since it represents an attempt by many artists 
and organizers to instantiate radical demo cratic practices, or at least to start to 
imagine what such practices might be, within the ostensibly hierarchical and 
corporate environment of the mid- twentieth- century university or business. 
The dilation of the coterie to include the spectator and passers-by, so central 
to the performative happenings, pro cesses, and interventions of artists like 
George Maciunas, Claes Oldenburg, and Otto Piene, and enlarged further in 
the multimedia broadcast experiments of Cage, VanDerBeek, James Lee Byars, 
and many  others, posits the re distribution of artistic agency and a redefini-
tion of what the aesthetic might be and do. The pursuit of common ground 
and a sense of the public good are key aspects of 1960s art- and- technology 
proj ects that are easily overlooked amid the (sometimes literal) smoke- and- 
mirrors spectacle of much of the activity. Without the prospect of social, as 
well as artistic, transformation, an ambition shared, though manifest in diff er-
ent forms, by the historical avant- garde and aspects of progressive pedagogy 
reintroduced to the US through Bauhaus émigré artists and educators, the 
art- and- technology proj ects are largely just experiments in  doing  things with 
 lasers. Taking the avant- garde credentials of the proj ect leaders seriously means 
that  these other wise ephemeral enterprises  ought to be situated within a lon-
ger temporality that includes both the politics of the early twentieth- century 
avant- garde and the early twenty- first  century reclamation of some of the key 
1960s proj ects. Furthermore, if  there are po liti cal considerations at play in the 
art- and- technology proj ects, which we believe  there are, an understanding of 
how the avant- garde aspirations of American artists might be situated within 
the broader cultural climate of mid- century corporate liberalism is necessary, 




World War II drew the United States into international affairs, and postwar 
global geopolitics was redefined largely according to US interests. With much 
of Eu rope and the Soviet Union devastated by war and eco nom ically depleted, 
the Pax Americana was predicated on the superiority of democracy as a system 
of government capable of restoring ruined nations and maintaining peace. This 
notion of the US as the modernizing guardian of freedom was especially com-
pelling given the extended Soviet influence across Eastern Eu rope.
The new global responsibilities facing the US  were inevitably colored by 
anx i eties produced by evidence of the extent to which po liti cal extremism in 
Eu rope had gripped entire populations. The massive mobilization of US re-
sources during the war had radically extended the role of government in Ameri-
can life far beyond anything  imagined by the architects of the New Deal. The 
scale of the challenges facing the postwar world left  little room for a rollback of 
government intervention; indeed, the Federal management of domestic affairs, 
not to mention foreign policy, came to be seen as entirely commensurate with 
the successful organ ization of a complex modern society. The effectiveness of 
war time mobilization, not least through the coordination of scientific, tech-
nological and military institutions and personnel, suggested that the continu-
ation of support for research across the  human and physical sciences should be 
maintained and developed during peacetime, not only for the purposes of na-
tional security but also to enhance the health and prosperity of the American 
 people. To the extent that American democracy was normalized as the natu ral 
order of  things, structured according to the value- neutral terms of a scientific 
rationality  free from theological or ideological influence, then the application 
of reason, in its managerial and orga nizational modes, could be understood as 
entirely in keeping with the demo cratic spirit.
Certainly, the prosperity enjoyed by many Americans during the 1950s 
and early 1960s appeared to confirm the sense that science and technology 
 were delivering unpre ce dented rewards in the form of the new consumer goods 
and improved infrastructure that transformed cities, created suburbs, provided 
jobs, and delivered mobility, opportunity, security, comfort, and, indeed, plea-
sure. Orga nizational efficiency and design innovation elevated the status of 
scientists, engineers, and planners, despite growing concerns regarding the 
increasing conformism of American life. To an extent, the collective  labor of 
corporate Amer i ca and its potentially flattening social effects could be offset by 
a cele bration of cultural ingenuity and novelty. The multiplication of consumer 
goods and ser vices, along with the emergence and promotion of a distinctive 
American culture able to embrace popu lar forms yet serious enough to sup-
plant Eu ro pean pre de ces sors, suggested that fears of bland uniformity could 
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be outweighed by the energy and inventiveness of a  people unfettered by old- 
world ideological limitations.
The American postwar embrace of the modern, then, meant holding 
in abeyance a number of contradictions. Even as con temporary science be-
came too difficult for the uninitiated to understand, science and the scientific 
method  were conceived of as foundational to modern democracy, guarantors 
of impartiality and objectivity. At the same time, it was the scientists who con-
tinued to invent the ever more destructive means by which the world might be 
destroyed. The same ambivalence marks the extension of new technologies into 
 every aspect of life. Technology was self- evidently an engine of social change 
and emancipatory potential, yet technology also injected into everyday life a 
nonhuman world of efficiency and alienation. Similarly, while individual free-
dom remained the bedrock of demo cratic virtue, the complexity of modern 
society increasingly required expert organ ization and management according 
to rational princi ples. This reliance on expertise extended into the arts which, 
despite their purported achievements, had become, like much modern science, 
increasingly abstruse and incomprehensible to the untutored.
The percolating anx i eties during the 1950s surrounding unwelcome levels 
of conformity and social control, not to mention the existential dread fostered 
by an awareness of the atomic bomb, sat alongside the widespread cele bration 
of mastery and expertise that also characterizes the era. The response to this 
unease was, in many areas of life, a commitment to more integration and more 
effective management, wider collaboration, and deeper investigation of the 
psychosocial dimensions of the modern world. The war time emergence of cy-
bernetics and systems thinking found new converts far beyond their military 
applications and converged with other approaches to conceptualizing totality, 
such as Gestalt theory.1 The sense that the complexity of any given situation 
required the combined understanding of numerous perspectives had become 
established during war time but, by the 1960s, was a commonplace of American 
institutional life, from government to university, corporation to think tank. 
This embrace of interdisciplinarity was, at once, a recognition of the neces-
sary fluidity required to solve complex prob lems but also, in keeping with the 
confused rhe toric of American mid- century democracy, an ac cep tance of the 
role of the expert and of the necessity of collaboration. As such, the rise of 
interdisciplinarity as a virtue combined a commitment to collective enterprise 
among equals with acknowledgement of the distinctiveness of some individu-
als by dint of their expert knowledge. Interdisciplinary networks provided a 
context within which individual capacities might be recognized while rejecting 
the idea that any one individual might be enough. Interdisciplinarity allowed 
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for expertise but rejected the notion of individual genius. Part of the attrac-
tiveness of interdisciplinarity during the Cold War across a wide spectrum of 
fields was that it appeared to capture something of the spirit of what a properly 
functioning democracy might look like. It is within this context that the trans-
fer of avant- garde artistic energies from Eu rope to the US was able to find a 
plausible place within the burgeoning military- industrial organ ization of Cold 
War Amer i ca.
The postwar emphasis on interdisciplinary collaboration and creativity in 
the  human and physical sciences chimed with the broad contours of the his-
torical avant- garde’s challenge to bourgeois art, namely through a rejection of 
individual genius and a stress on collective practice; a commitment to experi-
mentation and pro cess over outcome; a dismissal of medium specificity and 
a dismantling of the distinction between art and non- art, or, in other words, 
between art and life. While it is clearly a stretch to draw analogies between 
Dada or the Bauhaus and the rand Corporation or the Macy conferences, a 
general sympathy  toward the collaborative and the innovative increasingly at-
tracted, during the 1960s, the seemingly incommensurable worlds of advanced 
Cold War technoscience and advanced art. It is a convergence that is made pos-
si ble by the heightened status of scientists and engineers during the early Cold 
War, who came to serve as models of a new creative class, and the expanded 
ambitions of artists seeking access to new materials and methods of fabrication 
made pos si ble by technical advances as well as a revivified sense of art’s social 
remit as the high formalist moment of American abstraction came  under in-
creasing pressure from the neo- avant- garde.
The purpose  here is not to smooth out the profound differences in mission 
and function among technologists, scientists, and artists, nor to suggest that 
 these constituencies necessarily shared the same broad vision and subscribed to 
the same values. In many ways the converging paths of technology and art dur-
ing the 1960s was as much a clash as it was a meeting, and the often fractious 
and slender common ground between them  will be the subject of a good deal 
of what follows. What scientists, engineers, defense intellectuals, and artists 
did share, nevertheless, was a common sense, distributed widely in the culture 
not only in the US but strongly registered overseas as well, of the remarkably 
propulsive power of American modernity and its capacity to actualize new 
modes of experience and social organ ization on a  grand scale. To no small de-
gree this sense was a consequence of unpre ce dented and unrivaled access to 
financial and technological resources and the orga nizational structures with 
which to deploy them. Yet beyond the  simple fact of wealth and power, the 
compelling narrative the US was able to establish for itself, as the sole legatee of 
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a Eu ro pean tradition of enlightenment only the US was capable of protecting, 
lent a power ful moral charge to the stewardship of a world yet to attain the state 
of immanent utopia Amer i ca already enjoyed. This sense of mission is  there in the 
dream of a post- ideological liberal democracy run by a benign bureaucracy of ex-
perts, and it is  there also in the post- disciplinary aspirations of art and technology 
collaborations that grew, in weird technocratic countercultural formations, out of 
Black Mountain College in North Carolina, Bell Laboratories in New Jersey, the 
Mas sa chu setts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Mas sa chu setts, the Los 
Angeles County Museum of Art (lacma), and elsewhere.
While Black Mountain was not explic itly geared to art- and- technology 
collaboration, the college was an impor tant meeting point where the cross- 
disciplinary, thinking- by- doing ethos shared by the Bauhaus and American 
progressive education  were synthesized. Many of the key participants in art- and- 
technology proj ects of the 1960s passed through Black Mountain  either as visit-
ing staff (John Cage, Buckminster Fuller) or as students (Robert Rauschenberg, 
Stan VanDerBeek). The Bauhaus influence also permeated mit’s Center for 
Advanced Visual Studies (cavs), founded in 1967 by György Kepes, who had 
previously worked with László Moholy- Nagy at the New Bauhaus in Chicago. 
Unlike Black Mountain, which was a resolutely New Deal- era liberal arts col-
lege, mit was at the heart of Cold War r&d, and the well- funded labs pro-
vided cavs fellows like VanDerBeek and Jack Burnham with access to the 
most advanced technology.
If mit was the paradigmatic Cold War university, Bell Labs, where scien-
tist Billy Klüver launched Experiments in Art and Technology (E.A.T.) with 
Rauschenberg in late 1966, represents the other side of Cold War research. A 
private com pany whose labs  were designed to replicate the flow of ideas and 
personnel more characteristic of a campus than a business, Klüver and  others at 
Bell had, since the 1950s, facilitated an easy movement of artists, musicians, and 
composers from New York City and nearby Rutgers University and Douglass 
College through the Murray Hill complex. Envisaged as a clearing- house for art- 
and- technology collaboration, E.A.T. was at once an agency, lobbying organ-
ization, and think tank. More  limited in scope but still capable of drawing on 
major resources, lacma’s Art & Technology Program (a&t), launched in 1967 
by curator Maurice Tuchman, sought to hook up artists with organ izations and 
businesses in Southern California’s booming industrial and technology sectors. 
More focused on producing art than E.A.T., and culminating in an exhibition 
at the museum in 1971, a&t provided access to resources and expertise for a 
number of prominent artists, including Andy Warhol, Claes Oldenburg, R. B. 
Kitaj, and E.A.T. members Rauschenberg and Robert Whitman.
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Some of  these initiatives have become legendary, such as Black Mountain 
and E.A.T., even when, and sometimes  because, their achievements  were short- 
lived. In recent years,  there has been revived interest in many of the 1960s proj-
ects as new technologies and new conceptions of art practice have sharpened a 
desire to locate, evaluate, and emulate pre de ces sors’ experiments. Yet the proj-
ects discussed  here  were all relative failures, if success is mea sured according 
to the pronouncements of the proj ect leaders, and they often sustained heavy 
critical fire during their brief life spans. The demise of  these experiments in 
collaborative, interdisciplinary exploration can be easily summarized in local 
terms— lack of funds, lack of shared agenda, inability to engage or persuade 
relevant constituencies, withdrawal of institutional support— but the larger 
failure lies in the breathtaking collapse of confidence, during the latter half 
of the 1960s, in the US as a legitimate world power and the rapid reversal of 
fortunes, and withdrawal of trust, experienced by the institutions that autho-
rized that power. The complexity of modern society was, by 1968, no longer a 
marvel to behold for many Americans; indeed, complexity came to be seen as 
a function of power, and expertise its instrument. In retrospect, it is hard to 
imagine a worse time to launch an art- and- technology initiative than 1967, the 
moment at which technology was no longer seen as an open invitation to build 
the  future but increasingly perceived simply as a weapon.
One mea sure of the shifting po liti cal assessment of technology was the 
publication in the New York Review of Books in 1969 of sociologist John Mc-
Dermott’s withering response to the techno- optimism promoted by Emman-
uel Mesthene, director of the ibm- sponsored Harvard Program on Technol-
ogy and Society, which had just released its fourth annual report. By the time 
sculptor Richard Serra wrote, two years  later, in response to the Los Angeles 
a&t exhibit, that technology is neither art nor invention but “what we do to 
the Black Panthers and the Viet nam ese  under the guise of advancement in a 
materialistic theology” (Serra and Serra 1980, 40), McDermott’s association 
of technology with a managerial elite blind or indifferent to its catastrophic 
effects had become a widespread concern.2 Perhaps the worst critical batter-
ing among the prominent art- and- technology proj ects of the  later 1960s was 
meted out to a&t, but it was merely the most vis i ble casualty of the renuncia-
tion of the utopian promise of a marriage of art and technology. Ambitious 
proj ects in the early 1970s saw E.A.T. developing satellite broadcasting and 
communications technology in developing countries, but  these  were hampered 
by lack of funds. Kepes retired in 1974.
The restructuring and realignment of defense r&d funding according to 
a more entrepreneurial and commercial model  after the legitimation crisis of 
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the late 1960s is part of the broader neoliberal deployment of marketization as 
a means of redistributing responsibility and accountability from the late 1970s 
onward. In the arts, by the early 1980s the institutional critique posed by post- 
minimalist, often po liti cally radical, forms of practice (the kind of critique tar-
geted at the 1960s art- and- technology proj ects discussed  here) was supplanted 
by a revival of interest in painting (including such US artists as Keith Haring, 
Jean- Michel Basquiat, and Ross Bleckner, along with influential German paint-
ers like Anselm Keifer, Georg Baselitz, and Gerhard Richter) and the ironic dis-
tance of the so- called Pictures Generation (including Barbara Kruger, Cindy 
Sherman, and Richard Prince), both tendencies capable of delivering gallery- 
and market- ready product relieved of the broader conceptual and po liti cal 
burdens posed by the neo- avant- garde. As the art world became increasingly 
financialized and globalized as a luxury dry- goods market, and as New York 
became merely a node in the global supply chain rather than the pacesetter, the 
kind of artists engaged in the explorative interdisciplinary work characteristic 
of the art- and- technology proj ects of the 1960s  were more likely to find a wel-
come home in Silicon Valley, where the Stewart Brand mode of techno- futurist 
pioneer- consultancy, of the kind prototyped by Buckminster Fuller, had be-
come the orthodox workplace model. Brand’s cele bration of mit’s Media Lab 
in a 1987 book that claimed, in its subtitle, that mit was “inventing the  future” 
 there, is emblematic of the shift away from art as such and  toward a more fluid 
conception of innovation as world- building. To an extent, this had been the 
ambition of art- and- tech proj ects from the outset, from the Bauhaus and Black 
Mountain through to E.A.T. and cavs, and had undergirded the utopianism 
of the avant- garde proj ect since the early twentieth  century. Yet the integra-
tion of art and life achieved at Media Lab and in Silicon Valley, as much as 
it appeared to realize the erasure of distinctions between art and technology, 
work and leisure, that had been central to the historical avant- garde’s po liti cal 
ambitions, speaks more directly to the restructuring of cap i tal ist relations of 
production  after the 1970s than it does the eradication of bourgeois values.
The early twenty- first  century has seen a surge of interest in art- and- 
technology collaborations that is at once  future oriented and backward look-
ing.3 The reputations of the main 1960s proj ects considered  here, summarily 
dismissed at the end of that de cade as the worst kind of complicit corporate 
art, have all recently found themselves positioned as illustrious pre de ces sors. 
In 2013, lacma launched the Art + Technology Lab (a + t), explic itly in-
spired by the museum’s 1960s proj ect and designed to support artists seeking 
to develop work with emerging technology. In 2015, mit’s Center for Art, Sci-
ence, and Technology (cast), the descendent of Kepes’s cavs, received a $1.5 
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million Mellon Foundation grant to further promote and enable the center’s 
mission to inspire teaching, research, and programming that operate at the ex-
perimental intersections of art, science, and engineering. In 2016, marking the 
fiftieth anniversary of Klüver’s celebrated 9 Eve nings: Theatre and Engineer-
ing, the proj ect that kick- started E.A.T., Nokia Bell Labs launched the E.A.T. 
Salon, another self- consciously retro- futurist collaborative venture intended to 
foster innovation across the arts and technology sectors. All at once, it seems, 
the pre sent has caught up with, or at least caught on to, the lost  futures can-
celed by the most egregious excesses of Cold War militarism.
The revival of interest in art- and- technology collaboration in the early 
twenty- first  century, not least in the retrieval of the  earlier proj ects as proudly 
displayed precursors, is, we argue  here, not only a consequence of the mas-
sive transformations brought about by ubiquitous computation, but also due 
to the permeation of con temporary life by the time- limited, project- based, 
collaborative- labor model that has restructured society according to the demands 
of the neoliberal market. The buzzwords of the entrepreneurial ethos are in many 
cases the same terms circulating in the jargon of Cold War corporate liberalism, 
yet what has been evacuated from notions of creativity, collaboration, and inter-
disciplinarity in their con temporary iterations is the sense that they  were of value 
to the extent that they served a public good. It is true enough that the conception 
of what constituted the public, as understood through the scientism of the Cold 
War corporate state, might have been severely delimited and exclusionary, yet 
the realpolitik driving the need to improve creative and productive capacity in 
science and industry, and in society more broadly, nevertheless carried a uto-
pian charge largely missing from the atomized, Hobbesian revanchism typical 
of twenty- first- century enterprise. The con temporary art- and- technology lab is 
reliant on the precarity of the con temporary  labor market in the culture indus-
tries as much as it is the beneficiary of tech largesse. In this regard, as in  others, 
the history of art- and- technology collaborations since the postwar period is 
part of the narrative outlined by Philip Mirowski in his series of books that 
track the mutually supportive energies among neoclassical economics, physics, 
and the military as they produce neoliberal thought out of Cold War computa-
tion (Mirowski 1989, 2002, 2011, 2013; Mirowski and Plehwe 2015).
Recent scholarly and curatorial interest in the 1960s art- and- tech proj ects 
has identified them as influential in facilitating the use of computation and 
other new technologies in con temporary art (see, e.g., Blakinger 2016; Blauvelt 
2015; Lee 2004; Wisnioski 2012). To a significant degree, what was once seen 
as somewhat marginal to art history has acquired a prominent place.4 The po-
liti cal ramifications of  these proj ects, however, and their relation to the wider 
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military- industrial agenda of the Cold War US, remains under- examined and 
is often positioned as a background concern in the context of a predominantly 
art- historical narrative. On the other hand, recent work in the history of the 
social sciences, science and technology studies, and related fields, has explored 
the extent to which Cold War thinking, especially in relation to systems analy-
sis and rational choice theory, came to permeate American social organ ization 
and embedded itself into the deep structure of economic, po liti cal and social 
life (see, e.g., Amadae 2003, 2015; Cohen- Cole 2014; Erickson et al 2013; Isaac 
2007, 2011; Oreskes 2014; Rohde 2013; Solovey and Cravens 2012). Our aim, 
 here, in part, is to draw together the strands of  these two histories in order 
to contextualize art- and- technology proj ects within a broader narrative about 
the changing fortunes of American liberalism, and to understand how the pro-
gressive ethos realized, fleetingly, at institutions like Black Mountain and, less 
expectedly, commercial concerns like Bell Labs, was metabolized by the military- 
industrial state into neoliberal orthodoxy.
In his book on artistic  labor, Dark  Matter, artist and activist Gregory 
Sholette won ders  whether it is not “the alleged radicalism of art, but its dem-
onstrated capacity to mobilize excess, even redundant productivity, that makes 
it an attractive model to the priests and priestesses of the new networked econ-
omy” (Sholette 2011, 43). Perhaps, he goes on, it is “not the artist’s seemingly 
transgressive, risk- taking nonconformity, but exactly a mode of distributed risk 
and social cooperation denied by neoliberalism that leads certain ceos and 
business thinkers to see artistic methods as near- miraculous models of ‘just- in- 
time creativity’ ” (43). The impetus for art- and- technology collaborations dur-
ing the 1960s largely came from  those with an interest in realizing the poten-
tial of art,  whether it was curators like Maurice Tuchman and Jane Livingston 
at lacma or committed art- loving engineers like Billy Klüver. The traffic was 
mostly in one direction, with Tuchman, Klüver, and Kepes, among  others, work-
ing to persuade an indifferent or openly hostile science and tech establishment to 
accommodate the unusual interests and demands of artists. To a significant de-
gree, as James Conant’s Cold War model of general education, discussed below, 
suggests, the predominant notion of the arts through the Cold War period was 
that of civilizing influence, necessary for social cohesion and the inculcation of 
values but distinct from the serious, albeit creative work of research, design, and 
manufacture. When collaboration between arts and engineers did happen, the 
resulting work retained the imprimatur of the artist’s signature, despite the ef-
forts of some, like Klüver, to credit participating engineers.
To a considerable extent, then, the notional two- cultures model that 
dominated the debate in the early 1960s remained largely untroubled by the 
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incursion of artists into laboratories, workshops, and factories. The situation 
outlined by Sholette, however, suggests a significant shift in the perceived value 
of art and artists among corporate and business leaders, thanks in no small part 
to the successes of the tech sector and the restructuring of the economy since 
the 1970s, to which the rise of Silicon Valley substantially contributed. From a 
twenty- first- century vantage point, the claims made for creativity, innovation, 
and interdisciplinary collaboration during the 1950s and 1960s by scientists 
and artists seem unremarkable indeed, given the extent to which  these virtues 
have become normative. Yet the mainstreaming of the idea of the creative econ-
omy enabled by the absorption of countercultural rhe toric into tech business 
strategy has not resulted in the kind of revolution of everyday life envisaged by 
the historical avant- garde or its mid- century descendants. Instead, a deregu-
lated and dematerialized economy no longer beholden to any national interest 
or  labor force has found it extremely easy to accommodate the revolutionary 
ambitions of the avant- garde. A successful enterprise is now one that is nimble, 
creative, innovative, and disruptive, its workers contributing as outsourced en-
trepreneurs on temporary or time- or project- based contracts. The ability and 
willingness to collaborate is a given.
As university research has also become increasingly marketized, not only 
in the commercialization of military- related r&d, but also through the compe-
tition for funding, faculty, and students, the distinction Cold War technocrats 
defended between so- called basic (or non- instrumentalized) and applied re-
search has become less relevant. In such a climate, the arts and humanities have 
repositioned themselves as players in the new creative economy, the virtues 
associated with  these fields, such as critical and analytical inventiveness and 
the production of conceptual and formal novelty, now valued as a necessary 
component of an interdisciplinary business environment. The reconfiguration 
of art practice as research  under  these conditions, though it is often explained 
as a means of securing equal status across disciplines and as a recognition of 
practice as a mode of rigorous inquiry, nonetheless normalizes and regulates 
the antinomian energies still associated with the arts as another branch of the 
knowledge economy.
It is, then, artists (and the folk history of their creatively disruptive force), 
if not art itself, that have been celebrated, and vilified, as the primary agents 
of urban gentrification and the source of creative juice powering all manner of 
start- ups and entrepreneurial adventures. Sholette’s point that it is not their 
radicalism but their capacity for adaptation and cooperation that makes artists 
valuable for business is an argument Klüver or Kepes would have been unlikely 
to contest. What they would have challenged, however, is the degraded status, 
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if not the complete erasure, of the notion of a public good that counted for 
more than economic gain. Despite the nonideological ideology of much US 
Cold War thinking, where American democracy operated unproblematically 
as code for  human nature, and despite the strategic value placed on cele brations 
of individual creative freedom within the context of a set of tacitly accepted, 
shared normative values, the  grand talk of “civilization” or “Western man” did 
presuppose a model of  human community and the collective good.5 The extent 
to which this model also contributed to the deployment of science and tech-
nology in the engineering of consent and the suppression of dissent cannot be 
denied, but the atomized, economistic regime that emerged out of and sup-
planted Cold War- era consensus culture has left  little of the utopian capacities 
of that era uncontaminated.
The revival of cavs as cast, of a&t as a + t, and E.A.T. as the E.A.T. 
Salon is part of a broader reassessment of midcentury art- and- technology col-
laborations that identifies, correctly, the germ of many pre sent preoccupations 
in  those initiatives. Yet the conditions  under which  these proj ects are revived 
or re imagined must be attended to, just as the military- industrial context of 
the original proj ects must be understood as integral to their formation and, 
significantly, to their demise. The new art- and- tech proj ects are often spon-
sored by the tech sector and encourage work in areas such as machine learning, 
augmented real ity, and robotics that are already the mainstays of con temporary 
technological r&d. The artists participating in  these ventures are less likely 
than in the 1960s to be art “stars” and less likely to produce works for exhibi-
tion. Instead, they are the art professionals contracted in or winners of funding 
or residency competitions tasked with realizing proj ects that fall within the 
purview of the host institution. In a society where art’s emancipatory capacity 
has been codified as its contribution to a culture of competition- driven entre-
preneurial dynamism and precarious  labor, computationally mediated infor-
mation flows and privatized spatiotemporal capacities, it is unsurprising that 
it is  these ele ments latent in the 1960s proj ects that have been pulled out for 
use while the radical potential embedded therein— the incubated though often 
dormant revolutionary energies of the historical avant- garde— lay undisturbed.
The aim of this book is to disturb  these energies and to address the 1960s 
art- and- tech ventures within a context that extends backward and forward. We 
return to the early twentieth  century in order to understand how the complex 
coupling of American progressive liberalism and the Eu ro pean and Rus sian 
avant- garde produced a distinctive mid- century US art- technology utopian-
ism even as it was invariably nested within the growing military- industrial 
infrastructure of the corporate state. Chapter 1 seeks to position the 1960s art- 
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and- technology proj ects as the product of a par tic u lar way of thinking about 
the relation between science and democracy that has its roots in John Dewey’s 
pragmatism. It is Dewey’s conception of the scientific method as a generalized 
mode of active engagement with the world that enables him to conceive of 
science, technology, education, and art as aspects of a dynamic and transforma-
tive collective proj ect capable of actualizing a democracy commensurate with 
American modernity. The influence of Dewey’s ideas in Germany contributed 
to the design philosophy of prominent schools like the Bauhaus, many of 
whose leading figures emigrated to the US during the 1930s. Bauhaus émigrés 
like Josef Albers and György Kepes, among  others, brought an understanding 
of the Eu ro pean modernist avant- garde synthesized with a Deweyan model of 
scientific democracy that provided a compelling model for collaborative, inter-
disciplinary art- and- technology research for US artists and designers during 
the 1950s and 1960s.
World War II and the early years of the Cold War, however, also saw a 
realignment of priorities in education and the conception of the demo cratic 
citizen  toward specialization and expertise and away from Dewey’s participa-
tory collectivism. The massive surge in federal funding of scientific research 
and the exalted position of the scientist provided a plausible context for art- 
and- technology collaboration, but the social ambitions driving the Bauhaus- 
Dewey model  were increasingly downplayed, challenged, or distorted by the 
corporate liberalism that developed to fight the Cold War. The following three 
chapters consider key 1960s art- and- technology initiatives— cavs, E.A.T. and 
lacma’s a&t—as they attempt to work through the implications of what is 
essentially a progressive conception of participatory democracy within distinc-
tive but related institutional contexts. We read the main 1960s art- and- tech 
proj ects as engaged, in vari ous and challenging ways, with the prevailing ethos 
of the postwar institutions that supported them; that is, the research univer-
sity, the military- funded corporation, and the modern art gallery based in a 
region booming on defense- industry growth. It is  here that the radical legacies 
of the artistic avant- garde collide with the normalized corporate liberalism of 
the Cold War.
In chapter 2, we focus on mit as the site of Kepes’s attempts to redeem 
the Cold War university through the arts. Chapter 3 considers E.A.T.’s collab-
orative model as an extrapolation of Bell Labs’ innovative and longstanding 
support of interdisciplinary working within the private sector, though Billy 
Klüver’s stress on practical problem- solving remained loyal to the notion of the 
artist as the center of gravity underpinning any art and science collaboration. 
The strategy of lacma’s Art & Technology program, explored in chapter 4, 
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was perhaps less ambitious than  those of  either Klüver or Kepes in terms of 
broader social outlook, but the attempt to link Los Angeles’s new museum into 
the Southern California business environment nonetheless grasped the sense 
that art constituted a field of expertise on a par with technology and science. 
By focusing on collaborations lacma established between individual artists 
and two of the most influential think tanks of the era, the rand Corporation 
and the Hudson Institute, we consider how notions of expertise and specialist 
knowledge proved more resistant to collaborative enterprise than Klüver and 
Kepes might have hoped.
The art- and- tech programs  were never reductively complicit with military- 
industrial interests, however much their con temporary critics labored to make 
the charge stick. Instead, they operated within a broader cultural climate where 
the imbrication of technological innovation and social pro gress  were largely 
unchallenged and where the perceived nonideological virtues of creativity and 
collaboration could do real work  toward the preservation and protection of 
the public good. Chapter 5 takes a wider view of the ways in which art- and- 
technology proj ects of the 1960s attempted to erase distinctions across media, 
disciplines, and subject specialization in order to grasp the totality of American 
modernity. In a variety of ways, E.A.T., cavs, and lacma  were all involved 
in international expositions aimed at promoting American technology and 
American values. Through examination of some of the ambitious work under-
taken by, among  others, Charles and Ray Eames and Buckminster Fuller, we ad-
dress the cybernetically influenced desire to capture, and to an extent account 
for, the dynamic, fluid capacities of the modern world. Bolstered by the post- 
ideological imaginary fostered by US corporate liberalism, the “every thing is 
connected” ethos allowed designers like the Eameses and Fuller to imagine a 
benevolent generalized technology fully commensurate with the natu ral order 
and capable of awakening untapped  human capacities. Though  there remains 
more than a trace of Dewey’s anti- dualistic thinking in proj ects like Fuller’s, 
and their techno- utopianism found a ready audience among a counterculture 
suspicious of Cold War politics, the post- ideological notion of a value- free 
technology deployed by the unpre ce dented creative capacities of an affluent 
and benevolent democracy failed to account for the Vietnam War.
Fi nally, in chapter 6 we look forward from the 1960s to consider the com-
plex legacy of the era’s proj ects as it is manifest in twenty- first- century itera-
tions. The limits of the 1960s art- and- technology proj ects  were largely set by 
the realities, rather than the rhetorical claims, of Cold War corporate liberal-
ism, and the escalation of the war in Vietnam rapidly undermined the utopia-
nism that promised the solution to social prob lems through the application of 
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scientific rationality. The proj ects discussed  here did not survive the erosion 
of confidence in the American government of the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Chapter 6 reflects on the reasons for the turn away from art- and- technology 
proj ects. It also explores how the funding of defense research and development 
 after Vietnam served to reshape the relation among universities, the private 
sector, and the defense establishment, contributing to the growth of new tech-
nologies such as computing and biotechnology. The twenty- first- century tech 
sector, in its turn, has prepared the ground for the reemergence of art- and- 
technology initiatives, and this chapter examines the revival of our three core 
proj ects from the 1960s.
Part of the story  here, as  will hopefully become clear, is the way in which 
the Cold War generated the conditions and the modes of thinking that enabled 
neoliberalism to take root as the latest nonideological ideology. The work on 
probability that made pos si ble the innovations of the Manhattan Proj ect and 
migrated, postwar, to think tanks like the rand Corporation, where game 
theory underpinned nuclear strategy before finding widespread applications in 
economics and the social sciences, is a narrative that runs alongside, and peri-
odically intersects with, the history of the artistic avant- garde. This dual track, 
crisscrossing series of knots and loops binds the history of art and the history of 
science and technology in the US during the twentieth  century. Together,  these 
entwined strands reveal much about the assumptions and legacy of the Ameri-
can  Century, its cultural, economic, and military reach, and the ways in which 
 those assumptions continue to shape our sense of the limits of the pos si ble.6
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Science, Art, Democracy
The danger is in the neatness of identifications.
— Samuel Beckett, “Dante . . .  Bruno. Vico . . .  Joyce”
The art- and- technology proj ects of the 1960s mark the 
meeting point of the post- formalist experimentalists of an 
ascendant American art and the federally funded military- 
industrial university r&d machinery of the Cold War 
 superpower. What  these very diff er ent constituencies 
share is a commitment to continuous innovation in the de-
sign and application of technology, an understanding that 
this pro cess requires collaborative experimentation, and that such a pro cess is, 
broadly speaking, a social good,  whether that means enhanced national secu-
rity and an improved standard of living, or new modes of experience and un-
derstanding. Without this broadly sympathetic outlook, it is hard to imagine 
organ izations like Bell Labs or the companies involved in lacma’s Art & 
Technology Program (a&t) allowing artists, however grudgingly, on- site. Nor 
is it likely that artists would have participated so willingly without some in-
kling that science and industry offered, beyond merely technical expertise and 
access to materials, opportunities to explore new modes of working. It is true 
that in some cases the main draw for artists was the prospect of being able to 
scale up their work using skills and resources other wise unavailable to them. It is 
equally the case that the presence of artists in some companies and institutions 
was seen as a burdensome interference with business as usual. Nevertheless, a 
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general faith in the power ful capacities of technological innovation to further 
the interests of American society, a widely shared sense that American ingenu-
ity and energy  were inventing the  future, largely outweighed local challenges to 
the view that art and technology  were operating according to the same aspira-
tional values.
The shared virtues of creativity, collaboration, and experimentation that 
underpinned interactions between art and technology, however, mask pro-
foundly diff er ent ideas of what  those terms might mean and how they might be 
achieved. The conception of experimental collaboration in the arts largely derived 
from the process- oriented practice developed during the Progressive Era’s en-
gagement with educational reform, coupled with the integrated design practices 
characterized by Eu ro pean schools like the Bauhaus. By contrast, by the end of 
World War II, innovation and collaboration, as understood by institutions train-
ing and employing American scientists and engineers,  were aspects of an expertise- 
driven intellectual economy made pos si ble through a system of education based 
on competition and specialization. Both views of creativity, collaboration, and 
experimentation  were predicated on an understanding of a necessary interde-
pen dency between science and democracy, yet the nature of that relationship 
depended on very diff er ent notions of what each of  those terms might mean. 
The art- and- technology proj ects of the 1960s, then, mark the collision of two 
versions of what an American scientific democracy might look like.
A commitment to the belief that a scientific culture, broadly conceived, 
could support and enlarge American democracy is pre sent at least as far back 
as the post– Civil War period, when a scientific approach to understanding the 
physical and social worlds provided, it was thought by advocates of science, a regu-
latory ethical check on religious and corporate interests (see Jewett 2012, 28-54). 
Exposure to the princi ples and methods of science was considered crucial to the 
formation of citizens capable of disinterested observation, empirical inquiry, and 
the rational pursuit of knowledge uncontaminated by ideology, dogma, or nar-
row self- interest. To be sure, the promotion of science as a value- free model of 
social reproduction also contributed to the scientism that legitimated corporate 
managerialism and the engineering of consent, perhaps most vividly illustrated 
by the rise of Fordism. Nonetheless, the social liberalism of the Progressive Era 
was grounded by the sense that science provided the framework through which 
a modern demo cratic society could most effectively or ga nize itself in a secular 
fashion for the purposeful well- being of all citizens and that effective interven-
tion could mitigate the inequalities produced by un regu la ted individualism.
This was certainly the position of phi los o pher John Dewey who, during 
the first third of the twentieth  century, emerged as Amer i ca’s foremost pub-
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lic intellectual and, more than perhaps any other single figure,  shaped and in-
fluenced debate on the relations between science, politics, and society in the 
United States. It is Dewey’s argument for a ground-up rebuilding of American 
democracy through an education system informed by the experimentalism of 
the scientific method that dominated the strain of art- and- technology col-
lectivism that runs from the Bauhaus through Black Mountain College and, 
through shared personnel, into proj ects like mit’s Center for Advanced Visual 
Studies (cavs) and Bell Labs’ Experiments in Art and Technology (E.A.T.). 
It was, however, precisely in opposition to Dewey’s model of scientific democ-
racy that the military- industrial management of US science and tech research 
culture conceived of itself  after World War II, even though the fundamental 
commitment to an imbricated science and democracy remained its core princi-
ple. The contest over the meaning of the relations between science, democracy, 
and education is at the heart of art- and- technology collaborations between the 
artistic and military- industrial avant- gardes, and Dewey is the pivot.
Democracy and Education
Dewey’s thinking on democracy was forged in the pre– Progressive Era in Chicago 
in opposition to the dominant laissez- faire interpretation of Darwinism, pop-
u lar ized by Herbert Spencer’s phrase “the survival of the fittest,” and the atom-
istic conception of individualism that accompanied it.1 Exposed to the settle-
ment  house movement’s attempt to bridge class and cultural divisions through 
his involvement with Jane Addams’s Hull House and that organ ization’s par-
ticipation in campaigns for factory legislation and improved ser vices, Dewey’s 
commitment to Chicago’s reform movements resulted in the opening of the 
Laboratory School of the University of Chicago in 1896. The purpose of the 
so- called Dewey School was to test the proposition that the social reproduc-
tion of democracy required a properly demo cratic education.2 The most effec-
tive means of achieving this, for Dewey, was to emphasize collective problem- 
solving over the top- down delivery of information. As such, at the center of 
the curriculum was what Dewey called, in his 1899 book The School and Soci­
ety, the “occupation,” by which he meant “a mode of activity on the part of the 
child which reproduces, or runs parallel to, some form of work carried on in 
social life” (Dewey 1983, 92). By engaging in occupational activities, students 
 were expected to learn practical skills as well as gain an appropriate knowledge 
of all the subjects, from history through mathe matics, physics, biology, read-
ing, writing, and art and  music, required to fulfill the task. The acquisition of 
knowledge was driven by a need to develop the skills and use the tools necessary 
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to undertake an occupation. For Dewey, “ until the emphasis changes to the 
conditions which make it necessary for the child to take an active share in the 
personal building up of his own prob lems and to participate in methods of 
solving them (even at the expense of experimentation and error) mind is not 
 really freed” (quoted in Westbrook 1991, 103).
Among the common misrepre sen ta tions of Dewey’s pedagogy is that it 
is a model of child- centered learning and that it is mainly an argument for 
vocational training at the expense of intellectual inquiry, neither of which is 
accurate. The construction of an environment within which learning could 
be  shaped was a key component of Dewey’s sense of the teacher as a tireless 
agent in the development of character, and Dewey was a vocal critic of the 
child- centered education advocated by some Chicago reformers. On voca-
tional training, Dewey likewise was at odds with the growing demands for the 
inculcation of “industrial intelligence” in schools made by business leaders. 
Dewey’s problem- solving, occupation- based learning was conceived as a means 
of removing the distinction between culture and utility, not training for the 
workplace, and he was contemptuous of  those who claimed vocational educa-
tion was more demo cratic than traditional learning. “Nothing in the history 
of education is more touching,” wrote Dewey, “than to hear some successful 
leaders denounce as undemo cratic the attempts to give all the  children at pub-
lic expense the fuller education which their own  children enjoy as a  matter of 
course” (quoted in Westbrook 1991, 178). A reductive reading of Dewey’s edu-
cational philosophy that sees only  free play or instrumental training is pos si ble 
only if the operating princi ples underpinning Dewey’s thinking— that is, the 
overlapping virtues of science and democracy— are ignored.
Dewey claimed that Hegel had left a “permanent deposit” in his thinking, 
and the notion of Bildung shapes Dewey’s understanding of education as a pro-
cess of growth through experience.3 The German Bildung tradition’s insistence 
on the social nature of the self is crucial for Dewey, as is Hegel’s expansion 
of Bildung to include a challenge to superstition and tradition. While Dewey 
rejected the transcendental impulse in Hegel, the stress on conflict and strug-
gle— the perpetual encounter between consciousness and the world—is central 
to Dewey’s understanding of inquiry as embodied, dynamic, and prospective. 
Dewey’s combative re sis tance to binary thinking means that, for him,  there is 
no separation between theory and practice, knowing and  doing. The difficulty 
with this holism, however, is that it becomes hard to make any kind of distinc-
tion at all between one mode of operation and another. Science, democracy, 
ethics, education, aesthetics: for Dewey,  these are mutually supportive terms 
underpinned by a commitment to open- ended experiment grounded in “expe-
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rience,” the everyday interaction of the  human subject with the environment. 
One of the reasons Dewey has been misrepresented or misunderstood so often 
is that his preference for ordinary language over technical philosophical ter-
minology, not to mention his infamously longwinded style, means that his 
arguments lack the kind of precision that might inoculate them against reduc-
tive or inaccurate interpretations. Yet the fluidity with which Dewey moves 
between science and democracy, experience and aesthetics, however imprecise, 
is entirely in keeping with his rejection of hard edges that might wall off one 
term from another.
A Darwinian commitment to growth and change is never far from Dew-
ey’s thought, while scientific method, as an active means of advancing knowl-
edge, is conceived of as a social instrument capable of emancipatory trans-
formation (see, e.g., Metz 1969). What Darwin gave Dewey was a means of 
preserving Hegel’s notion of pro gress while ditching any sense that pro gress is 
inevitable. The strug gle in Darwin, for Dewey, is about finding ways to survive 
current conditions. This extends to philosophy and the overthrowing of out-
moded ideas. Old ideas, for Dewey, are more than just abstract forms; they are 
“habits, predispositions, deeply engrained attitudes of aversion and preference” 
(Dewey 1910b, 19) that “give way slowly” since the questions and alternative an-
swers are already anticipated by the framing of the idea. In fact, Dewey claims, 
“intellectual pro gress usually occurs through sheer abandonment of questions 
together with both of the alternatives they assume—an abandonment that re-
sults from their decreasing vitality and a change of urgent interest” (19). Old 
questions are not solved, Dewey concludes; “we get over them” (19).
Among the challenges posed in getting over the old questions is how to 
give proper weight to ideas and categories that have become narrowly instru-
mental. If education, for Dewey, is more than the acquisition of facts and skills, 
science is more than accumulated scientific knowledge and democracy is more 
than a system of government. For Dewey, it must be the job of inquiry to re-
sist the limitations of current definitions—an abandonment of the dominant 
paradigms framing the limits of the pos si ble. Dewey is clear that the current 
understanding of science is no less  limited and problematic than already ex-
isting democracy. Terms like “science” and “democracy,” for Dewey, have been 
degraded by their association with the inequalities produced by capitalism and 
must be reconstructed, along with philosophy, as functions of a dynamic liberal 
polity. Science, so conceived, is not a body of knowledge but a method of inquiry 
tethered intrinsically to the needs and desires of everyday life. In its most general 
form, Dewey divides inquiry into five steps: “(i) a felt difficulty, (ii) its loca-
tion and definition, (iii) suggestion of a pos si ble solution, (iv) development 
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by reasoning of the bearing of the suggestions, (v) further observation and ex-
periment leading to its ac cep tance or rejection” (Dewey 1910a, 72). The stress 
 here is on the experiential and material: difficulties are “felt,” located, and de-
fined; reasoning is not abstract but emerges in response to a concrete situation 
and leads to relays of experiment and observation. What is also striking is the 
re sis tance to any conclusive end to the pro cess. Indeed, for Dewey, reflective 
thinking “involves a willingness to endure a condition of  mental unrest and 
disturbance” that is not likely to abate: “To maintain the state of doubt and to 
carry on systematic and protracted inquiry— these are the essentials of think-
ing” (13). This notion of science as a perpetual pro cess of self- correcting inquiry 
underpins Dewey’s thinking on philosophy, education, politics, and art.
The influence of Dewey’s educational ideas extended beyond the US, 
notably among German educational reformers, and his notion of “learning 
by  doing” (Dewey 1916, 217) found its way into Bauhaus philosophy through 
Georg Kerschensteiner’s concept of Produktiver Arbeit and the Deutscher 
Werkbund industrial- design movement (see Díaz 2015, 46). In his Bauhaus- era 
writing, Josef Albers echoes Dewey’s critique of knowledge as the transmis-
sion of the accumulated opinions, methods, and rules of the past; as Eva Díaz 
comments, for Albers, like Dewey, “change was a privileged term” (47, original 
emphasis). Walter Gropius also sounds a distinctly Deweyan note in his 1923 
essay “The Theory and Organ ization of the Bauhaus,” where he rejects the “old 
dualistic world- concept which envisaged the ego in opposition to the universe” 
and notes the “dawning recognition of the essential oneness of all  things and 
their appearances” (Gropius 1938, 22). Gropius shares Dewey’s negative assess-
ment of the distortions produced by a narrow ends- oriented industrial econ-
omy, and argues that the solution depends on “a change in the individual’s at-
titude  toward his work” so that “machine- economy” is reconceived as “a means 
of freeing the intellect from the burden of mechanical  labor” (22). What the 
Bauhaus offered was an integration of art and craft with trade and industry that 
would end the reactionary partitioning of creativity, skill, and efficient produc-
tion, eliminating the rarefied enclosure that cultivated a useless, out- of- touch 
aestheticism divorced from experience and opening industry to the creative 
possibilities latent in technological modernity.
The Torpedo
Alfred Barr only spent four days in Dessau, but his 1927 visit to the Bauhaus 
school of art had a decisive impact on the  future director of the New York 
Museum of Modern Art (MoMA). Two years before his trip to Germany and 
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before completing his doctorate at Harvard, Barr was hired to teach art his-
tory at Wellesley College, where he offered the first- ever undergraduate course 
on modern art. While the course focused on painting, Barr introduced the 
study of design, architecture, film, sculpture, and photography to the class, 
expected students to read Vanity Fair, the New Yorker and the New Masses, 
and encouraged appreciation of factory buildings over museum visits.4 The 
Bauhaus visit did not make Barr a modernist but it confirmed his pedagogical 
practices. At Harvard, Barr had worked  under Paul  J. Sachs, associate direc-
tor of the Fogg Art Museum, an institution Sachs described as “a laboratory 
of the fine arts” (Kantor 2002, 56) due to the Fogg’s commitment to techni-
cal research and experimentation with new methods for the conservation and 
scrutiny of art works. An understanding of art as institutionally situated and 
produced through the mediation of a cadre of expert professionals primed Barr 
for the Bauhaus model of the arts as structurally unified and conversant with 
the methods and practices of the modern industrial world.
It was Sachs who recommended Barr as the first director of MoMA, 
though Barr’s vision of a multi- departmental museum devoted to, in addition 
to painting and sculpture, architecture, film, design, photography, commercial, 
and industrial art far exceeded what the original found ers had envisaged. Barr’s 
classificatory tendency, not to mention his teleological sense of the direction of 
modern art history, is captured in his famous “torpedo” diagrams of the “ideal 
permanent collection” (figure 1.1). In the first of  these, presented in 1933 as part 
of a long- range plan for building a collection, the torpedo’s propeller represents 
Eu ro pean and non- European “prototypes and sources.” Read chronologically 
from left to right, with the nose of the torpedo facing right, Barr’s timeline 
moves from 1850 to 1950, with significant artists and movements mapped across 
the body of the projectile.  There is still, in the 1933 drawing, plenty of space for 
the Eu ro pe ans alongside American and Mexican art at the 1950 nose. A new 
version of the diagram drafted in 1941, however, is more pared back in terms of 
notation and now the presence of the US and Mexico expands along a widen-
ing axis from just before the 1925 mark  until  these two countries occupy the 
entire front section of the torpedo. By 1950, according to the diagram, modern 
art (at least as far as MoMA is concerned)  will be exclusively represented by 
American (and Mexican) work. Modern art is a moving object, propelled by 
Eu ro pean energy but charged with an American payload.
The historical trajectory in Barr’s 1930s and 1940s projections is accurate 
enough in its expectation that American modernist art  will, by the 1950s, domi-
nate the field. Barr’s teleology, as well as his military- industrial trope of American 
art as the sharp end of US cultural hegemony, with MoMA as its institutional 
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centerpiece, are achieved facts soon enough. By this point, thanks in no small 
part to Barr’s advocacy, the Bauhaus had entered the American bloodstream 
and, alongside other selected strains of the Eu ro pean avant- garde, become a de-
fining influence on some of the most adventurous and utopian aspects of Cold 
War US culture. As a weaponized avant- garde, front- loaded with a US modern-
ism synthesized out of the thwarted experiments of the recent past and packed 
into a sleek projectile, Barr’s torpedo foreshadows what  will become a familiar 
postwar US narrative: the inheritor and guardian of the best of Eu ro pean inven-
tiveness has reengineered its components and rendered them  battle ready.
The movement Barr makes from the “laboratory” of Harvard’s Fogg 
Museum to the Dessau Bauhaus and then on to establish MoMA as a prime 
disseminator of Eu ro pean, and then American, modernism is in many ways 
a capsule lesson in how the Eu ro pean avant- garde found an institutional and 
cultural place in the postwar United States. The stress on an expanded defini-
Figure 1.1.  Alfred Ham-
ilton Barr’s “torpedo” 
diagrams of the ideal 
permanent  collection of 
the Museum of  Modern 
Art, as advanced in 
1933 (top) and in 1941 
(bottom). Prepared by 
Alfred H. Barr Jr. 
for the “Advisory 
 Committee Report on 
 Museum Collections,” 
1941. Offset, printed 
in black, 8� × 11 in. 
(20.3× 29.2 cm). 
 Alfred H. Barr Jr. 
 Papers, 9a.15, Museum 
of Modern Art Archives, 
New York. MA70. © 2019. 
Digital image, Museum 




tion of art along scientific lines in US institutions in the early twentieth  century 
is catalyzed through an encounter with the utopian modernist energies of the 
Eu ro pean avant- garde just as they are about to be canceled by the rise of fascism. 
Backed by American finance (Paul Sachs, as well as working for the Fogg, was a 
partner in Goldman Sachs, and the other MoMA found ers included Abby Al-
drich Rocke fel ler, wife of John D. Rocke fel ler Jr.), and seeded with émigré talent, 
modern art in the US is assimilated and distributed through elite institutions 
that, by the end of World War II, are able to serve as beacons of creative liberty 
and inheritors of the tradition of the new. The postwar expansion of higher edu-
cation in the US embeds the history of the avant- garde, as it has passed through 
the interpretive curatorial filter of institutions like MoMA, into American uni-
versities, reactivating the unfinished utopian proj ect in the Cold War US.
 There is much, then, in the Bauhaus philosophy that chimes with Dew-
ey’s anti- dualistic thinking, not only in the shared critique of the deadening 
effects of industrial  labor but in the broadly utopian conception of inquiry 
 free from disciplinary constraints as the agent of transformation. When John 
Andrew Rice founded Black Mountain College in 1933 following his dismissal 
from Rollins College in Winter Park, Florida, it was Dewey that provided 
the theoretical backbone, and Bauhaus émigrés who brought the  labor. The 
new college was modeled on Rice’s Deweyan commitment to an education 
stripped of constraining bureaucracy and artificial disciplinary bound aries. 
Louis Adamic captured the spirit of the enterprise in a 1936 article for Harper’s 
when he wrote, in full Deweyan flow, that at Black Mountain, “education is 
experience that involves in action the  whole person” (Adamic 1936, 519, original 
emphasis). Rice underscores the point in his autobiography: “Black Mountain 
was to be education for democracy” (Rice 1942, 327). Through connections 
at MoMA, Rice was able to recruit Josef and Anni Albers just as the Berlin 
Bauhaus closed. The Gestapo shut down the Bauhaus on April 11, 1933; the Al-
bers arrived in New York on November 24 (Danilowitz 2006). The fact that it 
was uncertain how the Black Mountain venture would work out actually ap-
pealed to the Albers, who  were encouraged by the description of the college in 
a letter of introduction from Theodore Dreier (another Rollins defector whose 
aunt Katherine was a patron of the avant- garde) as “pioneering” (Danilowitz 
2006).5 The open- ended, unformulated character of Black Mountain met both 
Deweyan and Bauhaus standards: an improvisatory, experimental environ-
ment unencumbered by conventional institutional or disciplinary hierarchies 





The core ele ment of Dewey’s thinking that animated Bauhaus and Black 
Mountain pedagogy was thinking by  doing, or what he called in Democracy 
and Education, “experience as experimentation” (1916, 317). While the “analy-
sis and rearrangement of facts . . .  is indispensable to the growth of knowledge 
and power of explanation and right classification,” it cannot, for Dewey, “be 
attained purely mentally— just inside the head” (321). To find something out, 
something has to be done, conditions have to be altered. This, claimed Dewey, 
“is the lesson of the laboratory method, and the lesson which all education has 
to learn” (321–322). The laboratory, he goes on, “is the discovery of the con-
ditions  under which  labor may become intellectually fruitful and not merely 
externally productive” (322, original emphasis).  Under Rice and Albers, Black 
Mountain modeled itself, in Deweyan fashion, as a laboratory in this sense, 
providing the conditions  under which experimentation might take place.7
As Eva Díaz explains, by the mid-1940s, the college “held experimentation 
to be a practice of changing ingrained habits of perception by testing the contin-
gency of form in controlled situations” (2015, 53). The precise nature, however, 
of what is meant by “experiment,” a term which comes to function in Dewey 
and  others as a code word for freedom, and as such, as intrinsically virtuous, is 
not always clear.  There is a difference, for example, between an experiment as 
a testing of previously formulated hypotheses and experiment as an innovative 
procedure, and Díaz identifies three models of experiment undertaken at Black 
Mountain: “the methodical testing of the appearance and construction of form 
in the interest of designing new, though ever- contingent, visual experiences 
(Albers); the organ ization of aleatory (chance- generated) pro cesses and the 
anarchical ac cep tance of indeterminacy (Cage); and ‘comprehensive, anticipa-
tory design science’ that tests traditional artistic and architectural forms, and 
embraces temporary failures, in order to teleologically pro gress  toward a uto-
pia of efficiently managed resources (Fuller)” (9). Though  these procedures are 
distinct in aims, methods, and outcomes, the exploratory, non- predetermined 
status of such activity is firmly within the bounds of Dewey’s understanding of 
the experiment, which did not mean, as Philip Mirowski reminds us, “mimick-
ing the  actual quotidian procedures of the physical scientists” (Mirowski 2004, 
296) but referred to what Dewey understood as “a certain logic of method” 
(Dewey 2016, 202).
 There is a shared embrace of contingency in  these methods and a prospec-
tive outlook that underpins the stress on pro cess.  There are, however, differ-
ences in relation to purpose. Albers and Fuller are committed to testing the 
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limits of conventional understanding; the experiment is simply the means of 
 doing so. They remain wedded to  matters of evaluation and improvement in 
way that Cage was not. For Cage, by contrast, the experiment is the work it-
self, with chance as the medium that determines the form the work takes. For 
Albers, experiment is a return to the study of materials in order to arrive at an 
understanding of what is pos si ble outside the constraints of established pro-
cesses. In a Bauhaus- era text called “Concerning Fundamental Design” that re-
veals the influence of Dewey, Albers writes that “To experiment is at first more 
valuable than to produce:  free play in the beginning develops courage . . .  Our 
aim is not so much to work differently as to work without copying or repeat-
ing  others. We try to experiment, to train ourselves in ‘constructive thinking’ ” 
(1938, 116). For Albers, the purpose of experiment is not innovation as such but 
the direct acquisition of understanding through action unhindered by pre ce-
dent. While experiments may yield innovations in application or treatment, or 
may result in methods already in use, the main  thing is that “we have arrived at 
them in de pen dently, through direct experience and they are our own  because 
they have been re- discovered rather than taught” (116).
Dewey’s major statement on aesthetics came surprisingly late in his  career. 
Initially delivered as a series of lectures at Harvard in 1932 and published in 
1934, Art as Experience rejects the compartmentalization of art as a distinct 
and separate sphere and charges philosophies of art as complicit in locating 
art “in a region inhabited by no other creature, and that emphasize beyond 
all reason the merely contemplative character of the esthetic” (Dewey 1980, 
10).8 For Dewey, art is an intrinsic aspect of everyday experience; the work of 
art “develops and accentuates what is characteristically valuable in  things of 
everyday enjoyment” (11). This is not to say that Dewey dissolves the category 
of art entirely into a generic notion of experience. Rather, it is the forms given 
to experience through interaction with the world that produces art.  Here, 
Dewey returns to a Darwinian notion of transformation: “ There is in nature, 
even below the level of life, something more than mere flux and change. Form 
is arrived at whenever a stable, even though moving, equilibrium is reached. 
Changes interlock and sustain one another” (14). The “rhythm” of discord and 
equilibrium experienced by the “live creature” in relation to the environment 
provides the conditions  under which the artist works. The artist, Dewey ex-
plains, “does not shun moments of re sis tance and tension. He rather cultivates 
them, not for their own sake but  because of their potentialities, bringing to 
living consciousness an experience that is unified and total” (15). The sense of 
completeness described  here, a unity and distinctiveness that constitutes the 
production of art out of experience, Dewey calls “an experience” (35, original 
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emphasis). Such an experience is distinguished by “a single quality that per-
vades the entire experience in spite of the variation of its constituent parts” 
(37, original emphasis). The kind of integral experience Dewey describes  here 
emerges out of the  doings and sufferings of everyday experience but is distinc-
tive within ordinary experience by virtue that it is somehow “finished in a way 
that is satisfactory”—it is a situation “so rounded out that its close is a consum-
mation and not a cessation” (35).
 There is not much discussion of art works in Art as Experience, which is 
more concerned with enlarging the field of the aesthetic to include everyday 
life than it is with addressing the narrow field of  actual works of art. This is a 
typical Dewey strategy, whereby the frame that defines the dualistic relation 
between two categories—in this case, art and non- art—is removed so that the 
properties of one are allowed to articulate the other. Art is repositioned so that 
it becomes experience, the artwork merely functioning as evidence of how the 
pro cess of experience is able to reach a consummatory stage. Though the influ-
ence of Art as Experience, in all its vagueness, is prob ably due as much to its 
role in providing an intellectual foundation of the Federal Arts Proj ect of the 
Works Pro gress Administration (wpa)  under director Holger Cahill as it is 
to its persuasiveness as aesthetic theory, Dewey’s account of the pro cess of ex-
perience as a kind of supercharged ordinariness nevertheless found a receptive 
readership among American artists. The wpa exposed Art as Experience to an 
entire generation of artists, and it became a key text for some Abstract Expres-
sionists, including Robert Motherwell, who briefly taught painting at Black 
Mountain in the 1940s and referred to Art as Experience as one of his “early 
bibles” (see Berube 1998; Buettner 1975). Albers, as we have already noted, was 
familiar with Dewey before he arrived in the US; a short article in En glish 
published in 1935, also called “Art as Experience,” underscored the influence of 
Dewey’s ideas on Albers’s thinking (Albers 1935).
Expertise and the Redefinition of Freedom
By the 1930s, then, Dewey’s influence extends across debates concerned, in 
terms of  matters of education policy, university curricula, and the public sup-
port of scientific research, with the relation between science and democracy, 
and, in the arts, with the broad relation between ordinary experience and the 
aesthetic. In this regard, Dewey’s thinking comes to shape the key preoccu-
pations of the emerging military- industrial and artistic avant- gardes in the 
de cades preceding World War II. By the end of the 1940s, however, Dewey’s 
conception of scientific democracy has been modified, eroded, and reformed 
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as corporate managerial liberalism, and his pro cessual understanding of art 
as experience is overtaken by the ascendancy of formalism in art criticism as 
the dominant mode of articulating the distinctiveness of American art. This is 
not to say that Dewey’s liberalism is entirely snuffed out, since its influence on 
Black Mountain continues to inform the work of John Cage, among  others. 
But the broad communitarianism of Dewey’s conception of democracy and 
the fluidity with which he imagines the interplay of science, technology, art, 
and everyday life in a  free society is increasingly reconceptualized within the 
remit of a diminished public sphere overseen by specialized expertise. The ho-
lism of Dewey’s philosophy is traceable, perhaps, in the rise of systems theory 
and cybernetics, and also in the growing popularity of Gestalt philosophy in 
the arts and social sciences. Yet it was not  until the 1960s that radical edu-
cationalists and  others retrieved Dewey’s thinking. By this point, the kind of 
progressivism  imagined by Dewey during the 1920s and 1930s, a mode of social 
democracy to the left of the New Deal and targeted at the power of American 
corporate wealth and influence, had access only to the fringes of mainstream 
debate. Despite the vari ous Dewey revivals of the latter half of the twentieth 
 century, the center of gravity in American politics had moved decisively to the 
right, and Dewey’s reputation as a radical phi los o pher never properly recov-
ered from the distortions and misunderstandings his work engendered.
Part of the prob lem with Dewey’s position is that his language of coop-
eration, adjustment, and problem- solving can easily be construed to suggest 
compliance, adaptation, and narrow functionalism. While Dewey’s arguments 
are often explic itly targeted against the iniquities of emerging corporatism 
and stress the reimagining, as opposed to the reinforcement, of social habits 
and practices, Dewey’s commitment to democracy as an essentially optimis-
tic mode of emancipatory creativity and inquiry often fails to account for the 
structural intractability of vested interests and inequalities. For Dewey  there is 
no injustice that cannot be overcome through the application of the ideologi-
cally neutral scientific method, broadly conceived as the on- the- ground test-
ing of possibilities. Dewey’s notion of science as a par tic u lar stance  toward the 
world bears  little relation to the instrumentalized science of the Cold War, yet 
the adventurous US techno- utopianism of the 1950s and 1960s can often look 
remarkably similar to Dewey’s demo cratic spirit of invention. The promise of 
a  great community, uninhibited by old ideas, experimenting its way into the 
 future, could just as easily capture the spirit of postwar corporate liberalism as 
it does the ethos of Black Mountain College. Among the dangers of Dewey’s 
loose- limbed sense of experience as a progressive, experimental practice is 
the way in which it can also be construed as an articulation of technocratic 
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individualism. While the demo cratic socialist position Dewey developed dur-
ing the 1920s and 1930s (he was critical of the New Deal as insufficiently radical 
and designed mainly to prop up capitalism) advocated public control of major 
industries and government oversight of the economy for the general welfare of 
the population, Dewey’s faith in science is often understood as scientistic and 
his politics merely weakly reformist. What Dewey was surprisingly unprepared 
to acknowledge, given his deep understanding of the social basis of education, 
was that the form that science takes is also determined by the historical cir-
cumstances within which it is articulated.  Here he might have learned from 
Thorstein Veblen, who noted in 1918 that, as with historical phases of civiliza-
tion, even “the latest, and in the mind of its keepers the most mature, system of 
knowledge”  will derive “its character and its scope and method from the habits 
of life of the group, from the institutions with which it is bound in a web of give 
and take” (Veblen 1918, 2).
By the mid-1940s, as Mirowski observes, Dewey’s model of science as 
democracy was not only untenable but “unintentionally provided the major 
resource for certain more pointed and virulent doctrines on the social relations 
of science” that developed during the Cold War (2004, 297). Black Mountain 
managed, briefly, to capture something of the emancipatory promise encoded 
in Dewey’s conception of a post- disciplinary,  free inquiry– driven, collectivist 
education as the platform for a thoroughgoing reconstruction of democracy. 
At the same time, however, the Black Mountain model reproduced some of the 
challenges that trou ble Dewey’s ideas. Among  these was the absence of a criti-
cal perspective from which to approach science and technology as they  were 
constituted in the mid- twentieth- century US and, not unrelated, the question 
of expertise and hierarchy. In many ways, Black Mountain College reproduced, 
admittedly in an idiosyncratic form, the institutional formations characteristic 
of the emergent research universities in the period following World War II. 
The notions of collective investigation, unimpeded freedom of inquiry, and the 
cultivation of elite expertise within a protected, self- legitimating environment, 
are attributes the science lab and the liberal arts college shared.9 Charismatic 
figures like Josef Albers, Buckminster Fuller, and Charles Olson are likewise 
versions of the elite research scientist and prone to cultish discipleship. While 
the collaborative spirit at Black Mountain drew upon the radical critique of 
individual genius derived from the original Bauhaus and the communitarian 
outlook of Dewey’s repurposed, socially responsive individualism, the presid-
ing model of collective endeavor dominant throughout most of Black Moun-
tain’s lifetime,  shaped by the New Deal but forged in World War II, remained 
prone to the hierarchical, patriarchal tendencies of its military- industrial 
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counter parts. It is in the context of an emerging corporate sense of collective 
enterprise— the prime example  here would be the hot  house of the Manhattan 
Proj ect— that Black Mountain reveals itself to be, at the same time, radically 
at odds with, yet remarkably close to, the group dynamic characteristic of the 
Cold War lab.10
The self- segregating laboratory of experts is far away from Dewey’s notion 
of scientific democracy as the  great collective experiment in freedom, and the 
kind of interdisciplinary collaboration envisaged by 1945 was as much about 
protecting the autonomy of advanced inquiry from the predilections of an ill- 
informed public. Part of the prob lem  here is that Dewey’s notion of a scientific 
democracy had  little to do with the scientific community as it was actually con-
stituted and served more as a projected model of what a generalized scientific 
method might mean for social organ ization. As Andrew Jewett notes, “the 
core assumption that citizens could harmonize modern economic and social 
forms with demo cratic po liti cal control by drawing on scientific resources was 
not a logical deduction from scientific practice, but rather a po liti cal tenet,” as 
was the notion that the community of scientists might serve “as a model for 
demo cratic deliberation” (2012, 371). While the identification of science with 
democracy did not dis appear, and was central to, for example, Robert Merton’s 
1942 outline of the four core values of the scientific ethos (universalism, com-
munism, disinterestedness, and or ga nized skepticism), the general distribution 
of creative agency in Dewey’s expansive model of science (and democracy) 
was significantly pared back (Merton 1973; see also Allen and Hecht 2001, 
6–7; Hollinger 1983; Wang 1999b, 2002). James Conant’s meritocratic model 
of general education is one example, where the pool of college entrants was 
expanded beyond narrow class interests by the introduction of standardized 
testing, thereby making access to elite institutions notionally more demo cratic 
while preserving the institution’s exclusive status.
Conant was skeptical of what he saw as the inflated claims made for the 
scientific method as it had come to be understood by the 1940s, thanks in no 
small part to Dewey. Rather than a description of professional practice, Conant 
complained, the scientific method had come to be seen “as a way of looking at 
life; at times it seems almost a panacea for social prob lems” (quoted in Mc-
Grath 2002, 106–107). For Conant, it was the institutions of science and not 
its methods that  were impor tant, since it was through institutions that ideas 
 were generated and circulated. Like Vannevar Bush, Conant wanted the public 
to understand enough science to be deferential  toward the experts and institu-
tions that practiced it.11 The uncoupling of science from the public, the  union 
of which was so central to Dewey’s understanding of a scientific democracy, 
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in effect produces the notion of the “scientific community,” a notion David 
Hollinger argues only came into everyday use during the 1960s, despite the 
long history of science as a collective enterprise. The reason for this new pub-
lic awareness of the scientific community, claims Hollinger, is that  after World 
War II, scientists “found themselves enmeshed in a system of capital- intensive 
research funded by a government responsive to popu lar po liti cal pressures and 
preoccupied with military priorities” (Hollinger 1990, 900; see also Hollinger 
1995).  Because science was eco nom ically dependent upon the public and wary 
of military encroachment upon academic freedom, scientists increasingly saw 
themselves as a po liti cal constituency. As a clearly identified “community,” 
however, scientists could now be perceived as an untouchable elite (by a pub-
lic suspicious of the consequences of scientific inquiry and its technological 
applications) and, si mul ta neously, as a collectivity constituted by a purported 
academic freedom that was also increasingly threatened by the demands placed 
upon it by its paymasters.
It is this latter position, of the scientific community as endangered by the 
instrumentalizing claims made upon it by its po liti cal and military backers, that 
prompted Vannevar Bush’s 1945 defense of scientific freedom in Science— The 
Endless Frontier. Bush was director of the war time Office of Scientific Research 
and Development (osrd) and, postwar, understood the need for science to be 
or ga nized for the purposes of peace. To some degree, Bush shared with Dewey 
a belief in a planning society, though the conservative Bush’s call for the organ-
ization of science was less interested in socialism than Roo se velt’s New Deal 
had been.12 Nonetheless, Bush was invited by the president in 1944 to pre sent 
recommendations on how to or ga nize science with a view to “advance the gen-
eral welfare,” including a program of medical research, aid to public and private 
institutions, and a plan to develop scientific talent in American youth (quoted 
in Kevles 1977, 17). Science— The Endless Frontier, based on the findings of four 
committees charged with developing Roo se velt’s request, is Bush’s response.
The instrumentalism of Bush’s defense of science was predicated on free-
dom but the argument in Science— The Endless Frontier is hardly comparable 
to Dewey’s Hegelian conception of the development of self through dynamic 
inquiry, though Bush’s argument in  favor of academic freedom remained un-
derpinned by an appeal to demo cratic virtues. So long, wrote Bush, “as scien-
tists are  free to pursue the truth wherever it may lead,  there  will be a flow of 
new scientific knowledge to  those who can apply it to practical prob lems in 
Government, in industry, or elsewhere” (Bush 1960, 12). The dependence of 
 those who pursue truth on the protection of government guarantees the flow 
of knowledge to  those most able to apply it, but the pursuit of truth itself must 
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be beyond the control of government. As such, scientific research becomes 
not only a resource but an embodiment of the values of demo cratic freedom: 
the pursuit of truth is, in a sense, ungovernable even as it remains the primary 
responsibility of government. “Scientific pro gress,” Bush made clear, “results 
from the  free play of  free intellects, working on subjects of their own choice, 
in the manner dictated by their curiosity for exploration of the unknown” 
(12). The instrumental benefits of scientific research, then, are underwritten 
by a resolutely non- instrumentalized conception of the conditions that make 
research pos si ble. Bush’s notion of the “ free play of  free intellects” driven by 
curiosity could serve as a description of Dewey’s notion of progressive educa-
tion or a shorthand for the ethos of Black Mountain College, but it is a con-
ception of freedom evacuated of the promise of public distribution. While the 
general population was at liberty to consume the practical applications that 
might spin out of scientific research, the activity of science itself must remain 
out of bounds.
The redefinition of freedom, by technocrats like Bush, as the fenced- off 
space of privilege for experts bears comparison with the re orientation of Amer-
ican art in the early postwar period. The investigative, experimental model of 
the aesthetic outlined by Dewey in Art and Experience was not bound by a 
conception of art predetermined by the activity of artists. Although their 
circumstances and aims may have differed, at both the Bauhaus and at Black 
Mountain, the stress was placed on a relational, comparative approach to 
materials that did not  favor one medium or skill set over another. Yet, as Jef-
frey Saletnik argues, the “sensory- integrated practices of Bauhaus preliminary 
instruction, although still essential to the training of artists and designers,  were 
denuded of value in their American context due in part to the specialized ten-
dencies that came to dominate American art criticism following World War 
II” (2009, 83). Clement Greenberg’s stress on the autonomous art object, the 
importance of medium specificity, and the priority of painting and of the op-
tical, set formalism at odds with the pro cessual interdisciplinarity and haptic 
performativity that characterized activity at Black Mountain. “Not much art 
came out of Black Mountain,” Greenberg noted (quoted in Díaz 2015, 56), only 
some famous names, and though he taught  there briefly in 1950 on Willem de 
Kooning’s recommendation, Greenberg soon left. He was not wrong, though, 
since “art” as Greenberg understood it was not  really the point of Black Moun-
tain. The par ameters of what constituted art  under Greenberg’s formalism sug-
gests, like Bush’s or Conant’s model of science, a protective containment of 
specialist knowledge within the walled garden, the only site where  free play is 




The National Security Act of 1947 expanded and centralized the federal gov-
ernment’s civilian authority over defense and intelligence operations, with the 
president as commander- in- chief. The army, navy, and air force  were unified 
 under the authority of the National Military Establishment (replaced by the 
Department of Defense [DoD] in 1949), headed by a civilian secretary of de-
fense. Inside the DoD, President Truman also united all signals intelligence 
 under the National Security Agency (nsa). All aspects of the national security 
state— DoD, nsa, cia, and the National Security Council— were now routed 
through the Oval Office, and the president was positioned to be able to coordi-
nate technology policy in relation to  these institutions.
By the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, following the Soviet blockade 
of Berlin, the “fall” of China, and the first successful Soviet nuclear test, com-
munism was no longer merely perceived as a subversive danger but a direct 
military threat. In response, the top secret “National Security Council Report 
68” (also known as nsc-68) outlined plans for a rapid and massive American 
military buildup, plans President Eisenhower pursued during the 1950s 
through developing a decentralized procurement policy, based in part on the 
war time system of contracting out, in alliance with the private sector. The aim, 
for Eisenhower, was to build on the integration of civilian and military exper-
tise that won World War II and allow each sector to more properly understand 
the needs and capabilities of the other. It was the job of the government, as 
Eisenhower saw it, to take the initiative in promoting development and, he 
explained, “our duty to support broad research programs in educational in-
stitutions, in industry, and in what ever field might be of importance to the 
Army” (quoted in Weiss 2014 28–29; see also Melman 1970). It was now the 
state’s job, as Linda Weiss puts it, “to guarantee U.S. technological leadership”; 
the national- security- state vision of innovation enterprise was “permanent pre-
paredness in pursuit of perpetual innovation” (2014, 29). Defense- led r&d 
was now embedded in the civilian economy, transforming the role of com-
panies and universities. Though Eisenhower famously had cause to doubt the 
wisdom of this thoroughgoing integration of civilian and military enterprise, 
as his farewell address in 1961 attests, it is largely through his encouragement of 
public- private partnership that universities like mit and Stanford  were able to 
develop into r&d power houses.
When Eisenhower warned, in 1961, that  under the conditions established 
by the military- industrial complex, “government contract becomes virtually a 
substitute for intellectual curiosity,” he was, somewhat belatedly, expressing a 
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concern for academic freedom that had been at the heart of Vannevar Bush’s 
writings during the 1940s. Bush accepted the militarization of society and the 
need for federal funding of science, but he was clear in his defense of the need 
for intellectual freedom for scientists. In Modern Arms and  Free Men (1949), 
a book aimed at making the case for public support for  free scientific inquiry 
funded by the state, Bush began by raising the threat of another war. Outlining 
the new technologies of war and the possibility of as yet unimaginable  future 
developments, Bush admitted that the prospect of grasping the implications 
could be overwhelming. Yet, he wrote, it is not acceptable to “take refuge in the 
assertion that  these  matters are for specialists” (Bush 1949, 3); as a democracy, 
it behooves the public to grasp the seriousness of the situation and choose re-
sponsible leaders capable of sound judgment. Amid the swirl of opinion and 
argument, for Bush  there  were two key points of focus: science and democracy. 
The two, wrote Bush, “are intimately entwined, for science does not operate 
in a vacuum, but is conditioned by the po liti cal system that controls its opera-
tions and applications” (5). For Amer i ca to prevail, Bush argued, it is impera-
tive that the public has confidence in the virtue of scientific endeavor and its 
necessity in preserving the demo cratic way of life. World War II demonstrated, 
Bush claimed, that the collective  will could support and harness science and 
technology in pursuit of victory from tyranny. The postwar world, he insisted, 
must continue to trust in science as an intrinsic function of democracy. While, 
unlike Dewey, Bush did not claim that all citizens  ought to become scientists 
(according to Dewey’s broad understanding of science as a stance  toward the 
world), he did insist upon the necessity for education as the engine of pro gress 
in science—we may not all become experts but we must embrace the collective 
responsibility to nurture expertise among us.
Modern Arms and  Free Men was part of a broader postwar push to foster 
public support for science as a  matter of urgent national security, to explain why 
advanced scientific research was now in the public interest and warranted gov-
ernment expenditure. Bush’s argument that the triumph of American productive 
capacity during World War II could be continued in peacetime, and his assurance 
that “the hopeful aspects of modern applied science outweigh by a heavy mar-
gin the threat to our civilization” (Bush 1949, 2), would become the standard 
US Cold War consensus narrative, the backbone of postwar consumer culture’s 
techno- futurism, and the primary evidence of Amer i ca’s virtuous place in the 
global order as the beacon of liberty and benign police presence. Bush made 
the federal funding of science and technology r&d for the military- industrial 
state seem reasonable and necessary. He also carved out a special place for sci-
entists as  those whose freedom must be protected and trusted.
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At least  until the mid-1960s, Bush’s view of what the public’s position on 
science should be held firm, though it was not public opinion that threatened 
“intellectual curiosity” for Eisenhower but business interests skewing innova-
tion away from the common good and  toward corporate profit. Bush’s concern 
for scientific freedom spoke mostly in defense of “basic science” and, at least for 
physicists and mathematicians (the postwar scientific elite least willing to give 
up the status and authority they had acquired saving the world from fascism), 
this special dispensation was granted, according to Mirowski, through the in-
vention of “operational research” (or) as “the empirical template for the idea of 
a free- floating ‘scientific community,’ distinguished by its possession of a special 
expertise rooted in a generic ‘scientific method,’ subsisting with a fair degree of 
autonomy within but apart from a larger social community” (2004, 301).
For Mirowski, it is or that secured the relationship between scientists 
and the state, providing the “intellectual firepower” with which to engineer a 
new society comfortable with the entwined relationship between science and 
the military (302). It is this “scientific community” of experts that framed the 
Cold War’s logical positivist philosophy of science and provided the context 
within which social science, driven to find a respectable home among the hard 
scientists, constructed a new articulation of modern democracy out of neo-
classical economics and theories of decision- making, rational choice, organ-
ization, and management. Eisenhower’s facilitation of university- based defense 
contract work, despite his farewell worries, made conditions favorable for sci-
entists to position themselves as separate from the sharp- end of military affairs 
while drawing on the considerable funds defense r&d made available. Already 
implicit in Bush’s defense of “basic” science was the notion of a far- from- 
democratic priesthood detached from ordinary affairs and beyond oversight.
The proliferation of federally funded research and development centers 
(ffrdcs), including research labs, test sites, and think tanks, was, as Bush en-
visioned in his defense of  free inquiry, driven by a commitment to speculative 
thinking and experimentation— this was a genuine interdisciplinary, hi- tech 
avant- garde. As Stuart Leslie explains, “The ‘golden triangle’ of military agen-
cies, the high technology industry, and research universities created a new kind 
of postwar science, one that blurred traditional distinctions between theory 
and practice, science and engineering, civilian and military, and classified and 
unclassified, one that owed its character as well as its contracts to the national 
security state” (1993, 2). The synergies among government, corporate, and edu-
cation institutions  were well- established by the 1960s, producing an interlock-
ing network of organ izations through which resources, personnel, and ideas 
could circulate.  After his landslide victory of 1964, President Johnson confi-
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dently aimed to extend the rational methods of corporate planning to fixing 
Amer i ca’s social prob lems. Think tanks like rand turned their attention to 
social issues, and the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act 
of 1965 created new federal agencies to support research, education, and public 
programs in the US.
The National Endowment for the Humanities (neh) and the National 
Endowment for the Arts (nea)  were intended to fulfill the declared findings of 
Congress, stated in the act, that “a high civilization must not limit its efforts to 
science and technology alone but must give full value and support to the other 
 great branches of man’s scholarly and cultural activity” (sec. 2). Furthermore, 
the act announced that “democracy demands wisdom and vision in its citizens 
and that it must therefore foster and support a form of education designed to 
make men masters of their technology and not its unthinking servant” (sec. 2). 
Though the act conceded that while “no government can call a  great artist or 
scholar into existence,” it is “necessary and appropriate” for the government 
“to help create and sustain not only a climate encouraging freedom of thought, 
imagination, and inquiry but also the material conditions facilitating the re-
lease of this creative talent” (sec. 2). Fi nally, just to make sure that the message 
is properly underscored, the act reminds the reader that “the world leadership 
which has come to the United States cannot rest solely upon superior power, 
wealth, and technology, but must be solidly founded upon worldwide re spect 
and admiration for the Nation’s high qualities as a leader in the realm of ideas 
and of the spirit” (sec. 2). This is power ful rhe toric and, from an early twenty- 
first  century standpoint, remarkable in its acknowledgement that the necessary 
health of the arts and humanities for “a high civilization” requires government 
support. While the general spirit of the National Foundation on the Arts and 
the Humanities Act is in keeping with Conant’s (rather than Dewey’s) concep-
tion of the arts as a civilizing counterweight to science and technology, it nev-
ertheless radiates demo cratic benevolence, right through to the desire to lead 
in the realms of ideas and spirit.
US techno- optimism and the country’s confident global outlook crested 
sometime around the creation of the nea in September 1965. The trough was 
to be steep. Johnson began the systematic bombing of North Vietnam, called 
Operation Rolling Thunder, in February 1965, and ground forces  were increased 
by 150  percent by the end of June. Two months  later, the African- American neigh-
borhood of Watts in Los Angeles exploded in rebellion on August 11, five days  after 
Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act into law. “To be an American engineer in 
the aftermath of World War II,” writes Matthew Wisnioski, “had been to look 
upon a seemingly limitless  future,” and in the name of democracy “engineers 
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found government patronage on the frontiers of electronics, aeronautics, and 
nuclear power that swelled the profession’s ranks” (2012, 3). By 1968, however, 
science and technology had come to be seen by many as sinister, nihilistic, and 
death- driven. “Never before,” Wisnioski notes, “had technological power ap-
peared si mul ta neously so autonomous and so inextricable from po liti cal power, 
and not since the machine- breaking uprisings of the early nineteenth  century 
had so many citizens perceived technology as a force to be resisted” (4).
Creativity contra Conformity
At the heart of all the art- and- technology initiatives discussed  here is a con-
ception of creativity as an intrinsic good. This sense is shared not only among 
artists but by the scientists, engineers, executives, and administrators prepared 
to develop relations across what C. P. Snow (1965) infamously called the “two 
cultures.” Certainly, Snow’s timely contribution to the discussion of what mod-
ern society might consider to be of shared value, delivered two years  after the 
launch of Sputnik triggered a wave of soul- searching and government spend-
ing aimed at closing the tech gap with the Soviets, provided part of the con-
text within which artists, scientists, and engineers sought common ground. 
Creativity, a suitably nebulous term with  little in the way of negative baggage, 
serves all comers.
In the context of the early postwar period, democracies like the US  were 
faced with the seemingly contradictory challenges of maintaining unity and 
protecting individual autonomy. Modern mass society was evidently capable of 
producing a dangerously conformist, de- individuated culture, as Eu ro pean fas-
cism and Soviet communism demonstrated. The main distinction Americans 
usually made between the United States and the Soviet Union was that the 
former encouraged individual autonomy. Anx i eties surrounding the creeping 
conformism of con temporary life therefore did not sit well with the notion of 
the US as a dynamic society of  free agents. On the other hand, the increased 
complexity of modern life was often associated with the heterogeneity of the 
American population in terms not only of race, religion, and ethnicity but also 
with regard to ways of life and forms of knowledge. The fragmentary nature 
of American society posed a serious challenge to the cultivation of a coherent 
set of shared values. The US was, it seemed, at the same time a society of frag-
mentary and mobile constituencies and of power ful conformist tendencies. 
For many intellectuals, educationalists, social scientists and policy- makers it 
was clear that authoritarianism fed on the isolation and lack of shared purpose 
experienced by a disunited  people.
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While the complexity of modern life required, as had fighting the war, the 
expert and specialized management of resources and populations, the growth 
of bureaucracy and homogeneity that came with good management threatened 
to flatten out long- cherished American demo cratic virtues, including the pio-
neering spirit exemplified in individual enterprise. During the 1950s, confor-
mity in its corporate and suburban forms became a widespread concern that 
turned so cio log i cal studies such as David Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd (1950), 
C. Wright Mills’s White Collar (1951), and William H. Whyte Jr.’s The Organ­
ization Man (1956) into bestsellers, along with Sloan Wilson’s novel The Man 
in the Gray Flannel Suit (1955), which became a successful film the following 
year starring Gregory Peck.
In order to  counter modern society’s conformist tendencies and the mod-
ern individual’s vulnerability  toward acquiescence, what was required was the 
development of qualities that resisted unthinking obedience to authority while 
remaining grounded in the sense of a common goal. The work undertaken by 
psychologists concerned with what the most influential study of its kind called 
the “authoritarian personality” (Adorno et al. 1950) developed a set of tools 
designed to identify character traits associated with authoritarian sympathies. 
Authoritarian types, Adorno and his co- authors claimed in The Authoritar­
ian Personality,  were similar to one another, uncritical of and unreflectively 
obedient to authority, prone to ste reo typed and prejudiced thinking, rigid, 
intolerant of ambiguity, and narrow- minded to the point of irrationality. By 
contrast, and  here the emergence of a healthy antithesis to the pathological au-
thoritarian seems to arrive almost as a relief, the demo cratic character is charac-
terized as diverse in attitudes and background, autonomous and reflective, and 
capable of exercising reason when confronted with complex and ambiguous 
ideas. In short, as Jamie Cohen- Cole explains, The Authoritarian Personality 
“concluded that autonomy allowed individuals not only to be true to themselves 
but also to maintain a connection with truth and real ity. Conformity, on the 
other hand, produced only lies and errors in vision, memory, or logic” (2014, 43).
In a particularly florid articulation of the dangers of conformity, Illinois 
governor and two- time Demo cratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson 
charged the female students of Smith College, in his commencement address 
of June 6, 1955, with the duty to nurture, in their  future roles as  house wives and 
 mothers, “not just ‘well- adjusted,’ ‘well- balanced’ personalities” or “better grou-
pers and conformers” but “more idiosyncratic, unpredictable characters (that 
rugged frontier word ‘ornery’ occurs to me);  people who take open eyes and 
open minds out with them into the society which they  will share and help to 
transform” (Stevenson 1955a, 196). Framing domestic life as the frontline in the 
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 battle between collectivism and individualism, as well as reviving nineteenth- 
century notions of female moral guardianship that would make Stevenson’s 
commencement speech a target in Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique (first 
published in 1963), Stevenson reached back to antiquity in order to track the 
swings of the historical pendulum as it arcs back and forth between freedom 
and bondage.14
Since “tribal life” gave way to the emergence of the individual in Greek 
and Judaic thought (the “origins of Western civilization”), the strug gle to 
achieve a  free society, claimed Stevenson, had been “at all times a precarious 
and audacious experiment.” Out of “medieval bondage”  rose science, reason, 
and the rebirth of individualism in the Reformation and the Re nais sance, he 
went on, producing “an almost explosive expansion of  mental horizons” (Steven-
son 1955a, 195). But, “as always,” the pendulum swung too far and produced, in 
the twentieth  century, extreme “social fragmentation” and “abstract intellectu-
alism” that developed into a “power ful drive”  toward “totalitarian collectivism” 
(195). As broad and reductively teleological as Stevenson’s diagnosis was in the 
speech, his suspicion of narrow specialization as the corrosive agent of atom-
izing alienation and the redemptive power he identified in “the cultivation of 
more mature values” articulated a widely held sense that creativity should oper-
ate as the defining virtue of a  free society: “we  will defeat totalitarian, authori-
tarian ideas only by better ideas; we  will frustrate the evils of vocational spe-
cialization only by the virtues of intellectual generalities” (196). In his appeal 
to open eyes, open minds, and intellectual generalities, Stevenson was in line 
with the psychological studies of creativity conducted since World War II that 
stressed open- mindedness, in de pen dence of thought, and tolerance of ambigu-
ity as indicators of good character and robust  mental health.
The same princi ples motivated Harvard University,  under its president 
James Conant, to draft General Education in a  Free Society (often known as 
the “Red Book”), published in 1945 and intended as a template for a demo-
cratic education in a time of increased bureaucratic expertise. A chemist who 
also worked on the Manhattan Proj ect, Conant understood that the compre-
hension of modern science was beyond the reach of many  people and that a 
basic scientific knowledge, fortified by the cultivation of morality through the 
humanities, was the best means of nurturing a pro- science demo cratic society. 
Specialization might be a necessary aspect of a complex society, and Conant 
was a firm defender of expertise, but the Red Book insists that education “must 
look to the  whole man” (huc 1950, 74) and include the cultivation of “in-
stincts and sentiments as well as the intellect” (75). The challenge of combining 
an “alert and aggressive individualism” with the willingness of citizens “to sub-
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ordinate their individual good to the common good,” the Red Book continues, 
“is one of the hardest tasks facing our society” (77). A  free society requires the 
toleration that comes from “openness of mind” and also conviction stemming 
from belief and princi ple, yet, as the Red Book concedes, toleration and con-
viction “seem incompatible” (77). “How far,” the reader is asked to consider, 
“should we go in the direction of the open mind?” (78). The proposed answer 
is to acknowledge a dialectical— though the word itself is not used— relation 
between tolerance and conviction: “each must have something of the other” if 
toleration is not to become nihilism and thus prevent conviction turning into 
dogmatism (78).
The challenge of modulating the extremes of tolerance and conviction is 
the task Stevenson charged the  future wives and  mothers of Smith College to 
undertake in their cultivation of the next generation of “ornery” Americans. 
The successful negotiation of individual and collective needs required a mode 
of socialization that produced well- adjusted yet idiosyncratic citizens capable 
of challenging authority, but also willing to subordinate individual  will to the 
common good. Furthermore, while modern life necessitated the acquisition of 
specialized, expert knowledge, this must be moderated through the cultivation 
of a general moral sense. As difficult as this task sounds, what is clear from the 
Red Book’s model of general education and Stevenson’s view of the  house wife’s 
duties is that creativity is not innate but is socially produced. If creativity was 
a sign of good health that was derived through interaction with  others, it was 
in contrast to the idea of genius, with its associations with  mental disorder and 
social isolation.
The antidote to conformity lay, for many, in the preservation of individual 
freedom made pos si ble by American democracy. For psychologist and presi-
dent of the Car ne gie Corporation of New York, John W. Gardner, so long as 
individuals  were able to pursue their natu ral curiosity, American society and its 
institutions would remain capable of “self- renewal” and avoid blind obedience 
to stultifying habit and outmoded tradition. “When we speak of the individual 
as a source of renewal,” wrote Gardner, “we call to mind the magic word cre­
ativity— a word of dizzying popularity at the moment. It is more than a word 
 today; it is an incantation” (1965, 32). Despite the “national vice” that tends to 
“corrupt and vulgarize” fresh or relevant new ideas, creativity “is more than a 
fad” for Gardner since it represents “part of a growing re sis tance to the tyranny 
of the formula, a new re spect for individuality, a dawning recognition of the 
potentialities of the liberated mind” (32). Delivered in the year he became secre-
tary of health, education, and welfare in the Johnson administration, Gardner’s 
defense of creativity insisted that the attribute was not the preserve of a small 
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minority, nor was creativity coterminous with intelligence. “Each of us knows at 
least one bright person,” he reassures the reader, “who is essentially no more origi-
nal or innovative than one of the more accomplished computers” (33). Gardner 
is convinced, however, that many  people “could achieve fairly impressive levels of 
creativity  under favorable circumstances” (33) since creativity is “pos si ble in most 
forms of  human activity” (34). The confidence Gardner was able to place in the 
virtues of creativity in 1965 was backed up by twenty years of intensive research 
into creativity by American psychologists that sought to understand and access 
the untapped natu ral resource that appeared to stand in opposition to the narrow 
and rigid obedience characteristic of the authoritarian personality.
Work on the psy chol ogy of creativity grew in the years following World 
War II as agencies like the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Sci-
ence Foundation sought to identify the most promising  future nuclear scien-
tists. The Institute of Personality Assessment and Research (ipar) at Berkeley 
began a major research proj ect aimed at developing standards for evaluating 
creativity in 1949 with support from the Car ne gie Corporation and the Rocke-
fel ler Foundation (Cohen- Cole 2014, 44). By the mid-1950s, J.  P. Guilford, 
who had worked on assessing the intellectual abilities of aircrew trainees during 
World War II, had developed what he called the structure- of- intellect model of 
 human aptitudes, which went beyond conventional intelligence tests in order 
to map a three- dimensional structure of 120 diff er ent intellectual abilities 
(Ogata 2013, 16). Twenty- four of Guilford’s personality traits  were components 
of what he influentially called “divergent thinking,” or the capacity to come 
up with many potential solutions to a prob lem, in contrast to the “convergent 
thinking,” or one correct answer, typical of what is thought of as intelligence. 
Guilford’s work prompted an expansion of research into creativity during the 
late 1950s and 1960s, including the development by E. Paul Torrance at the 
University of Minnesota of what became known as the Torrance Tests of Creative 
Thinking, and a series of studies by Jacob W. Getzles and Philip W. Jackson, at 
what was originally the Dewey Laboratory School at the University of Chicago, 
into creativity and intelligence.
What emerged from this research was a growing consensus that the en-
couragement of creativity in early life could have a significant impact on long- 
term professional success and a capacity for problem- solving that was not nec-
essarily tied to conventional mea sures of what constituted high intelligence. 
Faced with the recent memory of authoritarian, ultra- conformist regimes and 
the prospect of a  future conflict with another that might bring about unpre-
ce dented global destruction, creativity research was far from an experiment in 
progressive education and driven instead by the imperative to find in American 
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demo cratic society a decisive edge. Psychologist Carl Rogers claimed in 1954 
that “international annihilation  will be the price we pay for a lack of creativity” 
(quoted in Sawyer 2006, 41), and the sense of high stakes remained a staple 
of pronouncements made by creativity researchers, not least  after the success-
ful launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union in 1957. A Look magazine article 
on creativity from 1961, for example, quoted Torrence’s claim: “The  future of 
our civilization— our very survival— depends upon the creative thinking of our 
next generation” (quoted in Ogata 2013, 18). The danger with such pronounce-
ments, as Gardner would note in his comments on the “dizzying popularity” 
of creativity four years  later, was that they promised much but delivered  little. 
Despite the research, locating and cultivating creativity remained elusive. The 
tendency, explains Jamie Cohen- Cole, was for psychologists to define and mea-
sure creativity according to their own preexisting definition of what creativity 
was (2014, 44–45). The ipar study, for instance, included canvassing experts 
for names of creative  people in their field, who  were then invited to Berkeley to 
complete a range of tests (Sawyer 2006, 46). The possibility that conventional 
notions of what constitutes creativity might be replicated through such peer- 
selection did not seem to arise as a perceived prob lem.15
Collaboration
In its capacity for adaptability, creativity allowed for a responsiveness to change, 
and as a socially derived virtue, creativity was most meaningfully developed 
in collaboration with  others. Indeed, working with  people with diff er ent ex-
pertise and experience offered a response to Stevenson’s widely shared concern 
regarding overspecialization and its alienating effects. While the pragmatic in-
terdisciplinary  labors of war time scientists and engineers required  little philo-
sophical justification so long as the task was met, the enthusiasm among many 
for such collaborative work extended further than the commonsense under-
standing that a complex prob lem requires group effort. Collaboration seemed 
to confirm the sense of creativity as the outcome of interaction, where an open 
mind was the precondition for a shared collective effort that also served to 
break down rigid personal loyalties. Working together promised to deliver the 
kind of environment conducive to Conant’s dialectical conception of tolerance 
and conviction. Within such an environment individual expertise could be re-
spected even as it was creatively adapted to the group situation. Such a model 
of collaboration did not preclude antagonism and disagreement, which was to 
be expected among ornery individualists, but the moderating  factor of shared 
purpose would allow such friction to become part of the creative pro cess.
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Interdisciplinary collaboration did not begin with the war, but mobiliza-
tion radically accelerated the application of shared expertise across the physical 
and social sciences. Otto Neurath’s unity of science movement, intended to 
establish a common language for science, had its origins in the Vienna Circle 
of the 1920s, while private foundations like the Laura Spelman Rocke fel ler Me-
morial in the US had been supporting collaborative social scientific research 
since World War I.16 The Macy conferences, perhaps the best known interdis-
ciplinary scientific gatherings of the postwar period, notably for their work on 
cybernetics,  were initiated in 1941 in the first instance to facilitate communi-
cation across the sciences. The war, especially through the successes in physics, 
catalyzed this trend  toward the pursuit of a unified scientific discourse. In fact, 
advances in physics, it was argued, notably by Frank Fremont- Smith of the Macy 
Foundation, pressed the case for increased interdisciplinary communication as 
a  matter of urgency since the “physical sciences have developed to such a point 
and have gotten so far ahead of the social sciences that  there is grave possibility 
that social misuse of the physical sciences may block or greatly delay any fur-
ther pro gress in civilization” (quoted in Kline 2015, 39). The threat of narrow 
specialization looms large  here, and the need for an integration of the physical 
and social sciences, like so much of the rhe toric of the early Cold War period, is 
framed, not as a question of method but as a  matter of civilizational survival.17
A differently inflected argument for collaboration in the arts nonetheless 
maintained a connection between collective creativity and social organ ization, 
if not pro gress as such. The avant- gardes of Paris, Weimar Germany and the 
postrevolutionary Soviet Union variously challenged the singular status of art 
as a set of discrete objects, the artisanal skill set of the artist, the conventional 
modes of display and distribution of art, and the function of art and the art-
ist within bourgeois society. In diff er ent ways, Rus sian Constructivism, Dada, 
and Surrealism reconfigured artistic practice as a mode of investigation aimed 
at the reconstruction of everyday life. As such, as John Roberts suggests,  these 
tendencies  ought to be seen less as “movements” in the art historical sense and 
more as “loose confederations of collaborators and co- researchers, which in 
some instances, for short periods of time, conjoin to form units of group pro-
duction” (Roberts 2015, 122). It is this collective spirit, pitched  toward a broad 
transvaluation of the categories of  labor, discipline, skill, and function, that 
characterized the structure and practice of Black Mountain College, where the 
communitarian aspects of American progressive liberalism and the Bauhaus 
fusion of craft and industrial modernity combined to carve out a utopian col-
laborative space that blurred the distinctions between art,  labor, and living. 
George Maciunas, the driving force  behind much of the Fluxus activity of the 
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1960s, was one of the few American- based artists with a working knowledge of 
Rus sian Constructivism and Productivism, and the 1920s Rus sian journal lef. 
In New Jersey, both Rutgers University and Douglass College provided a base 
for a lot of Fluxus work, often in dialog with engineers and visiting artists at 
nearby Bell Labs. It is through networks such as  these that linked universities, 
corporations, galleries, and artist groups that information about the historical 
avant- garde, its ideas and methods found a plausible context within the na-
scent interdisciplinary ethos of the science- and- technology sector. It is hard 
to imagine E.A.T., cavs, and a&t without the conceptual backbone of the 
historical avant- garde, though the po liti cal energies of  those prior tendencies 
 were undeniably suppressed or stripped out in  favor of a more functionalist 
model in keeping with the de- or post- ideological mood of the times.
It is, however, precisely the po liti cal ramifications of the avant- garde proj-
ect that so decisively challenged the 1960s art- and- technology organ izations 
at the end of the de cade, as the adversarial capacities of the avant- garde met 
with the revolutionary ambitions of aspects of the US counterculture. If radi-
cal collectivism is implicit yet muted in art- and- technology collaborations like 
E.A.T. and cavs, the broader tendencies across American science and technol-
ogy  toward interdisciplinary collaboration  were no less rooted in a conception of 
how a  free society should operate. Like creativity, collaboration was figured as an 
intrinsic good, in keeping with demo cratic values, and among the distinctive fea-
tures both necessary and desirable for the progressive development of a modern 
industrial state. The very features of the interdisciplinary model that allowed for 
its ac cep tance as a nonideological, commonsense approach to rational problem- 
solving, however, are also among the attributes that have  shaped con temporary 
neoliberal notions of the social organ ization of  labor and the reconceptualiza-
tion of practice in the arts and humanities as a mode of research.
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A Laboratory of Form and Movement
Institutionalizing Emancipatory Technicity at MIT
The Bauhaus became the focal point of new creative forces accepting the 
challenges of technical pro gress with its recognition of social responsibil-
ity. It became the experimental shop, the laboratory of the new movement.
— László Moholy- Nagy, The New Vision
The task of the con temporary artist is to release and bring into social ac-
tion the dynamic forces of visual imagery. As con temporary scientists are 
struggling to liberate the arrested energy of the atom, paint ers of our day 
must liberate the inexhaustible energy reservoir of the visual associations. 
To accomplish this, they need a clear grasp of the social field, intellectual 
honesty, and creative powers capable of integrating experiences into a 
plastic form. This goal  will be reached only when art once more lives in 
inseparable unity with  human life.
— György Kepes, Language of Vision
In his introduction to a special issue of the journal Daeda­
lus published in 1960 and devoted to the “visual arts  today,” 
Hungarian émigré and Bauhaus veteran György Kepes ex-
plained how his early enthusiasm for the formal properties 
of painting came to seem “anemic” in a world character-
ized by “mass poverty, depression, and social unrest” (1960, 
5). Turning his back on painting and redirecting his inter-
ests  toward “man- made images” and their impact, Kepes sought in the mass 
“visual communication of ideas” (5) a means of making lives better, only to 
find that the suffering brought about by World War II rendered his ideas 
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“shallow”(5). Kepes de cided to go in search of “values” rather than tools and 
found them in modern science. “Basically,” he writes, “the world made newly 
vis i ble by science contained the essential symbols for our reconstruction of 
physical surroundings and for the restructuring of the world of sense, feeling, 
and thought within us” (5). Kepes became convinced that a purposeful  union 
of the visual arts and science provided the most compelling means of realizing 
the profound social reconstruction he had so long pursued, and he returned to 
the pages of Daedalus five years  later to make a pitch for the kind of collabora-
tion he had in mind. Central to his vision for combining the arts and science 
was the stimulation of discourse between artists interested in technical devel-
opments and generating interaction among artists, scientists, and technolo-
gists. “Fully aware of the considerable difficulties” involved in engineering such 
interaction, Kepes writes, with only the merest Swiftian irony, “I wish to put 
forward a modest proposal”:
I propose the formation of a closely knit work community of eight to ten 
promising young artists and designers, each committed to some specific 
goals. The group, located in an academic institution with a strong scien-
tific tradition, would include paint ers, sculptors, film- makers, photog-
raphers, stage designers, illumination engineers, and graphic designers. 
They would be chosen for their demonstrated interest and alertness to 
certain common tasks. It is assumed that close and continuous work con-
tact with one another and with the academic community of architects, 
city planners, scientists, and engineers would lead to a climate more 
conducive to the development of new ideas than could be achieved by 
individuals working alone, exposed only to random stimulations and 
subjected to the pressures of professional competition and the caprices 
of the art market. (1965, 122)
Two years  later, Kepes would realize his ambition with the opening of the Cen-
ter for Advanced Visual Studies (cavs) at mit, nearly thirty years  after the 
center’s core values  were first articulated in the US by Kepes and his Bauhaus 
colleagues.
Shortly  after the collapse of the New Bauhaus in Chicago  after only one 
year, its director László Moholy- Nagy rallied his teachers, friends, and ad-
vocates to reestablish the school and its progressive curriculum. In late 1938, 
Moholy- Nagy launched the School of Design in Chicago with a statement 
of intention “to form a new nucleus for an in de pen dent reliable education 
center, where art, science and technology  will be united into a creative pat-
tern” (quoted in S. Moholy- Nagy 1969, 166). Eschewing a traditional board of 
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trustees, Moholy- Nagy enlisted the moral support of like- minded educators 
whom he believed understood the nature and ambition of his proj ect, includ-
ing Julian Huxley, who had worked with Moholy- Nagy on a film about archi-
tecture at the London Zoo and who was an advocate of the “unity of science” 
school; W. W. Norton, the US publisher of Moholy- Nagy’s The New Vision; 
Alfred  H. Barr, who sponsored the Bauhaus exhibition at MoMA in 1938; 
and John Dewey. With Eu rope perched at the edge of the abyss, the luminaries 
Moholy- Nagy assembled to back his new iteration of the American Bauhaus 
represented the combined authority of the US progressive tradition and the 
remnants of the Eu ro pean design avant- garde.  After Barr’s impor tant MoMA 
Bauhaus exhibition closed in New York, it toured the West and East coasts for 
fourteen months, with other Bauhaus shows and events taking place across the 
country through 1939 and 1940. By the time the US entered the war in late 
1941, Barr’s promotion of Moholy- Nagy’s synthesis of US pragmatism and Eu-
ro pean discipline had embedded itself decisively into American cultural life as 
a vision of the  future. When asked why he felt the Bauhaus impor tant enough 
to warrant a show at MoMA, Barr’s response captured the extent to which 
US modernity and old- world vanguardism had found a common language: the 
Bauhaus, Barr explained, had “accepted the machine as an instrument worthy 
of the artist,” removing the gap between “the artist and the industrial system” 
and between “fine” and “applied arts” (quoted in S. Moholy- Nagy 1969, 168).
Kepes had worked with Moholy- Nagy in Berlin and Chicago, and now 
joined him on his staff at the School of Design, where he adapted the influen-
tial program of study on light and color that would lead to his appointment 
at mit in 1947. The vision for socially transformative arts- science collabora-
tion Kepes articulated in the mid-1960s is unthinkable without the Bauhaus, 
but it was prob ably unachievable without the postwar clout of a heavyweight 
research university like mit. Nevertheless, despite the long germination pro-
cess, cavs would last only seven years  under Kepes’s directorship. As with 
Moholy- Nagy’s New Bauhaus and School of Design, the American context 
proved welcoming in theory but resistant in practice. As the intellectual, aca-
demic, and institutional climate in the US during World War II and the early 
Cold War shifted, as we saw in the previous chapter, away from the collectivist 
spirit of the New Deal era and  toward a more competitive, meritocratic, and 
hierarchical model of ends- oriented corporatism, the kind of exploratory and, 
indeed, often emancipatory tendencies of proj ects like cavs, with their roots 
deep in early twentieth- century Eu ro pean radicalism, meant that although 
they might be supported rhetorically (as evidence of creative freedom), they 
 were often financially and po liti cally vulnerable.
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Nevertheless, cavs caught the wave of speculative techno- utopianism 
that  rose in the early 1960s to become the first of mit’s art- and- tech labs. 
Kepes was able, in his influential post- Macy conference interdisciplinary stud-
ies series of publications Vision + Value, to set the tone and the terms for what 
an integrated and institutionalized US art- science program might look like. 
Drawing in impor tant artists and thinkers, including Buckminster Fuller, 
Norbert Wiener, Walter Gropius, John Cage, Robert Smithson, and Jack 
Burnham, cavs laid the groundwork for subsequent mit ventures such as the 
influential Media Lab,  under Nicholas Negroponte, and the Center for Art, 
Science, and Technology (cast). Situated within a prestigious and influen-
tial university flush with Cold War military r&d dollars, cavs was able to 
mobilize Kepes’s thirty- years- in- the- making vision of a studio- lab fusion that 
might, as he hoped in 1960, be capable of restructuring the physical and spiri-
tual worlds—of inventing the  future.
Light, Vision, Kunst und Technik: The Bauhaus in Amer i ca
László Moholy- Nagy joined the Bauhaus in Weimar at the invitation of Walter 
Gropius in 1923 and developed the foundation course for the school in that 
year.  After emigrating from Germany initially to Amsterdam and  later Lon-
don, he landed in Chicago and became the first director of the New Bauhaus. 
The New Vision, first published in 1929 and translated into En glish for a US 
edition in 1935, helped broaden Moholy- Nagy’s reception while cementing a 
Bauhaus continuity with Eu rope. The work chimed with that undertaken by 
Gropius at Harvard and Albers at Black Mountain as émigré scholars, artists, 
and theorists returned ele ments of Dewey’s pedagogical philosophy to the US. 
The centrality of arts- and- design education, as well as aspects of the pragmatic 
application of new industrial materials, for building an emergent and semi- 
utopian social urbanism proved a key feature of this experimental educational 
practice— “the laboratory of [a] new movement” as Moholy- Nagy (1946a, 21) 
called it— and the  grand ambition undergirding the design program was no 
less than the transvaluation of everyday life. “We  shall give you a laboratory of 
form and movement,” László Moholy- Nagy promised a Chicago audience in 
September 1937, “a place where all  you’ve swallowed down inside of you dur-
ing office hours and in factories gets liberated by experience and coordination. 
When you have been with us, your hobby  will be your real work” (quoted in S. 
Moholy- Nagy 1969, 149).
The shared commitment of the Bauhaus and Deweyan pragmatism to a 
socially emancipatory “learning by  doing” philosophy runs through Kepes’s 
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writing. In The New Landscape in Art and Science, for example, Kepes cites a 
1919 speech by Dewey delivered in Tokyo in which Dewey claims that “ there 
is no more significant question before the world” than the challenge of rec-
onciling “practical science and contemplative esthetic appreciation.” Without 
science, Dewey goes on, “man  will be the sport and victim of natu ral forces 
which he cannot use or control,” while without art “mankind might become 
a race of economic monsters, restlessly driving hard bargains with nature and 
one another, bored with leisure or capable of putting it to use only in ostenta-
tious display and extravagant dissipation” (cited in Kepes 1956, 28). For Kepes, 
tasked at mit with directing a revamped drawing program intended to run 
through all levels of the university, the visual image could function as an “act of 
creative integration” able to “mobilize the creative imagination for positive so-
cial action, and direct it  toward positive social goals” (13–14). This required, at 
the individual level, retraining the eye of the perceiver, but also, more broadly, 
reshaping social perception. The purpose of books like The New Landscape, 
with their carefully designed interplay of image and text, was to assist in the 
reor ga ni za tion of visual literacy. This was the pedagogical basis for Kepes’s new 
“Visual Fundamentals” course at mit.
In a fresh edition of The New Vision published in 1945, Moholy- Nagy in-
cludes a short introduction that underscores the importance of fundamentals 
in Bauhaus thinking. Aimed precisely at the nonspecialist, the postwar ver-
sion of The New Vision set out to explain how the Bauhaus merger of theory 
and practice amounted to no less than the groundwork for a new society. The 
National Socialists closed the Bauhaus in Germany, Moholy- Nagy reminds his 
readers, but in the US it was pos si ble for the Bauhaus to aid “Amer i ca as the 
 bearer of a new civilization” that had to “si mul ta neously cultivate and indus-
trialize a continent.” The US is the “ideal ground,” he continues, “on which 
to work out an educational princi ple which strives for the closest connection 
between art, science, and technology” (Moholy- Nagy 1946a, 10). Explain-
ing Gropius’s first Bauhaus of 1919 as “a community of workers” that resulted 
in “the powers latent in each individual [being] welded into a  free collective 
body,” Moholy- Nagy highlighted the practical dimensions of art as experience 
(19). What this means for Moholy- Nagy is that art is always historically contin-
gent, and he gives an account of how the German iteration of the school arose 
in response to industrialization and the redundancy of traditional forms of de-
sign and manufacture. “The Bauhaus,” he explains, “became the focal point of 
new creative forces accepting the challenge of technical pro gress with its rec-
ognition of social responsibility.” Conceiving of a design school as “the experi-
mental shop, the laboratory of the new movement” (20–21) situates education 
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at the center of innovative social and cultural production, much as Dewey had 
conceived of the school as the engine of democracy.
Moholy- Nagy recruited a heavyweight team of supporters to launch the 
Chicago Bauhaus, just as he was to do with the launch of the School of De-
sign. Gathered from diff er ent universities, some even working gratis, sympa-
thetic researchers included “unity of science” members from the University of 
Chicago such as Charles W. Morris, Carl Eckart, and Ralph W. Gerard, the 
latter an impor tant neurophysiologist who became a founding participant in 
the Macy conferences on cybernetics. Morris and Gerard would provide pieces 
for Kepes’s  later book The New Landscape in Art and Science, and the holistic 
sensibility shared by voguish intellectual trends like Gestalt psy chol ogy, or-
ganicist biology, and cybernetics became integrated into the utopian Bauhaus 
ethos of crafting form from fragmentation and of creating  whole sociobiologi-
cal  humans through aesthetic and visual training.
This loosely defined mix of information theory, Eastern- inflected, 
process- oriented investigation, and Hungarian aesthetic rigor would come to 
shape a range of artistic preoccupations through the 1950s and 1960s, so it is 
not surprising that someone like John Cage felt at home among the Bauhaus 
crowd. Cage, who would  later collaborate with Kepes on numerous proj ects, 
met Kepes and Moholy- Nagy at Mills College when they  were all teaching 
a summer institute  there. The conversations  were such that Moholy- Nagy 
invited Cage to teach a course called “Sound Experiments” at the School of 
Design in 1941. Such was the sympathetic engagement on all sides that Cage 
occasionally described his work as “a counterpart in  music of the work in visual 
arts conducted at the School of Design, which is the American Bauhaus” (cited 
in F. Turner 2013, 121).
In 1945, as Moholy- Nagy typed out the introduction to the third edition 
of The New Vision, the short- lived Chicago Bauhaus had metamorphosed into 
the School of Design, and then the Institute of Design. American soil was 
perhaps thinner than he had hoped, and unable, or unwilling, to allow the 
luxuriant fo liage of the Bauhaus vision to prosper. Yet the republication of the 
book, as well as the extended work documenting the results of the experiment 
in Chicago in his posthumous volume Vision in Motion, attest to Moholy- 
Nagy’s unchecked determination. Signs of a larger economic shift away from 
progressive values in the US can be found in Sibyl Moholy- Nagy’s account of 
her husband’s tenure at the School of Design and its restructuring as the Insti-
tute of Design, complete with an administrative board. When László engaged 
in fund rais ing activities, he offered donors “a stake in the  future,” not in the 
kind of intellectual influence that can be achieved in a lifetime but rather that 
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attained “in the lifetime of generations.” The newly appointed professional 
fundraiser for the Institute, on the other hand, offered donors “an income tax 
deduction” (S. Moholy- Nagy 1969, 217). With the new fundraiser’s appeal to 
the rational motivations of individual actors, a diff er ent economic context 
for arts- and- design education becomes apparent. That Moholy- Nagy could 
not sustain the School of Design with his dedicated community of internally 
regulated artists and teachers, and needed the infusion of business expertise 
to survive, marks the changing values emergent in the shift from the school’s 
founding in 1938 to the institute’s in 1944. The postwar world of expertise and 
individual action entered the experimental lab and classroom of the Bauhaus in 
Chicago and converted it into another office.
The dissolution of the Chicago Bauhaus scattered its influential artists and 
educators across the US. Kepes wound up in north Texas, where he finished 
Language of Vision, his own version of Moholy- Nagy’s The New Vision, which 
would bring him to larger prominence.  Here Kepes revealed the same tena-
cious idealism  toward social pro gress and modernist belief in arts education 
that drove Moholy- Nagy. The introduction to Language of Vision is a paean to 
Deweyan pedagogy, with its desire for the perceiving subject to interpret and 
reconstitute the chaos of the world into forms capable of fully realizing the 
 human capacity of each individual. Looking beyond the catastrophes of the 
twentieth  century, Kepes maintained a vision of humanity as a transcendental 
good, following in the utopian steps of nineteenth- century forebears such as 
William Morris, Thomas Carlyle, and John Ruskin. Language of Vision led him 
to the heart of technoscientific research in the postwar US: mit.
Language of Vision: Kepes in Print
As an educational institution, mit has a unique r&d history, with shifting 
relations between industry and government, especially defense spending. As 
Anna Vallye notes, Kepes’s arrival at mit followed an extensive institutional 
reconstitution of mit in the 1930s from an applied sciences extension of in-
dustry to a full research- based science university interested in basic scientific 
research (2013, 146–147). The shift was somewhat prescient  because Vannevar 
Bush makes the same case in his influential apologia for basic research, Science: 
The Endless Frontier, just  after World War II. Writing for a general audience, 
Bush defends the long- term instrumentality of basic scientific research on the 
basis that “blue sky” investigations eventually translate into applications ini-
tially unforeseen. Technological pro cess as such is therefore a consequence of 
untrammeled scientific curiosity. In many ways, Kepes’s tenure at mit between 
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1946 and 1977 was characterized by a similar commitment to basic research 
and a trust in the virtues of the unintended consequence of a genuinely de- 
instrumentalized experimentalism. In Vallye’s assessment, Kepes was “directed 
 toward inventing a discourse of the aesthetic image as both analog and cata-
lyst for communities of knowledge— tentative, exploratory and allusive struc-
tures dedicated to the production of the ultimate postwar desideratum: social 
potential, aleatory and opportunistic” (146). His educational ideals, in other 
words, embodied the ele ments that constitute a lab. And mit knows labs.
***************************************************
The mit motto mens et manus (“mind and hand”) chimes perfectly with core 
Bauhaus pedagogical princi ples. The two institutions, however, could not have 
been more diff er ent when it came to financial stability and relevance within 
the national research agenda. In 1943, in the midst of World War II, mit han-
dled $25 million worth of government contracts. The president of the univer-
sity at the time, Karl Taylor Compton, wrote a report to his trustees that said: 
“The value to our country of this type of institution in a time of emergency [is 
enormous]. Its war value is parallel to that of a fleet or an army . . .  I submit that 
its value to our country justifies it maintenance on the highest pos si ble plane 
of effectiveness” (quoted in Schweber 1992, 152).  After the war, Department of 
Defense funding continued to rise. Flashpoint events such as the Czech coup 
and the blockade of Berlin in 1948/9 proved pivotal, but the Korean conflict 
“cemented” the postwar partnership (152). The volume of sponsored research 
at mit doubled  every six years during the immediate postwar period, and from 
1948 to 1968 accounted for 80  percent of the university’s total operating bud-
get (Kaiser 2011, 105).  These  were the years of Kepes’s most fervent activity at 
mit, activity that helped contribute to a momentum of institutional alliances, 
geopo liti cal demands, total war mentality, and a shared belief in technological 
solutions to military/po liti cal prob lems that can be found in the technicity the 
university established with the government prior to World War II.
Vannevar Bush argued that although a continuity existed in the pre-
war and war time alliance between mit (as an example of, and metonym for, 
university- based research), the military, and technological development, a 
fundamental change occurred within the momentum of the trajectory during 
the war and into the Cold War. The fact that “World War II was the first war 
in  human history to be affected decisively by weapons unknown at the out-
break of hostilities,” he wrote, created “a situation that demanded closer linkage 
among military men, scientists, and industrialists than had ever been required” 
(quoted in Schweber 1992, 156). This is the context in which the expanding 
54
chApter two
scale of scientific research moved  toward so- called Big Science. During the 
de cades  after the war, with the momentum of large- scale proj ects aimed at 
solving large- scale prob lems, the sciences, physics especially, moved from in-
dividual and small- team labs to huge factory or multi- sited proj ects involving 
large numbers and many teams, as Peter Galison (1992) explains. The teams 
included not just scientists but engineers, administrators, and technicians with 
university research entering the industrial factory floor and scientists becom-
ing proj ect man ag ers more than experimenters.
In the immediate postwar moment, Kepes helped overhaul mit’s cur-
riculum shift  toward general education and basic science with a set of courses 
structured around vision, techniques, and their social implications. Much of 
this was articulated in Language of Vision (1944), in which Kepes generates 
“a philosophy of the image as both index and instrument of a visual technol-
ogy of knowledge” (Vallye 2013, 154). Kepes charts the demise of traditional 
perspective due to visual technologies that have freed the biological eye to see 
other wise. The section titles indicate a dramatic, dynamic narrative movement 
in which perspective expands, proliferates, fragments, and converges in kalei-
doscopic sequence: “Amplified Perspective,” “Multiple, Simultaneous Perspec-
tives,” “Breakdown of Fixed Perspective,” “Integration of the Plastic Forces,” 
“Compression, Interpenetration,” “Final Elimination of the Fixed Perspective 
Order,” and “Ultimate Opening of the Picture Surface.” As is the case in some 
aspects of cybernetic theory, the centrality of the  human in a given pro cess (in 
this case, image- making) dis appears.
The interdisciplinary influence of Kepes’ book is indicated by the inclu-
sion of an introduction (in the first edition) by Sigfried Giedion, a cultural 
historian of automation and of architecture, and the addition, in the 1969 re-
print, of a new introduction by universal grammar advocate S.  I. Hayakawa. 
That thinkers working in advanced technology and information theory  were 
considered suitable advocates for a volume by a designer, artist, and educator is 
a mea sure of the extent to which Kepes perhaps achieved his aim of dissolving 
disciplinary barriers. Hayakawa highlights Kepes’s emphasis on the relatedness 
between viewer and viewed as a revolutionary call to move beyond “the de-
luded self- importance of absolute ‘individualism’ in  favor of social relatedness 
and interdependence” (1969, 10). The emphasis on pro cess and connections, 
of mediations and interactions between  things, spoke to the general impulse 
 toward systems art at mit and the new Center for Advanced Visual Studies 
(cavs). But as Donna Haraway reminds us, “it  matters which figures figure 
figures, which systems systematize systems” (2016, 101). For Kepes, the systems 
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with which he wished to systematize his own visual systems emerged from the 
sciences through a belief that the arts could positively and effectively engage 
with the challenges of con temporary society. The sciences  were the ultimate 
pharmakon: poison and medicine. Just as the only solution for nuclear pro-
liferation appeared, paradoxically, to be more nuclear proliferation, for Kepes 
the only solution to technological turmoil was more technology and science, 
but funneled through and tempered by visual communication obtained in arts 
training. Learning to see differently in a literal sense would, for Kepes, engen-
der a transformation of vision in a figurative sense: the perspective wrought 
by perspective, in other words, held the key to social healing, if only it could 
be envisioned— seen—as such. “To perceive a visual perception implies the be-
holder’s participation in a pro cess of organ ization,” Kepes claims in the intro-
duction to the second edition; “the experience of an image is thus a creative act 
of integration” (1969, 13). Such acts  were essential for imposing structure on 
an exponentially chaotic social sphere, leading to his conclusion that the plas-
tic arts, therefore, are “an invaluable educational medium” (13). The language 
of integration, impor tant to visual communication, found institutional fit at 
mit in defense- related research in the post– World War II environment that 
demanded interdisciplinary cooperation (Vallye 2013, 162). cavs emerged out 
of such efforts.
Both Reinhold Martin and Anna Vallye separately argue that Kepes’s The 
New Landscape in Art and Science (1956) lays out the philosophical vision for 
cavs. A similar argument could also be made for his foundational work Lan­
guage of Vision, and, more pertinently, for the Vision + Value series and its Macy 
conference- inflected gathering of interdisciplinary scholars. In the years be-
tween Language of Vision and The New Landscape, an explosion of technologi-
cal expansion of the  human sensorium and its capacities materialized. Kepes, 
as did Moholy- Nagy, had an interest in scientific or technologically generated 
images that dated back to their days in Weimar Berlin, something they carried 
onward to their London and Chicago activities. Further, the opportunities, 
challenges, and prob lems such images posed to traditional modes of image pro-
duction figured strongly in their artistic production, course design, and critical 
writings. The capacity of technological tools to alter spatio- temporal relations 
provided visual access to ele ments of nature not other wise detectable and trans-
formed the field of the vis i ble. Just as Ètienne- Jules Marey and Eadweard Muy-
bridge had done with motion studies in the previous  century, and Marey had 
done with electrocardiograms, labs at mit and elsewhere at the time Kepes was 
writing Language of Vision  were busy capturing the splash- back from drops of 
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 water (Berenice Abbott) and spark photo graphs of objects in flight. “The prod-
ucts of the oscilloscope, stroboscope, and interferometer,” Vallye writes, and 
“the images on radar screens, radiographs, and spectrographs,  were diagrams of 
events, rather than descriptions of ‘ things’ or ‘properties’ ” (2013, 163–165). Just 
as systems theory moved from object- centered research to pro cessual investi-
gations, repre sen ta tions of natu ral events previously undetectable by unaided 
senses provided graphic repre sen ta tions that challenged artistic mimetic forms. 
Rendering the invisible vis i ble held fascination for Kepes and  others.
In “ Toward a Dynamic Iconography,” the final section of Language of 
Vision, Kepes writes about the non- artist role in Dada and Surrealism in a 
way that evokes the scientist in the lab (1967, 194–196). Both work to deliver 
through specific techniques a form from nature in spite of the fact that it is the 
artist/scientist who provides and applies  these techniques. Sounding like an 
early incarnation of John Cage and his experiments with chance, Kepes writes 
that the  earlier generation of avant- garde artists had telescoped their role in 
artistic production “only to a sheer assistance of chance happenings” (194). It 
is but a small step from the artist as scientist setting up an experiment in a lab 
to the systems art that would preoccupy cavs from Jack Burnham’s fellowship 
 there into the end of the 1960s.
The Vision + Value series of publications resulted from an interdisciplin-
ary set of seminars and editorial commissions by Kepes intended to foment 
further exploration of a visual field capable of synthesizing technological 
change while also taking into account the shift marked by cybernetics  toward 
systems and information as leading the age  toward, in Kepes’s words, “commu-
nication and control” (quoted in R. Martin 2003, 67). Kepes attended some of 
the Macy conferences and had been inspired by the cross- disciplinary goal of 
pursuing cybernetic theory as a means for thinking the entire biosocial domain 
of  human and nonhuman action,  whether in the form of nature or machines. 
The echoes with Bauhaus ideals struck him as obvious, though certainly in the 
repetition of  these goals the stakes had been raised significantly. And the role 
of the Vision + Value books in laying the groundwork for cavs is significant, 
emerging as they did in 1965 and 1966 and reflecting overlapping interests 
found in Gestalt psy chol ogy, physiology, biology, systems theory, logical posi-
tivism, linguistics, architecture, art, design,  music, and perception theory. At-
tending the events that Kepes or ga nized  were friends from the New Bauhaus 
days, the University of Chicago scholars Charles Morris and Ralph Gerard. 
The impressive array of contributors also included Christopher Alexander, 
Rudolf Arnheim, Saul Bass, John Cage, Buckminster Fuller, Sigfried Giedion, 
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Marshall McLuhan, George Nelson, I. A. Richards, Lancelot H. Whyte, and 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy. The range of disciplines huddled  under titles such as 
Structure in Art and Science, The Nature of Art and Motion, Education of Vision, 
and Sign, Image, Symbol that reveal the scope and ambitions of Kepes’s vision 
of a lab that could bring the arts and sciences harmoniously together as avant- 
garde composers and artists argued ideas with mathematicians, physicists, 
microbiologists, psychologists, architects, systems theorists, literary theorists, 
sociologists, art historians, and media theorists.
 These seminars and their resultant publications displayed an ongoing con-
cern with the scale of visual and intellectual inquiry that underpinned much of 
the impetus  behind Bauhaus- influenced education, making, and theory. The 
import of scale is markedly evidenced across the de cades, for example in Kepes’s 
New Landscape, in which patterns of nature become scaled and technologically 
envisioned; and in Moholy- Nagy’s Vision in Motion, where he discusses the 
Industrial Revolution’s transformation of the world through “mass production, 
mass distribution and mass communication” resulting in the need to think in 
global terms (1946b, 13). The latter understood art as a means to bridge the 
biological and the social, the individual and society, the intellect and emotions. 
The role of the artist in society, he writes, is “to penetrate yet- unseen ranges of 
the biological functions, to search the new dimension of the industrial society 
and to translate the new findings into emotional orientation” (11). The arts for 
Moholy- Nagy are essential for a healthy society, and it is incumbent on artists 
and designers to solve the prob lems wrought by technology and industrializa-
tion. The exhibition The New Landscape that Kepes curated at mit in 1951 
displayed images from microscopic photography and the edges of telescopic 
imagery of outer space. The exhibition of images suspended in air essentially 
embodied a three- dimensional still version of the Eameses’ massively influen-
tial film Powers of Ten (1968), which placed micro and macro technologically 
enhanced scientific photography within an art- centric context.1 The title of the 
book that Kepes published five years  after the exhibition, The New Landscape 
in Art and Science, suggests that the visual essay and collage  format of the text 
provides “a kind of laboratory experiment” in which the “visual images” provide 
“the content” and the “verbal statements— comments and documents— are il-
lustrations” (1956, 17). The simplistic inversion of the standard power relation-
ship between image and text in scientific publications belies the larger agenda 
of subverting science as a privileged site for knowledge production. Offering 
the verbal texts as supplements for a visual story told through images, Kepes 
reveals the necessity of the supplement for the foundation of the main text—in 
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this case, one composed of a “poetic vision” for the “new landscape” the book 
invoked, evoked, and embodied (17).
***************************************************
The organ ization, layout, and textual strategies of The New Landscape, accord-
ing to Vallye, operate as “a collage of instruments and agents, a subjects- objects 
collectivity within which ‘pattern- seeing’ would spring forth” (2013, 171). The 
book—as did the Vision + Value series, though to a lesser extent— offers a dy-
namic juxtaposition of images, quotations, text, and image captions resulting 
in an Eisenstein montage effect of images propelling textual exegesis (see fig-
ure 2.1). The historical arc depicted in the book is long and intercultural, draw-
ing on examples from ancient and early civilizations in a synchronic though 
historically framed manner. The pattern- seeking agenda that scales from micro 
to macro levels of visibility and skipping through chronotopes of world history 
offers a reading of nature and culture in visual dialog that expands the struc-
Figure 2.1.  Layout design  
of György Kepes’s The New 
Landscape in Art and Science  
 (Chicago: Paul Theobald and 
Co., 1956).
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turalist interests of the moment. The experimental design deployed in Kepes’s 
and Moholy- Nagy’s books show the sustained interest in graphic design for 
Bauhaus educators, working as they did across advertising and numerous other 
design applications. Graphic design, back in the Weimar Republic, offered an 
early instance of industrial reproduction capable of appropriation for artistic 
production. The enthusiasm never left them, as The New Landscape exempli-
fies. Reinhold Martin, however, finds in the book a sense of “exhaustion,” of 
the Kepes proj ect for sociobiological training and control  running into a tech-
nological momentum no longer containable (if it ever was) (2003, 72–75). It 
is difficult to follow Martin on this one given that in 1956 Kepes leapt straight 
into the seminar series that became Vision + Value, and thus constituted the 
immediate interdisciplinary precursor to cavs. Perhaps this exhaustion can 
be noted in the almost immediate collapse of cavs proj ects as they ran into a 
sociopo liti cal and institutional context that made the avant- garde art and sci-
ence/technology lab an untimely intervention in US academia. Nonetheless, 
Kepes forged ahead and his first group of cavs artists included Jack Burnham, 
Stan VanDerBeek, and Otto Piene.
At the university level at mit, the late 1960s anti- war backlash registered 
loudly, as it had at many universities across the US. Given the institution’s 
heavy reliance on government- funded research, mit acutely felt the change. 
The Hoffman Committee’s 1970 report Creative Renewal in a Time of Crisis 
addressed a host of prob lems facing the university, including the drying up of 
government- sponsored research and the failure of the school of Humanities and 
Social Sciences to deliver on its mandate of creative, interdisciplinary think-
ing for all mit students (Kaiser 2011, 115–117). It was within such a context of 
institutional self- reflection and examination that Kepes’s cavs emerged. The 
report also argued that the institution had a burgeoning pr prob lem in the 
midst of Vietnam War controversies due to the institution’s close association 
with weapons of war, an image unlikely to help recruit students or serve the 
university well in the long run (much as ibm had made its own public- facing 
pivot from military computation to universal computation). Again, cavs 
could help with this prob lem.
The Totality of Patterns
“Experiment in Totality” is the subtitle of Sibyl Moholy- Nagy’s detailed, critical 
memoir of her husband’s life and work (1950, 1969), and it neatly articulates the 
consistency of Bauhaus ideals, at least as espoused by Kepes, from 1919  until the 
1970s. The consistency of the ideals proves especially marked in each postwar 
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moment. The subtitle could well be applied as easily to the Macy conferences, 
cybernetics, systems theory, and systems aesthetics. The history of the Macy 
conferences as the fount of cybernetics is well documented.2 Once Norbert 
Wiener and Johann von Neumann had become increasingly convinced during 
their World War II research that inquiry into neurology and engineering (biol-
ogy and machines) had essentially joined up as a single subject, they attempted 
to form a research center at mit to pursue this path. Although their institu-
tional efforts ultimately failed, the Macy conferences became their lab for sci-
entific and social scientific interdisciplinary debate and experimentation with 
cybernetic models and pro cesses (Dupuy 1994, 70–89). Designed as a forum 
for discussion and debate, not a site for the pre sen ta tion of final thoughts and 
findings, the informal laboratory nature of the conferences allowed for experi-
mentation with shared prob lems and interests across disciplines.
The primary driving force  behind the Macy conferences was not Wiener 
or von Neumann but the University of Chicago physiologist Warren McCulloch, 
who initiated the interdisciplinary examination into “ce re bral inhibition” in 
1942, an event funded by the Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation. At that event, Wie-
ner and Julian Bigelow presented some of the research they  were conducting for 
the military on the theoretical prob lems posed by antiaircraft defense, research 
that found unexpected resonance with that pursued by Mexican physiologist 
Arturo Rosenblueth. The paper presented at the initial Macy conference, and 
published in 1943  under the title “Be hav ior, Purpose and Teleology,” found 
analogy between antiaircraft targeting systems and the movements of patients 
suffering from brain damage: essentially self- correcting mechanisms or systems. 
An obvious difference between the two examples is that one system is mechani-
cal and the other organic, with the self- correcting be hav ior of each overriding 
the difference. The paper contained nascent ele ments of cybernetics, including 
feedback loops and the difference between how a system ( human, machine, or 
human- machine) actually behaved, and its stated or intended results.  After the 
war ended, a series of ten additional conferences took place leading to the es-
tablishment of cybernetics, information theory, systems theory, and artificial 
intelligence as impor tant interdisciplinary areas of academic study.
Kepes, along with many artists and art theorists, was drawn to  these theo-
ries as a means of articulating, according to the latest jargon, the convergence 
of mechanical and organic energies that had preoccupied his work since the 
1930s. As “interpretive syntheses” (Shanken 2013, 83–86) of systems theory 
and cybernetics, Kepes’s applications and inspirations, as with many of the art 
world’s adaptations of cybernetics research,  were a less than rigorous deploy-
ment of new scientific models and, as Jones suggests, more of an “ameliorative 
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proj ect” to keep art and science together through “analogy and translation” 
( Jones 2013, 517).
Systems theory in biology predates by a de cade the cybernetic inklings 
articulated by Wiener et al. in 1943. Posited by von Bertalanffy in the 1930s, 
systems theory concentrates on pro cesses over objects, relationships between 
parts, organic teleology over mechanical function, and the organ ization of 
an entity in relativistic terms. In a manner of speaking, cybernetics provided 
mathematical and engineering underpinning for the insights laid in biological 
systems theory, and hence their frequently linked status. The developments of-
fered by cybernetics to the emergence of information theory by Shannon and 
Weaver, again initially offered at the Macy conferences, added ideas of con-
trol and communication to the potent mix of theories available to the artistic 
avant- garde. Some members of the Macy conferences  were also prone to a kind 
of meta phorization and interpretive synthesis, though of a stripe more scien-
tifically grounded and informed than that which filtered out into the art world. 
Pushing back against the then-dominant positivists and behaviorists, many of 
whom occasionally antagonistically attended the conferences, Wiener, along 
with the anthropologists Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead, and phi los-
o pher Filmer S. C. Northrop, also gravitated  toward using ele ments of their 
theoretical insights as a means to generate knowledge about the world (Heims 
1991, 248–272). Wiener easily traversed a vast terrain of social and po liti cal 
issues using the language and conceptual apparatus of cybernetics as a discur-
sive heuristic to consider communication’s similarities in nature, machines, and 
society— rendering cybernetics, in his work for a general reading public, more 
moral philosophy than mathe matics. Bateson too  later attempted rather vast 
experiments in totality that made him a leading light in the emergent counter-
culture of the 1960s.  These  grand visions spoke to Kepes’s own desires.
***************************************************
Nonetheless, Kepes’s selective engagement did not deter the scientists them-
selves from speaking to or collaborating with him and  others in the arts; nor 
did  these dialogs dampen the impulse to experiment with totality in any and 
all domains that Kepes kept alive. Wiener, for example, responded to Kepes’s 
brief for the expanded book version of the exhibition The New Landscape 
with a contribution entitled “Pure Patterns in a Natu ral World” (1956). In the 
chapter, Wiener outlines three approaches to abstract patterns in the world 
from the point of view of science and mathe matics: one is the approach con-
structed through axioms or postulates that describe “intellectually or emotion-
ally satisfying arrangements in the world” (274); the second approach works to 
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disentangle neat axioms; while the third approach, where Wiener sees mathe-
matics and artists coming together, observes “specific patterns of intrinsic in-
terest” and then offers “a  free composition as an essay of the patterns observed” 
(274). This is the affinity he feels for Kepes’s agenda predicated on six images 
the artist has sent him. Wiener asserts that his brief contribution intends to 
illustrate that the patterns in  these images not only “excite a sensory interest in 
the eye of the observer,” but do so precisely  because “they have a specific math-
ematical structure” (274). Wiener then briefly analyzes the images by dividing 
them into mathematically sound patterns made available through telescopic 
and other prosthetically enhanced visual technologies and  those that are mere 
“emotional puns”— that is, accidents of morphological analogy. Some of the 
latter are produced through the operation of visual technologies rather than 
from a mathematical standpoint. One of the more in ter est ing of the former, for 
Wiener, and  here echoing Kepes’s overriding agenda, depicts “dielectric break-
down,” which leads to a few lines from Wiener on the import of understanding 
and theorizing the phenomenon of “breakdown” for physics, mathe matics, and 
indeed society (274). Wiener’s ongoing interest in noise and entropy finds its 
way into his comments and offers Kepes a real nugget to work with, while his 
critique of “emotional puns” flags up the prob lems inherent in wishing to find 
analogies and  wholes at  every turn. For Kepes’s part, though, he was  under no 
illusion that his agenda would occasionally teeter on the vagaries of chance, 
happenstance, and mistaken analogs.
Ralph Gerard (1956), also fresh from Macy conference engagements and 
recalling his days as Kepes’s colleague in Chicago, follows Wiener’s contribu-
tion with a piece entitled “Design and Function in the Living,” which argues 
that while beauty might be in the eye of the beholder, it might also reside in 
“the object beheld” (277) as well. Gerard’s brief but wide- ranging and variously 
scaled reading of structure and patterning in living organisms chimes with the 
New Landscape remit beautifully. Citing evidence available through X- ray and 
electron microscopes, Gerard explains “chemistry, the structure and be hav ior 
of molecules and molecule aggregates, thus grades insensibly into biology, the 
structure and be hav ior of cells and cell aggregates” (279). Just as Kepes’s se-
lection of technoscientific images for the exhibition and the book scale from 
micro to macro, so too does Gerard’s argument that “nature has an anatomy at 
all levels” (279). In the end, though, Gerard concludes that the most complex of 
organisms yield the most beauty, with a kind of evolutionary pro gress and bias 
smuggled into his nuanced overview of form, function, structure, and biology.
Despite Kepes’s efforts to keep Bauhaus princi ples of experimentation and 
 wholeness operative through the 1970s, Moholy- Nagy’s wife and collaborator 
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thought the spirit of the endeavor ended quite a bit  earlier than her friend’s 
efforts would indicate. Writing in the second edition of her memoir in 1969, 
Sibyl Moholy- Nagy states that the first experiment in totality ran from 1919 to 
1945,  dying the year her husband did. Nevertheless, she notes a renewed inter-
est in his work among a younger group of artists, thinkers, and scholars who 
distanced themselves from the “Art and Technology foundations whose aim 
is ‘the esthetic contribution to technology, the upgrading of the new world 
of automation science through art’ ” (S. Moholy- Nagy 1969, xviii). Such foun-
dations, she claims, have nothing to say to this new generation who fully un-
derstand in “Moholy’s bio- technical  matter the message of an inexhaustible 
cosmic energy he tried to decode” (xviii). Sibyl Moholy- Nagy captured impor-
tant strands of the emergent consciousness- raising next iteration of Bauhaus 
experimentation with holistic visions found in the work by Gregory Bateson, 
Buckminster Fuller, Gene Youngblood, Stewart Brand and  others.
Following in Moholy- Nagy’s footsteps in his attempt to rethink design 
pedagogy from the ground up, Fuller published a curriculum of “design sci-
ence” that includes “general systems theory,” “theory of games (von Neumann),” 
and “cybernetics” alongside more traditional areas of scientific inquiry such as 
meteorology, geology, biology, and sciences of energy (Fuller 2008). The list 
also includes an area of scientific inquiry he calls “synergetics,” which examines 
“the be hav ior of  whole systems as unpredicted by the be hav ior of their separate 
parts” (78). The examples that he provides link the effects of the moon and 
sun on the earth within the solar system, as well as the exchange of gases by 
mammals necessary for plants and vice versa within the ecosystem. Each part 
requires the  others within the system, but the be hav ior of each separate part 
does not predict the be hav ior of the  others nor that of the system as a  whole 
(78). This curriculum appears in the first volume of Steward Brand’s Whole 
Earth Cata log (1968), which explic itly describes the proj ect instantiated by the 
cata log as one initiated by the writing, thinking, and strategies of Fuller. The 
curriculum Fuller proposes, as Sibyl Moholy- Nagy states when scanning the in-
tellectual horizon, reiterates Bauhaus biosocial concerns for the study of design 
writ large but does so in a manner that raises the stakes and scale exponentially.
Systems theory, as we have seen with Kepes’s New Landscape, always ad-
dresses concerns of scale and complexity. And a prob lem with systems, as noted 
by von Bertalanffy (1950), is that open social systems are much more complex 
and difficult to circumscribe than closed physical ones. For Moholy- Nagy’s and 
Kepes’s borrowing of systems theory, and indeed  going back to Wiener’s writ-
ings,  there is a continuum of systems that scale across  those domains found 
in their sociobiological concerns about technology and materiality. But this is 
64
chApter two
taken to even greater lengths by Buckminster Fuller in his musings on “general 
systems theory” in Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth— a title inviting con-
templation of scale if ever  there was one (2008, 65–82). Fuller claims that the 
challenge to systems theory is to think the biggest systems pos si ble: the planet 
within the solar system. Using his newly established field of “synergetics,” Fuller 
approaches the be hav ior of large- scale systems (in this case, the largest we have) 
and their constituent parts, including Earth, all life upon it, and the ecosystem 
in which that life functions. Fuller’s sci-fi imaginary positions  humans as astro-
nauts who must learn how to live in the closed system Spaceship Earth affords 
while understanding fully the rapidly changing nature of the ele ments in the 
systems. A year  later, Fuller wrote his famous introduction to Gene Young-
blood’s influential study, Expanded Cinema, where holistic design and think-
ing, as it is in Spaceship Earth, is in its fullest glory, helping establish him as a 
key countercultural futurist, and  doing so within an experimental visual arts 
context. Fuller enters the text in speculative fiction mode, positing telepathic 
communication between all unborn  children in utero, so- called womb landers 
that constitute, at the time of his writing, a quarter of the population of Africa 
(1970, 16). To protest against the conditions into which they would be born, in 
a kind of reverse or sideways Lysistrata revolt, an allusion one of them invokes 
telepathically to the  others, the womblanders in collective social re sis tance re-
fuse to leave their individual amniotic worlds (17). Fuller’s account becomes a 
springboard for thinking about long stretches of  human history, travel, and cross- 
cultural interaction to comment on current globalization and real- time telecom-
munication technologies for reshaping the  future of  human life on the earth.
One of Fuller’s primary targets is the false geometry of Cold War planetary 
divisions, without considering the liberatory potentialities of emergent com-
munication technologies. The visualizing technologies that Youngblood’s book 
(1970) discusses at length, the realm of expanded media, holds the potential for 
“Space Vehicle Earth” to awaken our sense of interconnected fragility within 
the biosphere of our benevolent, isolated sphere (Fuller 1970, 30–31).  These 
technologies, as theorized by Youngblood, can correct our “misorientations” 
of terrestrial power and control, Fuller claims,  toward the “forward, omni- 
humanity educating function of man’s total communication system” (34). 
Fuller closes by stating that Youngblood’s notion of the “Scenario- Universe 
principal” “must be employed to synchronize its senses and its knowledge” in 
order to ensure the survival of  those installed on “Space Vehicle Earth” (35).
Telepathic fetuses and geometries of power, subjugation and financial 
gain might at first glance seem a far cry from the pedagogical trajectory of 
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Moholy- Nagy and Kepes. Yet the claims for what the “expanded cinema uni-
versity” of the near  future can provide through “a synchronizing of the senses” 
and an alignment of knowledge attendant upon their technologically enhanced 
operation are consonant with Bauhaus- era utopianism and the insistence on 
the control and utilization of the full range of  human capabilities by Kepes 
and  others. The techno- utopian moment perhaps has arrived, but Fuller has 
seen such possibilities squandered before; thus  there is no breathless techno-
philic cheerleading  here. Rather, Fuller’s aim is a reckoning of  human capacities 
and limitations, an understanding of  human vulnerability in an ecosystem on 
a planet hurtling through inhospitable space. To recall the Bauhaus edict, he is 
looking for a biosocial perspective to emerge from technologies of visualization 
that expand  human sensorial perspective.
Youngblood’s own, rhetorically Fuller- fueled, analy sis of the implica-
tions of telecommunication technologies for humanity manages to combine 
the Bauhaus, the Macy conferences and the Esalen Institute, filtered through 
Fuller, Wiener, and McLuhan, each of whom is cited as an influence (Young-
blood 1970, 44). For Youngblood, the pre sent is what he terms “the Paleocy-
bernetic Age,” a portmanteau phrase he claims fuses the “primitive potential 
associated with the Paleolithic and the transcendental integrities of ‘practical 
utopianism’ associated with Cybernetic [sic]” (41). For Youngblood, expanded 
cinema actually means “expanded consciousness” through technological in-
novations that  will allow humanity “to be  free enough to discover who we 
are” through a somewhat oxymoronic, unmediated capacity for externalizing 
to  others our internal consciousness (41). The agenda is  grand, but perhaps 
no grander than the other experiments in holistic theorizing examined  here. 
The fractured visual environment reflecting a fractured sense of society’s rela-
tionship to the individual and the world sounded by Fuller and Youngblood 
echoes the challenges to art and design in the early de cades of the  century 
as recounted by Moholy- Nagy and Kepes. Expanded Cinema reiterates and 
scales their agenda for new materials and immaterialities that look to the same 
technologies responsible for rending the biosocial order as containing the 
conditions of possibility for mending it. If the visual field is in crisis, then it 
is up to art and design to fix it. Youngblood claims to be writing at the end of 
cinema as we have known it, and an end to a mass media being expanded and 
decentralized with emergent technologies, with a new wave of cinemas and at-
tendant worlds ready to emerge from the exponentially expanding visual field 




Mens et Manus: MIT and Untimely Interventions
The “Seminar on Technology and Culture at M.I.T.” convened in 1964 by the 
Episcopalian chaplain, for example, became a model of cross- disciplinary 
reflection; its premise was that since society’s prob lems are not generated in 
any single intellectual discipline, therefore one should not expect their resolu-
tion to lie in any one discipline,  either. — MIT Arts, “White Paper”
 Those of us who have contributed to the new science of cybernetics thus 
stand in a moral position which is, to say the least, not very comfortable. 
We have contributed to the initiation of a new science which, as I have said, 
embraces technical developments with  great possibilities for good and for 
evil. We can only hand it over into the world about us, and this is the world of 
Belsen and Hiroshima. We do not even have the choice of suppressing  these 
technical developments. They belong to the age, and the most any of us can 
do by suppression is to put the development of the subject into the hands 
of the most irresponsible and venal engineers. The best we can do is to see 
that a large public understands the trend and the bearing of the pre sent 
work, and to confine our personal efforts to  those fields, such as physiology 
and psy chol ogy, most remote from war and exploitation. — Norbert Wiener, 
Cybernetics
Many of the scientists involved in the Macy conferences had returned to uni-
versity life from war- related work, including Wiener, whose circular causality 
and its relation to computing for anti- aerial ballistics found purchase in many 
disciplines. The postwar hope was for a more unified scientific enterprise aimed 
at humane social pro gress and the benefit of humanity. Jones notes that Wie-
ner’s desire that cybernetics and systems theory would elude the fate of instru-
mental modernity found in the concentration camps was shared by Kepes and 
his work on cavs (2013, 532–533). Kepes’s first year  running cavs was de-
voted to proj ects that considered art and technology in relation to the “civic 
sphere” and the “total environment,” works generated to make  whole again 
the visual domain and  human positioning within it.  Others held similar ideas. 
The designer and frequent Eames Office collaborator George Nelson echoed 
Kepes with regard to the potentially healing power of design, art, and aesthet-
ics aligned with science and technology. Nelson expressed  these views in Prob­
lems of Design (1957), a book that led Kepes to invite Nelson to participate 
in the Vision + Value seminar. Such endeavors, as with the Macy conferences, 
would depend on collective rather than individual efforts, though cavs was 
more geared  toward outcomes than the Macy conferences’ more discursive en-
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vironment. Ragain describes the cavs structure as “perhaps most reminiscent 
of the collaborative research teams popu lar in corporate and scientific settings; 
tangible outcomes  were expected as well as a collectivist mindset” (2012). The 
collectivist mindset of research teams flourished at mit and other sites. How-
ever, what kinds of expertise entered  these labs was rapidly shifting in the post-
war de cades. For all the fears of fragmentation in a truly frightening world of 
atomic physics unleashed— used in vio lence and constitutive of a new geopo-
liti cal world order with potentially apocalyptic possibilities and certain ecolog-
ical trauma— the general corporate, university, scientific, and artistic consensus 
seemed to cluster around a firm belief in the lab/studio proj ect to “experiment” 
our way out of collective imperilment while feeding the demo cratic belief in 
collaboration as intrinsically beneficial to society. Even stripped of its progres-
sive Deweyan basis, the collective endeavor of cavs still fed into the larger but 
shifting vision of how to advance technology and the modern industrial state, 
a vision at odds with Kepes’s own, but one that allowed him to establish his 
center at mit.
If the Bauhaus in Germany developed a focus on tactility in design and art 
that drew some inspiration from Filippo Marinetti’s 1921 manifesto on “tactil-
ism,” as well as from the wealth of new materials provided by the early part of 
the twentieth  century (see Smith 2014), its  later manifestation with Kepes at 
cavs had to address the new dematerialized efforts of current technological 
explorations of pro cesses and simulation. Kepes’s own interests, though wide, 
almost always held an immaterial dimension in that he concentrated on vision 
and light, developing the basic course on light and color in Chicago that he 
brought to mit. This movement to the apparently immaterial ele ments of con-
temporary technology attracted the attention of Jack Burnham, who, in the 
last chapter of his book Beyond Modern Sculpture, argued for a move  toward 
systems and the dematerialization of art production (1968, 312–378). Burn-
ham’s and Kepes’s interests had aligned for years before the two started working 
together at cavs, and the issue of dematerialization was central to the critical 
practices of 1960s artists, as Lucy Lippard’s (1967) influential chronicle of the 
period attests. At cavs, Moholy- Nagy’s core Bauhaus princi ple of “experience 
with the material” (25) refines and questions the constitution of empirical ex-
perience with the material and immaterial world when put through post- Macy 
conference mit thinking, goals, and agendas.
Kepes wrote to Jack Burnham in 1967 to discuss the potential of cavs, as 
well as to covertly gauge his pos si ble interest in the center. Burnham responded 
enthusiastically and said the proj ect was “already twenty years  behind where 
it should be,” asserting that the logical moment of such an endeavor was 
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immediately following World War II— that is, around the time of the Macy 
Conferences ( Jones 2013, 528). In an impor tant sense, Kepes’s publications and 
exhibitions had indeed been pursuing collaborative interdisciplinary work all 
along, albeit without the institutional frame and imprimatur provided by the 
center. With cavs, he secured his platform, at least for a moment. The estab-
lishment of the center— his “creative gestalt” (quoted in Vallye 2013, 178)—in 
many ways was the apotheosis of his entire  career as an artist, teacher, and theo-
rist. It also proved to be an untimely intervention.
The capacity to work collaboratively with other sectors of the university 
and other disciplines, as well as within a community of artists, was the primary 
criterion Kepes used for the se lection of cavs fellows. Joining VanDerBeek, 
Piene, and Burnham in 1967  were Vassilakis Takis, Harold Tovish, Ted Kraynik, 
and Wen- Ying Tsai. Piene collaborated with Kepes on major public art proj ects 
and would eventually take over directorship of the center. The experimental 
filmmaker VanDerBeek arrived at cavs via Black Mountain College, where 
he had worked with Fuller, Cage, and Merce Cunningham— each of whom 
remained inspirations and collaborators for decades— before getting involved 
with Allan Kaprow’s “happenings.” Described by Gene Youngblood as a vision-
ary investigation into the “cultural and psychological implications” for the “Pa-
leocybernetic Age” (1970, 246), VanDerBeek’s experimental “Movie- Drome” 
displayed inside a repurposed grain silo suggested his desire for an infinite screen 
and immersive environments. This proj ect led him to computer- generated cin-
ematic experiments with Poem Field, an early computer- animated set of films 
initiated at Bell Labs that he continued working on at cavs.3 VanDerBeek’s 
work from the 1960s, as Gloria Sutton (2012, 313) argues, was in dialog with 
Kepes’s Language of Vision, making him a splendid interlocutor for the center 
and its director.
In a short documentary about his work at cavs punningly entitled Stan 
VanDerBeek: The Computer Generation!!, the filmmaker explains he has be-
come “an itinerant technological fruit picker,” or “a film plucker,” working col-
laboratively in ways “involving lots of machines and other  people,” such as com-
puter programmers, technology experts, scientific theorists, and other artists in 
a range of spaces.4 Freed from the studio by the means of telecommunication 
(modems and so on) and software storage, VanDerBeek highlights negotia-
tions between himself and  others, diff er ent technologies, human- machine rela-
tions, diff er ent languages, and new tools for artistic production. In one short 
sequence, VanDerBeek and his programmer/collaborator at the mit Architec-
tural Machine ponder the possibilities of creating an “electronic paintbrush” 
to complement the electronic pen they use to demonstrate to viewers diff er ent 
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kinds of software for art— such as a haptic program for onscreen fin ger paint-
ing—as well as computer- generated imagery. Drinking from mit’s cybernetic 
well, he includes a futural meditation on the possibilities afforded by electronic 
art platforms, especially tele vi sion and computers, that promise the creation of 
completely immersive environments capable of producing “homeostasis and 
balancing of our  whole mind and body.” The documentary concludes with 
a pitch for more labs like the one at mit to provide increased opportunities 
for artists to shape communication systems and networks. Predicting that 
art schools  will soon teach programming alongside life drawing, VanDerBeek 
claims that the challenge to the artist and “to society as a  whole” is to make  these 
tools accessible to all. Chanting the Kepes mantra, he says directly to camera: 
“we must reach out, communicate, balance our senses and live a good life.”
Both the sculptor Wen- Ying Tsai and the sculptor and theorist Burn-
ham explic itly wished to pursue systems, cybernetics, and “post- formalist” 
aesthetics while resident at the center. The Lincoln Laboratories at mit espe-
cially drew Burnham’s attention and found their way into several theoretical 
pieces he produced while a fellow at the center, including his highly influential 
1968 article “Systems Esthetics” for Artforum (2015d). Burnham’s interest in 
intelligent systems, artificial intelligence, and computer networks led him to 
seek out Marvin Minsky while at cavs. Minsky helped pioneer ai research 
with chess- playing programs and robotics, and his theoretical work helped 
formulate Burnham’s approaches to human- machine interactions. Burnham 
also was in regular contact with Nicholas Negroponte, then working at the 
Architecture Machine Group before it metamorphosed into the Media Lab, 
and which constituted the primary site for computing innovation at mit at 
the time. Building on ideas that provided the conclusion of his book Beyond 
Modern Sculpture, which opted for a systems or process- oriented understand-
ing of modern sculpture as opposed to an object- based one, and argued that 
a systems consciousness would replace the art object, Burnham published ar-
ticles while at cavs such as “The Aesthetics of Intelligent Systems” that, while 
not always explic itly socially progressive in the manner of Dewey, argued for 
an altogether diff er ent understanding of humanist assumptions, which in turn 
altered sociopo liti cal relations. Burnham also attempted to distance his own 
pedagogical approaches from  those held dear by the Bauhaus ethos by basing 
his  later teaching at Northwestern University on self- organizing models that he 
considered far removed from the  earlier collaborative and communal approach 
offered by Moholy- Nagy.
One issue regarding the increased engagement between art and technol-
ogy that concerned Burnham, who was generally favorable of such interactions, 
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concerned the scale of funds for cultural production that such proj ects en-
tailed. He found an example of this issue played out in Billy Klüver and Robert 
Rauschenberg’s 9 Eve nings: Theatre and Engineering events, which he explored 
in some detail in the article entitled “The  Future of Responsive Systems in Art” 
(Burnham 2015c). Although Burnham considers many of the ele ments of the 9 
Eve nings successful and laudatory— not least in the operating assumption that 
“a dehumanized scientific technology cannot help but destroy itself and the 
world around it,” but with artists providing the massive “social need for a sym-
biotic fusion between art and technology” (91)—he argues that the rising costs 
of technologically informed systems- art  will eventually lead to artists finding 
themselves as part of a “technological elite” in the same way “Nobel prize sci-
entists” have (95). Their entire position and role  will merge with that of big 
science: “rather than being  humble experimenters in the laboratory,” he writes, 
 these scientists and  future artists “are executives manipulating research money” 
and controlling the proj ects of  those working  under them (95). The critique, 
however, ends in a call for a Kantian moral imperative to understand the full 
ramifications of the integrated systems of nature yielding to the unavoidable 
responsibility society has  toward the technological systems that increasingly 
determine  human existence. In a move not unlike the Sartrean existential 
call placing morality in the hands of humanity  because  there is no recourse 
to a transcendental God, Burnham closes the essay by stating that as this new 
systems consciousness becomes vis i ble and material, “we are beginning to ac-
cept responsibility for the well- being and continued existence of life upon the 
Earth” (98).
Pivoting between the possibilities of technological development and the 
ontological dread resultant from it in terms of socioeconomic and politico- 
ethical be hav ior of  humans in relation to the natu ral and built environment, 
Burnham’s texts challenge, extend, and occasionally overturn the more san-
guine humanism and uncluttered progressivism of Kepes’s books and theoreti-
cal positionings. In this way, Burnham’s writings come closer to Wiener’s socio- 
philosophical concerns than they do Kepes’s written works. cavs proved 
an excellent black box for Burnham to think with, and he pushed the social 
agenda in ways less overtly polite than VanDerBeek or Kepes managed while 
keeping the general revolutionary spirit firmly intact.
In an echo of the warnings about the power relations inherent in art and 
technological collaboration, such as with the 9 Eve nings events, and where it 
could all too easily lead, especially with opportunities for instrumental and 
financial exploitation, Burnham reaches back to a historical example as a 
cautionary moment in his essay “Systems Esthetics” (2015d). Cozying up too 
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quickly and easily to engineering and technological thinking led, he notes, to 
artistic catastrophe for the Soviet Constructivists. A revolutionary movement 
embraced by Moholy- Nagy while in Berlin in the 1920s, the Soviet Construc-
tivists  were not much mentioned in the US at the time, except by Burnham 
and Fluxus ceo George Maciunas; as a group, they followed both “historical 
materialism and the scientific ethos” that quickly yielded to the “technological 
needs of Soviet Rus sia” (125). As artists, Burnham states, “they ceased to exist,” 
yielding to “a utilitarian aesthetic” that allowed artists to be “crushed amid the 
Stalinist anti- intellectualism” that followed the movement’s initial forays into 
socio- technical aesthetic exploration (125). Even though he provides a histori-
cal antecedent of warning, Burnham believes that the current moment of his 
writing offers ways to avoid the totalitarian impulses that destroyed the Con-
structivists due to an altogether diff er ent economic and material climate from 
that found in the US in the 1960s. While still clearly fraught with peril, making 
art in the age of systems means that artists are not engaged in “novel ways of 
rearranging surfaces and spaces,” but rather they are enmeshed in a larger exis-
tential, perhaps even evolutionary, proj ect (125). Burnham states that the com-
bination of art and technology in the current moment shifts from Homo faber, 
“man the maker (of tools and images)” to Homo arbiter formae, “man the maker 
of aesthetic decisions” (125). The further he wishes to distance himself from 
Moholy- Nagy and Bauhaus influences, it seems, the closer he comes to clos-
ing the circle, for the pedagogical goal of Moholy- Nagy was clearly to produce 
students capable of making con temporary aesthetic decisions of import for the 
larger community. Concluding the article in a way very similar to the ending of 
“The  Future of Responsive Systems in Art” (Burnham 2015c), he claims the de-
cisions now facing artists,  here serving as metonyms for all of humanity, “con-
trol the quality of all  future life on the earth” (Burnham 2015d, 125).
Implied in this claim, operating in the long mushroom- shaped shadow 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki while the Vietnam War raged in the jungles of 
Southeast Asia and the streets of the US, and again shot through with existen-
tialist inspired ethics, is the intimation that  these technological decisions  will 
determine not only the quality of life on the earth but the very continuance of 
that life. Caroline A. Jones argues that Burnham’s concluding paragraphs move 
rather quickly and elegantly from “the technocratic progressivism of Soviet 
Constructivism, the Bauhaus, and the Logical Positivists” implicated in some 
of the ele ments of systems theory to “Dewey- inflected pragmatism and Kepes’ 
ambitious new unity- of- science” desires as articulated at cavs, operating in 
what she calls “the crucible of cybernetics and systems that was mit” ( Jones 
2013, 531). The stakes of artistic, technological, and aesthetic making at cavs, 
72
chApter two
 housed in this crucible, for Burnham, Kepes, Wiener, and  others  were con-
sciously high. But it is worth noting that Burnham opens his article with a ges-
ture  toward Thomas Kuhn’s theories of paradigm shifts in scientific revolutions: 
as he closes the article he pauses to state the time for aesthetic decision- making 
about the  future of technology was evanescent, and once gone, perhaps gone for 
good, with a new paradigm waiting (out of structural necessity) to overturn the 
systems moment and its bioso cio log i cal opportunities as he saw them.
Otto Piene became the director of cavs  after Kepes, at a time when that 
temporal win dow for proper aesthetic decisions about technology that Burnham 
mentioned at the end of “Systems Esthetics” seemed to be closing. Along with 
Burnham and VanDerBeek, Piene was a fellow at cavs when it opened. He 
joined specifically to work on his “sky art” proj ects, and acquired helium for 
 these massive constructions through the cryogenic lab at mit (Wisnioski 2013, 
776). Intended as art for public spaces,  these works  were not flying objects but 
aleatory, floating ones, and thus depended explic itly on environmental condi-
tions without necessarily being environmental art. The ideas for Piene’s “sky 
art” emerged initially from his days with Group Zero in Dusseldorf and his 
experiences during World War II. Piene co- founded Group Zero on princi ples 
and interests similar to  those at cavs, as Kepes noted, and his move to the 
center followed a logical trajectory.
While at mit, Piene also worked with Harold Edgerton on strobe- lit 
sculpture and the development of “cybernetic sculptures,” continuing his long- 
held interest in scientifically informed aesthetics (Bijvoet 1997, 46). Gene 
Youngblood, borrowing a phrase from Buckminster Fuller, called Piene a “de-
sign scientist” (Wisnioski 2013, 780). The son of a physicist, Piene claimed that 
the center  under him was diff er ent from what it was  under Kepes  because he 
wished to foreground “making,” the need for “dirt” studios and making new 
 things by getting one’s hands dirty. Kepes, he said, wrote “beautiful books” and 
had “wonderful ideas” that he felt bought the center more purchase in its early 
days (786). When Piene took over cavs in 1974, he expanded its brief to in-
clude environmental arts, media arts, and events/happenings. This expanded 
the reach of cavs across mit and into the public realm. Piene’s emphasis on 
environmental arts moved CAVS away from the criticisms leveled at Kepes’ 
exhibits for supposedly glorifying the military- university- technology nexus. 
Nonetheless, Piene came  under specific attack for his “sky art” proj ects as well 
as other cavs initiatives even though the center  under his directorship refused 
defense research funding (786).
With Kepes still at the head of the center, the 1970 cavs- directed exhi-
bition at the Smithsonian, Explorations, sought to bring the ethics of techno-
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logical innovation directly into dialog with aesthetic production and artistic 
institutional display habits and priorities. Kepes’s cata log for the show was en-
titled  Toward Civic Art and stated the exhibition’s goals  were to get “art and the 
public to come together” through technological innovation and its potentials 
rather than have the civic sphere cleaved by them (1971, n.p.). But the civic space 
that the show directed its aims at was a polis torn asunder by war, economics, 
race, and the seemingly endless stream of technological innovation for military 
and governmental control of that same civic sphere. The exhibition featured 
several cavs artists, such as Burnham, Piene, and VanDerBeek, who  were in-
vited to bring the ethos of the center to the country’s po liti cal center through 
one of its most revered cultural institutions. It comes as no surprise that the 
exhibition was plagued by financial, technological, and critical prob lems. One 
highlight of the exhibition, though, was VanDerBeek’s Panels for the Walls of 
the World, which deployed images, collages, drawings, and photos (often from 
the news) essentially streamed live from mit by VanDerBeek through newly 
 developed fax machines (by Xerox) for display on an ever- changing set of 
walls at the Smithsonian.5 The dynamic and pro cessual nature of the work 
spoke to the civic cybernetic goal of the exhibition stated in the cata log to 
place art and museumgoers in a “live audience feedback.” VanDerBeek, draw-
ing on his long- standing Black Mountain influences and friendships, as well as 
his continued engagement and dialog with Fuller and Marshall McLuhan, re-
lated this proj ect to aspirations he had for his Movie- Drome: a site of real- time 
communications overcoming time- space constraints to bring  people together to 
engage visual materials and produce communicational communities from them. 
Although the networked ideas underpinning the work relied still on broadcast 
technologies, in a sense the piece intimated an emergent decentralized means of 
communication and media that anticipated internet discursive idealism. How-
ever, grounded in the moment, the more immediate demand was one that Fuller 
articulated in 1965, to encourage artists, designers, engineers, and the general 
public to develop “a design revolution that would put an end to the basic  causes 
of war” (quoted in Sutton 2015, 63). An attempt to heal the ongoing divisions 
of the Cold War, then red hot in Vietnam, but  housed within the Smithson-
ian and sponsored by mit, VanDerBeek’s message was largely lost in ambient 
social noise.
And so the controversies continued and the new director of cavs often 
found himself in the crosshairs. Piene’s “sky art” was singled out by Sid Lewis of 
the Situationist- inspired group Council for Conscious Existence as being “the 
advanced guard of the cybernetic welfare state, the reconsecration of order, no 
longer with God as ruler, but with technology raised to myth in the perfect 
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order of zombies” (quoted in Wisnioski 2013, 188). The colorful pamphleteering 
in Lewis’s rhe toric raises a central issue for arts investment at research universi-
ties, especially one so tethered to defense as mit.
The Media Lab: Experiment Yields to Opportunity
The institutional self- representation about art and science/technology ex-
perimentation at mit, as indicated in its “Arts at mit White Paper” (2011), 
might well have been instigated by cavs, but the true center of how mit is 
sensorially inventing the  future is the Media Lab, the site for which Stewart 
Brand coined the phrase “inventing the  future.” The Media Lab has long been 
a shining star for mit, and it is likely so for a number of reasons, most es-
pecially its digital championing of the individual rather than the social as its 
target audience. This championing complements and furthers the fundamental 
role that the digital has played in neoliberal reconfigurations of the general 
US economy. With the passing of the Bayh– Dole Act in 1980, the year that 
the Media Lab was launched, universities and small businesses could apply for 
patents based on research from federally funded proj ects, which spoke deeply 
to the coffers of university r&d centers. The Media Lab’s co- founder Jerome 
Wiesner’s pithy formulation that “if you look carefully, an awful lot of the 
media technology is art, and the art is technology” syntactically bestows tech-
nology and art positions of ontological equivalence through the grammatical 
leveling of the copula. Nonetheless, the Media Lab has not been much inter-
ested in art or the arts, or even full-bore experimentation for that  matter, with 
its corporate- directed gaze. So it is of  little surprise that the statements issued 
from the Media Lab and cavs about each other should reveal a kind of antipo-
dal set of institutional goals and values.
Wiesner was president of mit when the Media Lab first opened its doors 
in 1980  after a massive capital- building campaign. He left the president’s of-
fice to join Nicholas Negroponte as co- founder of the lab. More Negroponte’s 
brain child than Wiesner’s, the latter provided administrative and intellectual 
heft to the new endeavor. Wiesner, in many ways, perfectly embodied the lab’s 
initial exploratory interests. Cultured and accomplished, Wiesner was friends 
with Picasso and Alexander Calder, and founded the Rad Lab, the most suc-
cessful of mit’s World War II defense technology breakthroughs. Prior to 
working at mit, he collected folk songs with Alan Lomax in the 1940s for the 
Smithsonian folk  music proj ect, and  later that de cade he attended the Macy 
conferences where he collaborated with fellow mit scientist Norbert Wiener, 
whose thinking would guide Wiesner’s own interdisciplinary lab in the 1950s. 
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The transition from Architecture Machine to the Media Lab in 1985, with the 
opening of the Wiesner Building (which had originally been called the Place 
for the Arts at mit), meant a shift from primarily defense research to industry- 
funded research (Negroponte and Steenson 2013, 806–807).
The initial proposal for the lab argued for a new kind of education that 
would combine “two rapidly evolving and very diff er ent fields: information 
technologies and the  human sciences” (quoted in Heims 1991, 279). The lab 
received funding from ibm, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, Apple, and 
the Defense Advanced Research Proj ects Agency (darpa), and  these kinds 
of funding sources— corporate and military— proved a dividing line between 
Piene and Negroponte. The lab offered an explic itly promotional technophilic 
engagement with the digital, championing high tech’s applications to all as-
pects of daily life. Such an ethos permeated the lab, and continues to do so 
(279). The Media Lab has become the primary precursor of con temporary art- 
technology labs operating with and through the digital  because it is no longer 
concerned (and perhaps never was) with investigating prob lems, as was the case 
with the School of Design or cavs, but rather with facilitating individual op-
portunity and monetizing new technologies for the market and consumption. 
A general vision of and belief that studio and lab can combine for the bet-
terment (and increased profitability) of the US and indeed the world and its 
prob lems remains central to mit and its many arts- based labs such as cast 
and the Media Lab.
Negroponte would distance his pedagogy from that held dear by  those 
who simplistically espouse Moholy- Nagy’s famous dictum “every one is tal-
ented,” or perhaps merely modify it with the phrase “if aided with the proper 
technology.” “The impact of computers on the arts,” he says, “ will be bringing out 
the artist in all of us. Much of it  will be like hanging the child’s paintings on the 
icebox. It  doesn’t have any meaning outside the  family circle, but its very impor-
tant to the local constituency. You’ll see a return of the Sunday painter” (quoted 
in Brand 1987, 83).  There are impor tant differences though in the vision for art, 
technology, and aesthetic training that signal the shift from the biosocial com-
monweal of the 1930s and 1940s to that espoused in the 1980s. The goal beyond 
the individual has been circumscribed to the nuclear  family as “a local constitu-
ency” of influence for the occasional artist. For Moholy- Nagy, Kepes, Piene, 
and  others, of course, the aim is much grander and progressive— more of an ex-
periment in techno- social aesthetic training than a consumer good and hobby 
that could be fun for the  whole  family but irrelevant beyond that tiny circle.
“The binding princi ple at the Media Lab, the primary theme,” Negro-
ponte revealed when addressing a group of potential Media Lab funders in 
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1986, “is personalization” (quoted in Brand 1987, 150). The external private 
funding and investment from corporations, coupled with occasional federal 
government monies, to further the personalization of computing and media 
technologies plays perfectly into a socioeconomic model that  favors the indi-
vidual actor who, in making rational choices for individual good, creates the 
collective good. Rather than having the social as the explicit goal of innovation, 
the model the Media Lab operates with has an assumption of the common-
weal as a collateral, rather than a primary, result. Writing about Negroponte’s 
position, though, Steward Brand reverts to his Buckminster Fuller- influenced 
communal techno- utopian ideals and contradicts Negroponte’s assessment by 
stating that the primary theme of the Media Lab is not personalization but 
“conversation”— conversation “with and through computers” (151). Such a sen-
timent invokes more than a hint of Wiener’s cybernetic ideals, ones with which 
Wiesner worked in the 1950s, using cybernetics as the foundation for the en-
compassing theme of communication at his Research Laboratory in Electron-
ics (134). But how the Media Lab has evolved from the Architecture Machine 
and away from cavs is succinctly stated by Negroponte and Piene respectively. 
Negroponte: “This is not an advanced art school” (quoted in Brand 1987, 83). 
Piene: “The offspring of the Media Lab are Media Lab type  things and the off-
spring of the Center are mostly artistic  things. And thank goodness. We never 
considered ourselves part of mit  doing what other  people at mit are  doing 
very well” (quoted in Wisnioski 2013, 785).
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The Hands- On Pro cess
Engineering Collaboration at E.A.T.
Friction is as necessary to generate esthetic energy as it is to supply the 
energy that drives machinery.
— John Dewey, Art as Experience
Bell Telephone Laboratories, Incorporated was formed 
out of the engineering department of the Western Electric 
Com pany in 1925 and based on West Street in New York 
City, where the building complex extended back a full city 
block. Several facilities  were based in New Jersey, includ-
ing the radio research stations at Whippany, where the 
first experimental tele vi sion broadcast in the US was con-
ducted in 1927, and Holmdel, where radio astronomy was in ven ted in 1932. It 
was south of Whippany, however, at Murray Hill that the expanding Bell Labs 
would make its New Jersey center of operations in 1941.  Imagined from the 
start as a custom- built r&d fa cil i ty, the purpose of the proposed new lab com-
plex, Bell president Frank Baldwin Jewett told local residents in 1931, “is some-
thing along the lines of a miniature college or university” (quoted in Mozingo 
2011, 56). The  Great Depression held up the proj ect, but the site, designed by 
landscape architects Olmstead  Brothers and architects Voorhees, Walker, 
Foley, and Smith, was eventually completed in 1942, with additional buildings 
added in 1949 and 1958, by which time Fortune magazine was willing to name 
Bell Labs “The World’s Greatest Industrial Laboratory” (Bello 1958).1
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The pastoral surrounding was a key feature of the lab, and though the fin-
ished site had less of a campus feel than the original early 1930s design prom-
ised, the stress on intellectual and creative freedom remained. A 1954 feature 
in Business Week typically noted that the rural setting of Murray Hill gave the 
site a “university ambiance,” while wondering how the “notoriously uncontrol-
lable” scientists “can be kept working in such fruitful harmony without vis i ble 
control” (quoted in Mozingo 2011, 62). The impression of freedom noted  here 
was a power ful effect of the campus- like surroundings, marked by an appar-
ent absence of corporate oversight and disinterest in commercial affairs. Such 
an effect was in part designed, as Louise Mozingo explains, “to attract, foster, 
separate, and elevate the research activities” of the Bell scientists, an intention 
which the success of the labs seemed to confirm (2011, 64).
While the conception of the Murray Hill campus preceded World War 
II, the site was completed amid the massive surge in government funding for 
new technologies that accompanied the war. In the first few years  after Pearl 
Harbor, writes Jon Gertner, “Bell Labs took on nearly a thousand diff er ent 
proj ects for the military— every thing from tank radio sets to communications 
systems for pi lots wearing oxygen masks to enciphering machines for scram-
bling secret messages” (Gertner 2013, 62). Murray Hill was bigger and more 
prestigious than other industrial laboratories, and internationally recognized 
alongside Harvard and mit (Knowles and Leslie 2001, 22). General research 
director Mervin J. Kelly had built up a strong solid- state physics group during 
the 1930s, including three  future Nobel Prize  winners, and Bell Labs, accord-
ing to Knowles and Leslie, “beat other industrial and academic groups to the 
transistor largely  because of the interdisciplinary collaboration and engineer-
ing resources unique to Murray Hill” (24).
It was with regard to disciplinarity that the Murray Hill lab self- consciously 
differed from the university model.  There  were no buildings for separate depart-
ments, and staff members with diff er ent expertise and roles  were expected to 
work together (Gertner 2013, 56). When Kelly became executive vice president 
in 1945 he set about restructuring the organ ization by creating interdisciplin-
ary groupings— “combining chemists, physicists, metallurgists, and engineers; 
combining theoreticians with experimentalists” (79)—to work on new electronic 
technologies. The attempt to cultivate free- ranging intellectual inquiry at Bell 
Labs was in keeping with the emerging consensus on the value of interdisciplinary 
collaboration. It was also a means of avoiding the kind of compartmentalization 
that, by the 1950s, was identified as one of the worrying hallmarks of Ameri-
can social conformism. The new, affluent research universities and laborato-
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ries  were driven less obviously by disinterested intellectual inquiry, despite the 
pleas of basic research advocates like Vannevar Bush, and more by the demands 
of the military and business. The everyday responsibilities of the government- 
sponsored scientific researcher was as likely to involve, in addition to research 
itself, managing contracts, proj ects, and staff, and committee and government 
agency work. The bureaucratic demands of the new order, increasingly set 
 either on campus itself or in faux university environments like Murray Hill, 
produced a kind of r&d version of William H. Whyte’s organ ization man (see 
Kaiser 2004).
Coupled with the demands that researchers comply with the patriotic 
ethos of cooperative loyalty to their proj ect and their laboratory, the federally 
funded scientist’s workload suggested that the pressures of research work left 
 little room to be, as Business Week  imagined scientists, “notoriously uncontrol-
lable.” Yet the article on Bell Labs’ pastoral ambience had already half- answered 
its own question about how the work would get done in such luxurious sur-
roundings when it recognized that, despite the expansiveness of the surround-
ings, “Partly the Freedom is illusory. The lab has firm plans and knows precisely 
what it wants. . . .  Over the years men have been meticulously selected and 
precisely trained. Men chosen to fit the mold  will fall into the desired pattern 
without any pressure from the mold itself ” (quoted in Mozingo 2011, 62). The 
interdisciplinary openness, and the easy ambiance of the environment at Bell 
Labs, belied, according to this account, a more ingrained sense of discipline 
that required no compulsion. While it is unlikely that Business Week was de-
veloping a critique of the organ ization man in  these comments, the grudging 
admiration of the Murray Hill campus is modified by the assumption that the 
rigor of the organ ization’s se lection and training pro cesses has rendered such 
temptations redundant.
The Business Week assessment prob ably says more about how the business 
world  imagined the lives of scientific researchers than about scientists them-
selves, but it is true that the challenge of protecting intellectual freedom amid 
an increasingly bureaucratized workplace environment remained a prob lem. 
As well as facilitating interdisciplinary movement across fields by avoiding 
discipline- specific buildings, Murray Hill further sought to engineer fluidity 
by making the laboratories themselves physically flexible. The buildings had no 
fixed partitions and rooms, and equipment and facilities could be assembled 
and taken apart at short notice. As depicted in a 1944 article in Life magazine, 
the impression of the magically appearing research lab stresses the capacity of 
the com pany to fit research around the needs of the scientist (see figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.1.  One of the 
 pop-up laboratories at Bell 
Labs’ Murray Hill campus, 
featured in Life magazine, 
September 18, 1944, p. 79.
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The conception of the Cold War scientist, then, oscillated between the 
internalized discipline of the managerial class and the freewheeling inventive-
ness of the creative individual. Bell Labs, unhindered by the institutional and 
disciplinary loyalties of conventional university departments, managed to 
combine this mixture of conformity and free- thinking by cultivating inven-
tiveness within, as Business Week suspected, a regime of rigorous se lection and 
training. In this, Bell was able to harness something of the glamour and prestige 
associated with postwar scientific research while maintaining its business and 
military connections. Yet even within the innovative structure of Bell Labs, it 
is hard to see how such a corporate, managed environment might appeal to 
workers in the arts. Nevertheless, during the 1960s Bell became a focal point 
for arts- and- technology activity.
In part, the lure of the laboratory for non- scientists may be due to what 
used to be called cultural lag— the public cele bration of physicists in par tic u lar, 
and scientists and technologists in general, during the 1950s created a perception 
of scientists as the true visionaries of the pre sent, the avant- garde of the American 
 century, powered by government largesse and public acclaim. While the pioneer 
phase of nuclear physics, with its eccentric Eu ro pean émigrés and charismatic 
leaders, was mostly over by the end of the 1950s, replaced by bureaucratic sprawl 
helmed by the big science organ ization men described by David Kaiser, the per-
sis tent aura of the scientist as a heroic innovator remained a persuasive prospect.2 
From a more practical point of view, the resources that research in science and 
technology had at its disposal  were a more immediate source of attraction to 
artists. Many of the artists who became involved in art- and- technology proj ects 
during the 1960s thought mainly about how science and technology might be 
brought to bear on artistic prob lems— either practically and technically, in re-
lation to materials and production, or theoretically through the introduction 
of new modes of expression (such as computers). In terms of prestige and re-
sources, science and technology promised much for artists.
Less obvious, though no less impor tant, is the question of how and why 
scientific and technological researchers might be interested in, and willing to 
become involved with, artists. If the allure of the laboratory for artists lay in the 
promise of other wise inaccessible expertise and novel materials and methods, 
the attraction among science and technology professionals for art is less clear, 
especially now that the notion of the creative scientist had become a plausible 
framework within which to situate research. As we have seen, however, the pos-
sibility of the laboratory as a space for creative investigation and invention was 
more of an aspiration than a real ity for most research scientists. The idea of the 
scientist as creator, though, fortified by Cold War social science’s cele bration 
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of creativity as the engine of liberty, remained as power ful a spur among sci-
entists and engineers as it did for artists. The Bell Labs model of interdisci-
plinary collaboration appeared to offer a solution to the restricted demands 
of specialized and compartmentalized research that might be extrapolated to 
resolve the “two cultures” prob lem that notionally continued to prevent scien-
tists and artists from collectively pooling their creative energies. This, at least, 
was the thinking  behind what would become perhaps the most ambitious art 
and technology proj ect of the 1960s, Bell scientist Billy Klüver’s Experiments 
in Art and Technology.
While American art certainly did not command the same high status as 
American science in the 1950s and 1960s, the ascendancy of New York as the 
center of the global art world and the “triumph” of American art during the 
postwar period did elevate the self- image of American artists and aligned them 
with the perceived cutting edge of American innovation.3 To some degree, 
then, the desire to forge an alliance of art and technology is an  imagined 
coming together of the  great creative forces of the day. Klüver joined the 
Communication Sciences Division at Bell Labs in 1958, where he worked on 
backward- wave magnetron amplifiers, linear tubes, and small- signal power- 
conservation theorems. Klüver was far from the organ ization man, however, 
and  whether it was Murray Hill’s history of interdisciplinary collaboration 
or the labs’ geo graph i cal proximity to New York City that encouraged him, 
Klüver soon found himself deep inside the art world.
Klüver had assisted artists in developing proj ects since he worked with 
Jean Tinguely in the construction of Homage to New York, his self- destructing 
sculpture machine, in 1960. It is around this time that Klüver began inviting 
artists to Murray Hill. “From 1960 on,” he  later explained, “I brought some 50 
to 100 artists through Bell Labs,” providing a tour of the site and exposure to 
advanced technological experiments other wise inaccessible to outsiders. The 
artists could see, he noted, “the hands-on pro cess and that one could actually 
do  things” (Ramljek 1991, 32). By the spring of 1966, Klüver’s involvement 
with artists was notable enough for him to make the cover of the in- house Bell 
Labs magazine the Reporter. In a guest editorial by Klüver’s boss John R. Pierce, 
executive director of the Research Communications Sciences Division, Pierce 
reminded readers that the collaboration between engineers and artists was 
nothing new at Bell Labs. In the 1930s, engineer Harvey Fletcher worked with 
composer Leopold Stokowski on stereophonic sound, and the labs’ research on 
speech, hearing, and visual perception had a hand in the development of sound 
in films and the beginnings of tele vi sion. Frequent visitors to the labs, noted 
Pierce, included the conductor Hermann Scherchen and the composers Ger-
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ald Strong, Milton Babbitt, Vladimir Ussachevsky, and Otto Luening, as well 
as Edgard Varèse, who sought assistance from Bell with the electronic aspects 
of his Déserts (premiered 1954). “We are now,” Pierce claimed, “in a period of 
increasing appreciation of the impact that science and engineering can have 
on art. We are also becoming aware of the fact that art can have an impact on 
science and engineering” (Pierce 1966, 1). An effectively designed telephone, 
he wrote, is not the result of “an occult effort of artistic genius” but of the com-
bined energies of engineers, designers, and psychologists (1). The “intellectual 
barriers of the compartmentalization of the past” are, according to Pierce, 
being destroyed by  human understanding and knowledge and he  imagined a 
 future where the barriers “of ignorance and temperament” that divide science 
and the arts  will be overcome (1).
Pierce’s faith in interdisciplinary knowledge exchange reflects the Bell 
ethos and a recognition of the commercial benefits to be gained by cultivating 
relations with creative types. A sometime science- fiction writer, Pierce super-
vised the team that developed the first transistor (and was responsible for naming 
it) and worked extensively on satellites, including Telstar, the first communica-
tions satellite. He was also, as indicated in the name checking of composers, a 
prominent researcher in computer  music, a field he pursued  after retirement at 
Stanford’s Center for Computer Research in  Music and Acoustics.4 Klüver’s in-
volvement with con temporary art was, then, less unlikely than first appears, and 
Pierce himself had, around the same time as Klüver, started inviting artists to 
Bell Labs and welcomed composers such as James Tenney to Murray Hill. Ten-
ney worked at Bell Labs for around two and a half years, from September 1961 to 
March 1964, collaborating with Pierce, Max Mathews, and  others on computer- 
synthesized sound. At the time, Tenney observed  later, “they found it remark-
able that anybody in the outside world would be interested in what they  were 
 doing” (quoted in Kahn 1999). The same, of course, might be said for much of 
the art world activity of the early 1960s, which occupied its own insular realm. 
 People like Tenney and his then wife, artist Carolee Schneemann, bounced 
back and forth between the mutually supportive environments of Murray Hill 
and New York City, as did Klüver and the Bell Labs engineers.
A third site triangulates Bell Labs and the New York art world and pro-
vides an articulation of a generalized sense of shared mission among the sci-
entific and artistic avant- garde. Less than twenty miles south of Bell Labs, the 
Rutgers University– Douglass College cluster of educators, artists, and students 
comprised what Claes Oldenburg called the New Jersey School: Allan Kaprow, 
George Segal, George Brecht, Robert Whitman, Robert Watts, Lucas Samaras, 
Geoffrey Hendricks, and Roy Lichtenstein (see Marter 1999). Kaprow had 
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taught art at Rutgers since 1953 (though he was refused tenure and left in 1961), 
the same year Watts began teaching at Douglass and Brecht settled in New 
Jersey to work as a chemist at Johnson and Johnson. Hendricks joined the 
Rutgers staff in 1956, and Samaras was a Rutgers undergraduate. It was while 
teaching at Rutgers between 1960 and 1964 that Lichtenstein developed his 
interest in paintings derived from commercial printing pro cesses. And it was 
Segal, living on a chicken farm in nearby South Brunswick, who introduced 
the Rutgers crowd to John Cage, whose Black Mountain College experiments 
in multimedia per for mance anticipated the environments and per for mances 
staged by Kaprow and his New Jersey associates through the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. Segal, Kaprow, and Watts all attended Cage’s experimental com-
position class at the New School for Social Research in New York City, as did 
George Maciunas. The emerging Fluxus activity around Maciunas, Brecht, 
and Kaprow drew heavi ly on the New Jersey contingent— Klüver and his girl-
friend Letty Eisenhauer (who studied with Watts at Douglass and was to be-
come Lichtenstein’s girlfriend) both featured in Kaprow events, as did per for-
mance artists Schneemann and Olga Adorno (who married Klüver).
Bell Labs, in short, despite its appearance as a suburban, buttoned-up cor-
porate enclave, was a key node in a network of technological and artistic in-
novation throughout the early part of the 1960s. The current of influence, and 
admiration, surged both ways, as composers and artists picnicked on the lawns 
at Murray Hill while Klüver assisted artists with technical  matters in Manhat-
tan. The collaborative spirit of the Fluxus proj ects and the interdisciplinary in-
vestigations at Bell Labs, while radically diff er ent in many ways, equally drew 
on the Deweyan ethos of thinking by  doing— what Klüver would recall as the 
“hands-on pro cess.” The sense of shared purpose was clear enough to Klüver, 
who went on to develop his guided tours for artists into a fully fledged network 
of engineering and artistic collaboration.
Klüver the Transducer
For a lecture to be delivered at mit on April 21, 1967, five months  after Ex-
periments in Art and Technology (E.A.T.) was established, Klüver divided his 
material into four sections. The first was to be a taped introduction accompa-
nied by eighty slides, each shown for ten seconds, beamed from six carousel 
projectors. The slides would themselves come in four “waves”: con temporary 
art works; Claes Oldenburg “happenings”; black and white shots taken back-
stage at 9 Eve nings: Theatre and Engineering, the series of multimedia events 
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Klüver hosted, with, among  others, Cage and Rauschenberg, at the 69th Regi-
ment Armory in New York in October  1966; and fi nally, color images of 9 
Eve nings itself. This compressed audiovisual contextualization of Klüver’s 
proj ect not only demonstrated E.A.T.’s commitment to Bell- style multimedia 
communications but also acknowledged the inspirational influence, through 
its distillation in Oldenburg, of the Rutgers contingent’s emphasis on pro-
cess and per for mance. Most importantly, 9 Eve nings provided Klüver with 
evidence that his orga nizational chops  were sufficiently developed to pull off 
a complex, high- visibility arts and technology event. It was 9 Eve nings that 
inspired Klüver, his Bell colleague Fred Waldhauer, Robert Rauschenberg, and 
Robert Whitman to form E.A.T., and it was the Armory events, symbolically 
performed at the venue responsible for hosting the epochal 1913 International 
Exhibition of Modern Art (or Armory Show, as it is commonly known) that 
brought Eu ro pean modernism to the attention of the American public, that 
captured for Klüver the spirit of experimental overreach and glitch- prone ad-
venturism he wanted E.A.T. to disseminate throughout the networks he aimed 
to create among engineers, inventors, industrialists, business leaders, and artists 
of all stripes.
Impossible to summarize, Klüver and his associates hurled every thing 
Bell engineers could supply at the 9 Eve nings events. Deploying four dancers 
(Deborah Hay, Yvonne Rainer, Lucinda Childs, Steve Paxton), two musicians 
( John Cage, David Tudor), four visual artists (Robert Rauschenberg, Öyvind 
Fahlström, Alex Hay, Robert Whitman), and over thirty engineers from Bell 
Labs, 9 Eve nings variously used closed- circuit tele vi sion and tele vi sion projec-
tion, fiber  optic and infrared tele vi sion cameras, a Doppler sonar device, porta-
ble wireless fm transmitters and amplifiers, and a multitude of complex video, 
sound, and light projection systems. Cage repurposed telephones, transistor 
radios, Geiger  counters, contact microphones, and the brain waves of his col-
laborators to generate a real- time composition from sound siphoned through his 
numerous receivers into the Armory speakers. Rainer choreographed perform-
ers from the balcony using a walkie- talkie, while Rauschenberg staged a tennis 
match with amplified racquets that  were also wired to cut the lights in the au-
ditorium each time a ball was hit.5 For Klüver, as he would explain to his mit 
audience the following spring, this was merely a taste of what a successful or-
chestration of Amer i ca’s twin art and technology avant- gardes might achieve.
The creative energy Klüver believed E.A.T. was capable of generating was 
commensurate with the con temporary sense of US cultural ascendancy. Klüver 
was not shy in admitting that E.A.T. was catching the wave, and his taped 
86
chApter three
introduction to the mit pre sen ta tion, over the surge of the first wave of slides, 
announced the triumph of American culture:
Over the last 15 years the best Con temporary Art has been produced in 
the United States. During this period at least three original schools of 
painting and sculpture have originated or found their form  here. The 
most in ter est ing development in modern dance is American. The best 
con temporary writer is an American. A new form of theater has devel-
oped and is currently being absorbed by the commercial theater. The most 
in ter est ing new development in film making comes from New York.6
The establishment of New York City as the capital of the art world was, for 
Klüver, an achieved fact;  there are, he pointed out, some one thousand artists 
working in the city, and around five hundred artists from around the world 
travel to New York to meet American artists and show their work. “The rich-
ness and variety of con temporary American art,” Klüver insisted, “far exceeds 
what was produced in Paris during the Golden Years of the Twenties.”
Klüver took Claes Oldenburg as his primary example  because Oldenburg 
seemed to best characterize the con temporary artist’s “transgression” of disci-
plinary bound aries—in the case of Oldenburg, from painter and sculptor to 
theater writer. Klüver’s brief description of Oldenburg’s practice in staging the 
1962 happenings emphasized the process- led modifications that took place 
throughout. “Unskilled actors”  were used as the artist’s “primary material,” and 
the script changed during rehearsals to fit the “character and peculiarity of each 
par tic u lar performer.” By the end of the pro cess, Klüver noted, “sometimes 
 every detail in the original script had been changed.” The keynote  here, for 
Klüver, is transformation: the artist moves across disciplines and is responsive 
to the environment while maintaining agency and control. As a prelude to his 
introduction to 9 Eve nings, the happenings establish a pre ce dent and a method 
that the Armory events radically amplify. On 9 Eve nings, Klüver stressed the 
numbers: ten artists, thirty engineers clocking in 8,500 engineering hours, over 
thirty technical proj ects, each developed out of an artist’s idea. The event, ex-
plained Klüver, was a “deliberate attempt to prove a point”— that “they could 
talk and work together.” Despite difficulties, “every one seems to agree that the 
collaboration was a fact.” For Klüver, the real lesson of 9 Eve nings was not aes-
thetic but orga nizational: he had proved the point that collaboration could 
happen.
The talk for which this thirteen-minute audiovisual section served as an 
introduction was called, with a deft removal of connectives that gives the title 
an equation- like efficiency, “Interface: Artist/Engineer,” and Klüver’s broader 
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aim was to explain the purpose of E.A.T.7 Only five months old, the new proj-
ect had been kick- started with $8,000 from John High tower at the New York 
State Council on the Arts that allowed E.A.T. to establish an office on the top 
floor of 9 East Sixteenth Street, where the organ ization held a weekly open 
 house on Sundays. The purpose of E.A.T. was not to provide technical ser vices 
for artists, though Klüver had initially thought along  these lines, his own in-
volvement with artists having begun when he lent his expertise to Tinguely and 
in his subsequent work helping Rauschenberg construct Oracle, as well as the 
technical assistance he gave Jasper Johns with the use of neon and in repairing 
one of the spinning discs of Marcel Duchamp’s Rotoreliefs (see Klüver 1994). 
Instead, at Rauschenberg’s insistence, E.A.T. aimed to facilitate genuine col-
laboration across the arts, sciences, and industry capable of generating unfore-
seen new forms and ideas (Miller 1998, 28). This ambitious goal was the theme 
of Klüver’s talk at mit.
He launched the talk on interdisciplinary collaboration with a survey of 
con temporary art  because, Klüver explained, the new relationship between art 
and technology had “been born out of the direction and the nature of con-
temporary art itself ” (1967b, 2). Historically, argued Klüver, technology had 
provided new materials, techniques, and imagery for art, but it was rarely in-
spired by art.  After Duchamp, according to Klüver, it was clear that “the vector 
space that forms the world of the artist must never be experienced as a com-
plete set. The artist must be conscious of the pro cess of being an artist and 
hence of his own unawareness, of his not- knowing” (3). In other words, art has 
become a reflexive pro cess of exploration unencumbered by an adherence to 
traditional tools or methods and unconstrained by an expected outcome. The 
meaning of art, Klüver insisted, “is not to communicate what we already know 
but what we  don’t know, to dislocate our vision, to make us look, to make us 
aware of our traces and tracks” (3). The con temporary artist “needs access to 
the con temporary world and he wants to be part of the world of the  future”; he 
“sees the engineer as his collaborator, his material and his inspiration” (7). The 
ultimate purpose of E.A.T., claimed Klüver, “ will be to act as a transducer be-
tween the artist and industry, to protect the artist from industry and industry 
from the artist, to translate the artist’s dreams into realistic technical proj ects. 
We also hope that we  will accumulate enough experience to give help to other 
institutions who want to set up similar cooperative programs” (15–16).
The evidence of only five months of operations suggested to Klüver that 
they  were on to something. Klüver explained that E.A.T. had received appli-
cations from over 250 artists and drawn up a mailing list of over two thou-
sand  people. While a number of proj ects  were already underway, what E.A.T. 
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needed was more engineers. The remainder of the talk addressed practicalities. 
The basic requirements for the artist/engineer interface must include, Klüver 
believed, full cooperation from industry, a professional attitude, the protection 
of artists and engineers in their own environment, short turnarounds for proj-
ects, and an emphasis on new technology. It is clear that Klüver’s upbeat intro-
duction about the vitality and centrality of art to con temporary American life 
is, in part, aimed at winning over a skeptical industrial sector. “If industry does 
not get involved,” he makes clear, “the artist/engineer collaboration  will go 
down with a whimper.”8 Allaying concerns that artists would take over the lab 
or workshop, Klüver told his audience that “the artist and the engineer both 
need their own environments to be creative.” Furthermore,  there was no need 
to worry about aesthetics. “The artist,” Klüver explained reassuringly, “likes to 
deal with his prob lems in a  matter of fact way and not ‘esthetically’. Esthetic 
considerations  will hinder the development of new art.”
Beyond  these operational practicalities,  there  were also clear benefits for 
industry in encouraging the artist/engineer interface, including the sort of so-
cial prestige companies already enjoyed by associating with local  causes and 
education, as well as fostering a collective sense of shared purpose among em-
ployees. The presence of artists offered a fresh perspective on prob lems: “Artists 
are autonomous,” Klüver explained. “They do not ‘report’ to anyone. As such 
they form an effective intelligence resource.” More attractively, perhaps,  there 
was also potential commercial gain to be had through patents, methods, prod-
ucts, and ideas. Furthermore, artists  were likely to identify new applications 
for technology. Indeed, Klüver suggested that “feedback to industry that the 
collaboration  will lead to is the most impor tant reason why industry should 
support and sponsor proj ects.” The artist sees the world differently from the en-
gineer, Klüver explained, and it is “not necessary that our environment should 
always be born out of the engineering mind.” Fi nally, collaboration with artists 
was likely to foster a greater public understanding of engineering and industry, 
according to Klüver.
So, what has to be done? Klüver offers a number of items. Professional 
“engineers in art” groups should be or ga nized as part of existing engineering 
socie ties, able to disseminate through journals and conferences the results of 
their activities.  There is also the prob lem of the diff er ent working habits of art-
ists and engineers, and the need to break down misunderstandings about how 
the other half sees the world. It is impor tant, fi nally for the engineer to keep 
focused on the common goal and not get too caught up in “his own contribu-
tion.” For artists, Klüver suggests that it is impor tant for artists and engineers 
to meet face to face “ under relaxed conditions.” Tours of laboratories and in-
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dustries are essential so that artists understand working conditions, the nature 
of materials, pro cesses, and so on. It is also essential that artists learn what they 
can reasonably expect from an engineer.
Klüver offered troubleshooting tips, or what he called “collaboration 
handicaps.” Difficulties tend to arise, Klüver suggested, when  there is a confu-
sion of roles. “When an engineer says ‘I am an artist’ the collaboration usually 
breaks down.” On the other hand, artists can confuse technical decisions with 
aesthetic decisions: “Where should the knob sit? What about the color of the 
batteries— does it  matter?” Differences in the pace of work must also be accom-
modated: artists may work quickly and must understand that engineers require 
time to tackle prob lems. Klüver is warming to his subject  here and lists “black box 
syndrome”: “When an artist wants a black box that can do all  things and does not 
have time to visit the engineer, you can tell him to forget it. No  matter what you 
do you  will never be able to satisfy the artist.” Fi nally, a word of warning about 
category  mistakes: displaying the “products of technology in a gallery  will not 
transform [them] into art.” Technology is already beautiful, Klüver explained, 
“and it does not become more beautiful if it is put up for display.”
Rauschenberg and Klüver had drafted a more concise version of E.A.T.’s 
purpose back in January 1967, where they explained that they wanted to “bring 
about the adjustment needed for industry to accept its responsibility to actively 
assume its role in the integration of con temporary technology and the arts” 
(Rauschenberg and Klüver 1967). The stress  here is on industry becoming cog-
nizant of its duties; the integration of technology and the arts is presented as not 
merely desirable but necessary. In a statement prepared for a well- attended press 
conference to publicly launch E.A.T. held in Rauschenberg’s studio on Octo-
ber  10— reported in the New York Times as “enlivened by revolving painted 
disks, film projections, floating pillows and mini skirted girls in paper smocks” 
(Lieberman 1967, 49)— E.A.T. announced a “working alliance” with the 
American Foundation on Automation and Employment (afae), a nonprofit 
organ ization focused on promoting automation by “solving the  labor prob-
lems it creates.”9  Here, the notion of industry’s responsibility is underscored 
by stressing the inevitability of the convergence of art and technology: E.A.T., 
according to the statement, “functions as a catalyst for the inevitable fusing of 
specializations creating a responsible man operating in the pre sent”:
The mutual objectives are to maintain a constructive climate for the recog-
nition of the new technology and the arts by a civilized collaboration be-
tween groups unrealistically developing in isolation. Both organ izations 
[E.A.T. and afae] are committed to the elimination of the separation of 
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the individual from technological change and to expand and enrich tech-
nology to give the individual variety, plea sure, exploration and opportu-
nity of self- fulfillment in con temporary life. We  will encourage industrial 
initiative generating original forethought, instead of a compromise in af-
termath, and precipitate a mutual agreement in order to avoid the waste 
of a cultural revolution.
The “adjustment” that needed to be made involved gaining for artists “ free 
access to technology, engineering and the technical pro cesses.” Meeting the 
challenge of achieving this, for E.A.T., “is not only a cultural, educational or 
aesthetic prob lem but amounts in fact to an organic social revolution.” The vi-
sion  here is entirely one of mutual transformation: “In their collaboration the 
artist  will stimulate and enlarge technology and its means, and the engineer  will 
significantly transform the arts. This collaboration  will be part of a pro cess of 
accepting and exploring technology as our natu ral environment.” The ultimate 
aim of E.A.T. is to dis appear as a separate organ ization and to be absorbed into 
“engineering institutes, universities and industry. This is a nationwide proj ect.”
It is striking how much of Rauschenberg’s and Klüver’s rhe toric draws on 
the vocabulary of progressive liberalism Dewey made commonplace during the 
1920s and 1930s. The emphasis on “adjustment,” “responsibility,” “integration”; 
the rejection of the cultural and aesthetic as a separate sphere and instead the 
call for an “organic” social revolution through the collapsing of bound aries be-
tween art and technology; the notion of technology as a “natu ral” environment 
rather than as an externalized set of procedures and techniques— all of  these 
positions carry with them the power ful social demo cratic ethos Rauschenberg 
brought with him from Black Mountain College and which, as we have seen, 
Black Mountain derived from its hybrid Dewey- Bauhaus inheritance.
What is also true, however, is that this language of adjustment and adap-
tation had long since been loosened from its radical demo cratic moorings and 
had come to serve corporate liberalism’s post- ideological culture of consensus. 
As a consequence, it is hard to tell from the rhe toric quite what Rauschen-
berg and Klüver had in mind by an “organic social revolution.”  There is  little 
doubt, though, that they saw their undertaking as ambitious, with E.A.T. as a 
means of radically re orienting the way  things are done in the arts, sciences, and 
industry. On a practical level, it was clear that such a proj ect needed to pre-
sent itself effectively to the business world, and Klüver and Rauschenberg  were 
 adept enough to structure the organ ization more along the lines of a corpora-
tion than a revolutionary art movement. Soon, E.A.T. had a president, a board 
of directors, an advisory council, a small staff, and its own newsletter. Francis S. 
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Mason  Jr., dance critic and former cultural ambassador to London, was ap-
pointed president of E.A.T.; art collector John G. Powers was made chairman 
of the Business Committee; and Theodore W. Kheel, an attorney,  labor nego-
tiator, and president of afae, served as chairman of the Executive Committee. 
Klüver and Rauschenberg  were, respectively, chairman and vice- chairman of 
the board. By November  1967 the E.A.T. newsletter could announce that 
the organ ization had the formal support of at&t and the  union federation 
afl- cio. Kheel made available to E.A.T. the afae’s new building, Automa-
tion House, on 68th Street.
Kheel was strongly influenced by the view of technological change pro-
moted by Emmanuel Mesthene, director of the Harvard Program on Tech-
nology and Society, and stressed the need for adaptability in the face of the 
transformations technology would inevitably bring to social organ ization 
(Wisnioski 2012, 143). Klüver’s position tended to broadly follow this line, 
though at times he would back away from the large social claims made by E.A.T., 
more pragmatically highlighting the innovations that art and engineering col-
laboration made pos si ble. Klüver’s main objective was to grow the organ ization 
and raise funds, and to this extent the language of adjustment and the rhe toric 
of transformation had to be held in some sort of balance.
Klüver made sure that the fund rais ing and pr statement drafted in Janu-
ary 1967 carried an endorsement from Bell Labs, in the form of statements from 
John R. Pierce and Max Mathews, director of Bell’s behavioral research labora-
tory and computer  music pioneer. A May 1967 E.A.T. promotional fund rais ing 
pack went further, including press cuttings about 9 Eve nings (from Fortune and 
Artforum) and evidence of the “first technical ‘fallout,’ ” as Klüver described it, of 
the event: a thermographic phosphor discovered during work with Rauschen-
berg and Whitman that “is now in daily use in infrared  laser research at Bell 
Laboratories” (E.A.T. 1967a). How many proj ects could boast of coverage from 
the business and art worlds as well as the Institute of Electrical and Electronic 
Engineers’ Journal of Quantum Electronics? The documentation included in the 
fund rais ing pack outlined E.A.T.’s orga nizational structure, explained how 
artists and engineers  were matched and managed, and provided over seventy 
samples of artists’ technical proposals as well as a list of over two hundred art-
ists wishing to participate. Another list provided the names of around seventy- 
five “Member Engineers (List Incomplete).” Aside from a number of Bell Labs 
employees, Klüver had also recruited engineers from other major companies 
such as Eastman Kodak, Western Electric, Astrosystems, Inc., and rca, as well 
as top- drawer universities like mit, Northwestern, and Cornell. A final three- 
page list of names and addresses evidenced expressions of interest.
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The organic social revolution Rauschenberg and Klüver  imagined in 
January 1967 was fleshed out in the November newsletter. Following the Octo-
ber press conference, the newsletter registers an emboldened tone, imagining 
that the scope of E.A.T.’s collaborative ethos must extend “further than the 
individual artist and engineers, and  will necessarily involve the cooperation 
and support of other institutions in society: industry, universities,  labor and 
even politics” ( J. Martin 1967, 2–3).  There is a sense of urgency to the edito-
rial, which repeatedly stresses the need for an awareness of each “individual’s 
responsibility for the environment he is creating for himself ” (3). The artist- 
engineer relationship should serve as “a catalyst for re- examining and redefin-
ing individual responsibilities” (3). As well as its ongoing work with  labor, uni-
versities, and industrial management, readers are told that E.A.T. must equally 
be able to “sell its ideas” to middle- management, since they are responsible for 
formulating com pany policy (4). A Council of Agents, including John Pierce, 
Alfred Barr, John Cage, György Kepes, liberal Republican senator Jacob Javits 
and Harry Van Arsdale Jr., president of the Central  Labor Council, are charged 
with using their influence on behalf of E.A.T. “according to their authority and 
sympathy” (7).
The Role of the Engineer
The sense of urgency and the stress on social responsibility in E.A.T.’s pub-
lic pronouncements are no doubt aimed at providing a broad context within 
which potential corporate sponsors could situate their understanding of what 
they  were being invited to support. But the emphasis on responsibility also, 
we think, speaks to a need to address a growing disquiet about technology 
in American society generally and, more specifically, a longer-standing issue 
surrounding the status and function of the engineer in American life. While 
Klüver largely saw the artist as the primary agent in the art/engineering collab-
oration, it was engineers and corporate sponsors that needed persuading of the 
value of working with artists. Applications from artists poured into the E.A.T. 
offices from the start; finding willing engineers was more difficult, and snaring 
corporate support even more so. Making an appeal for a general sense of social 
and cultural responsibility was, then, a pitch aimed at the engineering profes-
sion and the corporate world. Unlike someone like Kepes, Klüver had from the 
start avoided considerations of art and science and was more interested in the 
technical and material pro cesses of making and  doing than anything theoreti-
cal (Halpern 2015, 96). Even the word “experiment” in the organ ization’s name 
was problematic for Klüver, who would have preferred “something mundane” 
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like “Foundation for Artists and Engineers” (1997, 316). The mundane names 
 were already taken, so the group’s  lawyer registered Experiments in Art and 
Technology instead, a name he had come up with himself. Despite his advo-
cacy of pro cess, the provisional implications of the word “experiment” seemed 
to be what troubled Klüver, who  later explained that “an artwork is  either fin-
ished or it  isn’t, and the public should not be subjected to incomprehensible 
scientific or technical experiments” (Klüver 1997, 316–317; see also Goodyear 
2004, 623). As science had become increasingly specialized, abstract, and ab-
struse, engineering, at least as Klüver conceived of it in its interaction with art-
ists, retained a pragmatic, problem- solving appeal that made it closer to the 
explorative investigations of con temporary art.
For all its interdisciplinary credentials, Bell Labs nevertheless maintained 
a strict division between research and development, as Ross Bassett explains: 
“Bell Labs was a massive effort to control the chaotic and uncertain pro cess 
of inventing and developing new technology” (2002, 18). While research 
“consisted mainly of scientists who used their superior knowledge of physical 
laws to produce novelty,” once a new device was created it was quickly turned 
over to the development group charged with converting it into a product. De-
velopment, according to Basset, “was essentially an engineering function— 
concerned with economic and technological considerations. Man ag ers at Bell 
Labs believed that if researchers worked on  these types of prob lems they would 
lose their scientific edge” (18). It is clear from Klüver’s investment in the hands-
on work of engineers that it was the development end of the r&d pro cess that 
he favored, rather than the more theoretical (and higher status) research work.
By the mid-1960s however, Klüver’s conception of the engineer as maker 
was already at odds with the real ity of an increasingly managed and compartmen-
talized profession. A Time Life volume titled The Engineer, published in 1966, 
the same year as the 9 Eve nings events and the founding of E.A.T., explained 
that “the  great majority of engineers  today work in teams— behind desks or in 
laboratories— tackling mutual prob lems with slide rules, computers and micro-
scopes.” Although the modern engineer sounds versatile and capable (“He is part 
scientist, part inventor, part technician, part cost accountant”), he is nevertheless 
“almost always a specialist in a narrow field.” A chemical engineer, for example, 
“may do nothing but study better ways to manufacture quick- drying paints” 
(quoted in Wisnioski 2012, 16). This popu lar account of the engineering life in-
cludes collaboration and interdisciplinary flexibility, but a dominant narrative 
of conformity, repetition, and blinkered specialization subsumes  these virtues.
In many ways, the status of the engineer suffered from the same oscilla-
tion in public perspective that burdened the postwar scientist. The engineer 
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was  either the driver of technologically fueled prosperity and social pro gress 
or, conversely, the epitome of hollow technocratic alienation. As with science, 
the engineering profession prospered during the early postwar period, and by 
1960 engineering was the most common white- collar occupation for men in 
the country, with one in fifty men in the  labor force identifying as an engineer, 
and over 40  percent of engineers, directly or indirectly, employed by the govern-
ment (Wisnioski 2012, 23). The compromised position of the scientist—at once 
the creative soul of the technological revolution and the sold- out functionary of 
the military- industrial state— was also true for the engineer. Klüver’s ambition 
to grow E.A.T. into an integral aspect of the technological apparatus was, we 
think, an attempt to realign the role of the engineer according to the perceived 
creative freedom enjoyed in the arts in the face of a creeping corporatism. Such a 
move would  free engineers from the subordinate position they frequently occu-
pied in relation to scientists and establish engineering alongside art as the proper 
place for the creative deployment of technological innovation. The debates cir-
culating in the pages of professional engineering journals over the status and 
role of the engineer during the 1960s are echoed in E.A.T.’s desire to appeal to 
industry and, at the same time, to maintain its artistic credibility and articulate 
a vision of engineering as a creative profession (see, e.g., Wisnioski 2012, 31).
The relations between artists and engineers on E.A.T. proj ects  were, given 
this situation, mixed at best. Artists often felt that engineers relegated their 
collaborative input to their  free time, while engineers tended to feel subordi-
nated to the role of technical support. The engineers, inevitably, had to hold 
down jobs, and even John R. Pierce, despite his support for Klüver and his own 
involvement in  music and computation, saw E.A.T. as “strictly comparable to 
golf, skiing, politics, public ser vice, and other spare- time avocations” (quoted 
in Wisnioski 2012, 146). More problematic for Klüver was the difficulty of se-
curing financial support. Despite the impressive listing of big corporations as 
sponsors in E.A.T. promotional lit er a ture, and Klüver’s tireless campaign to 
enlist more substantial support, most donated only the $1,000 required to re-
ceive recognition.
The Pepsi Generation
At its peak in 1969, E.A.T. could claim around six thousand members, includ-
ing approximately two thousand engineers and two thousand artists, and had 
made about five hundred collaborative matchings.  There  were over thirty US- 
based E.A.T. groups, along with overseas activity in South Amer i ca, Eu rope, and 
Australia, while regional offices operated out of Los Angeles and Tokyo (Lind-
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gren 1969b, 53). The E.A.T. Operations and Information bulletin of April 24, 
1969 claimed that matchings  were being made at the rate of forty per month, 
though a shortage of engineer and scientist members persisted in a number of 
fields. Never an organ ization to shy away from aggressive inventorial display, 
however, the list of technical areas in which matching had been made was pro-
vided in full, taking up almost a  whole page. As a typical example of E.A.T.’s 
audacity and penchant for Whitmanesque volumetric posturing, the list oper-
ates as an exuberant psychedelic hymn to tech potentiality that is best captured 
by excessive citation:
electrical and mechanical engineering, computer- generated films, mathe-
matics— computers, printing electromagnetically on irregular surfaces, 
fiberglass manufacturing, environmental mobile/electric construction 
involving light/sound, mechanics for inflatables, intermedia, plastic 
forming and optics, holography,  lasers, electro- dynamics, oceanography, 
geology, space, crystal growth, translucent and luminous aqueous colors, 
floating  house boats on foam, light machinery, projectors and projection 
systems, kinetic art, electric engineering/plastics, reor ga niz ing language, 
effects of technology upon body physiology, earth/global simulation pro-
jection, light projectors— color organ, light projection, color organ, flash-
ing lights, holography, use of light for robot [sic], electronics information 
display devices, flying and floating inflatable forms, vacuum molding, 
plastics, photoelasticity, rotating scrolls to which paper is attached, aer-
ial projections, cinegraphics, chemical engineering, polyester sculpture, 
 laser technology, computerized lighting, photographic collages, poetry 
and mathe matics, high voltage coronas, random movement and sound, 
plastics, making use of computers for multisensory and dynamic pies, 
aquar ium environmental simulation  lasers, light box, holography, opti-
cal simulation— electrical engineering, video tape, projection of intense 
light, holography, light, mechanics, projection, holography, computers, 
plastics, liquid sculpture, retro recorder, electronic data pro cessing sys-
tems, remote control, sound translations, films,  etc., photocell- activated 
light show, electroluminescence, electric cir cuit layouts, painted alumi-
num for outdoor use, electronic  music synthesizers, electrical/mechanical 
engineering, plastic forms filled with incandescent gases, chemical light 
sources— holography, structural engineering, computer programming and 
poetry, multi media use of computers, plastics, cultured rotating forms, 
fiber optics, antigravity machine, mechanical clock containing record-
ings, relief photography, experimenting with light/electronics, video- tape, 
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selling and working with vinyl, neurology, plastic lamination, opaque and 
translucent art works, glass, light, mechanical engineer to assist in three- 
dimensional projections, electronic constructions with special lights, glass 
mirrors, computer- electronic  music analyzer and synthesizer, computer 
graphics, audio- visual conversion, electrical mechanical engineering, me-
chanical engineering, outdoor constructions with electric lighting, earth 
grading, asphalt construction, electrical engineering, planar image assem-
bling painting and film, mathematical formulae for sculpture, electronic 
media- music, optical and mechanical engineering, motorized steel panels, 
heating device for plastic fabrication box, castings and coding techniques, 
electronic  music computer, plastic lamination, illuminated fluid moving 
in relation to lenses and mirrors, plastic objects flailing in liquid, com-
puters and TV, computer- controlled light array, light effects from linear 
polarization, electroplating non- metallic material, computer- controlled 
audio- visual conversion, construction of plexiglas- neon/vacuum form, 
planted sheet metal constructions, moving holograms, traveling circus. 
(E.A.T. 1969, 2)
This is a cata log of potentiality, despite (or perhaps  because of ) some repeti-
tion, that is designed, presumably, to appeal to  those who spend their spare 
time perusing the classified ads in Popu lar Mechanics. But it also revels in the 
rhythms, internal rhymes and barely suppressed erotics of the long list (“float-
ing  house boats on foam,” “plastic lamination, illuminated fluid,” “flailing in 
liquid”). Klüver’s cata log is a printed incantatory strobe effect designed to be-
witch engineers.
Drumming up business was hard, but as far as sponsorship went, the final 
edition of the E.A.T. newsletter (which was replaced with the short- lived news-
paper Techne) in April 1968 was able to list seventy- eight sponsors contributing 
$1,000 a year, an odd but representative mix of art- world patrons like John and 
Dominique de Ménil and gallery  owners such as  Virginia Dwan, and corpora-
tions including ibm, Schlumberger, and Xerox. Prob ably only E.A.T. could list 
as sponsors both the American Flange Com pany and Max’s Kansas City.
The core aspect of the E.A.T. agenda was the Technical Ser vice Program, 
founded in 1966, which sought to pair artists with engineers using informa-
tion supplied by applicants on a  simple form. Or ga nized tours of Bell Labs 
and other industrial sites continued for artists as a means of opening dialog, 
providing a sense of what materials and resources might be available, and to 
instruct artists in the limits of what they might expect. In addition, E.A.T. also 
ran a weekly open  house, offered rental equipment, and or ga nized numerous 
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conferences and lectures. In conjunction with a 1968 MoMA exhibition called 
The Machine as Seen at the End of the Mechanical Age, E.A.T. ran a competition 
for art- tech collaborations. The following year, 140 proposals  were exhibited at 
the Brooklyn Museum in an exhibition called Some More Beginnings: An Exhi­
bition of Submitted Works Involving Technical Materials and Pro cesses.
Despite the ongoing funding issues, E.A.T. proj ects became more am-
bitious and international. In 1968, E.A.T. was enlisted by PepsiCo to design 
the American pavilion for the Osaka World’s Fair, Expo ’70. Coordinated by 
Klüver and filmmaker Robert Breer, the pavilion was envisaged as a rolling 
program of artist- led immersive environments. The stress on atmosphere and 
environment was rendered literal outside the pavilion as artist Fujiko Nakaya 
and research scientist Thomas R. Mee swathed the building in a manufactured 
fog. Inside, E.A.T. constructed an inflated  spherical Mylar mirror and built 
an audiovisual system with a krypton  laser. The cost of the pavilion came to 
over $1 million, twice the agreed- upon bud get. Despite numerous technical 
and orga nizational prob lems, the pavilion opened on schedule, though E.A.T.’s 
proposed operating bud get for keeping the site  running for six months effec-
tively ended Klüver’s involvement  after Pepsi refused to pay. The E.A.T. pro-
gram prepared for inside the pavilion was replaced with a cobbled together, 
Pepsi- approved replacement, and the E.A.T. team returned to New York.10
In an essay on E.A.T.’s adventures in Osaka published in the New Yorker, 
art critic Calvin Tomkins was curious about the business side of the proj ect and 
mentions, at the outset, what is often left unspoken in discussions of art- and- 
tech proj ects: who pays and why. A “surprising number” of big corporations 
have recently shown themselves willing to fund art- and- tech, wrote Tomkins, 
though the “businessman’s motives in sponsoring proj ects of this sort are sel-
dom entirely clear to anyone” and the “relationship between the new art and 
its potential patron remains somewhat confused and confusing” (1972, 105). 
Pepsi got involved with E.A.T. seemingly “inadvertently,” according to Tom-
kins, through a “series of productive confusions that never quite reached the 
level of corporate decisions” (105). The initial contact between the corporation 
and E.A.T. came about  because David Thomas, vice president for international 
marketing coordination at the com pany, asked Breer, a neighbor, if he knew 
any artists interested in working on the expo. Breer called Klüver, who put to-
gether a team  after Pepsi agreed to finance a pitch. The competition was the 
East Village discotheque the Electric Circus, whose proposal was unapologeti-
cally well over bud get; E.A.T. by default slid into position, though no contract 
was signed  until a week before the event opened in November 1970. According 
to Tomkins, most of the information about E.A.T.’s plans received by Pepsi was 
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judiciously mediated through Thomas, while Klüver made full use of the cor-
poration’s funding, with E.A.T. personnel making over one hundred trips to 
Japan and E.A.T. setting up shop in new premises on Park Ave nue (128–129). 
Pepsi, for its part, was more interested in gaining a foothold in the Japa nese 
market than in what form its expo presence would take, and it secured its site 
before having much of an idea what would go inside. No doubt Pepsi’s reso-
lute pursuit of the youth market— the “Pepsi generation” campaign had been 
 running since the early 1960s but the drink was still being outsold by Coca 
Cola eight- to- one— influenced the com pany’s willingness to take on the art-
ists, but E.A.T.’s endless experimentation and undetermined end product, not 
to mention the rising cost, eventually proved too much for the com pany.
Aside from 9 Eve nings, the Osaka pavilion at Expo ’70 was the most 
ambitious proj ect E.A.T. had undertaken, and Klüver had high hopes that it 
would serve to launch his organ ization on a new phase of ambitious, socially 
conscious activities “outside art.” The withdrawal of Pepsi’s financial support 
and the outstanding costs E.A.T. still had to pay all but put an end to such 
plans. The defeat, however, did not stop Klüver from shaping the pavilion 
proj ect into a compelling narrative of orga nizational experiment through the 
1972 publication of a detailed book edited by himself, E.A.T. newsletter edi-
tor Julie Martin, and art critic Barbara Rose (Klüver, Martin, and Rose 1972). 
Titled Pavilion, the book included a section on “hardware,” with accounts by 
artists and engineers on the innovations they developed during the pro cess, a 
detailed exploration of the planned “Live Programming,” along with propos-
als received from an impressive array of composers and musicians— including 
Allan Kaprow, Alvin Lucier, Pauline Oliveros and Lynn Lonidier, Terry Riley, 
and La Monte Young. Accompanied by a technical as well as an E.A.T. bibliog-
raphy, extensive black- and- white photo graphs and a sequence of color plates, 
and fortified by three narrative accounts of  every detail of the proj ect from the 
perspective of a technology writer (Nilo Lindgren) and two art critics (Rose and 
Calvin Tomkins, whose New Yorker essay is reprinted in full), Pavilion is at once 
an archive of E.A.T.’s energy, ambition, and outlook, and an exhaustive prospec-
tus. The book, it is fair to say, has one eye on posterity and the other on pos si ble 
 future sponsors. Most importantly, perhaps, the book delivers a sustained ex-
amination of Klüver’s vision of E.A.T. as an experiment in organ ization, since 
the expo pavilion proj ect relied on an extensive network of (mostly) willing 
collaborators working across disciplines, languages, and nations.
The fullest account of Klüver’s collaborative ethos is Lindgren’s essay, 
which opens by recognizing that  there is  little original about the component 
parts of the pavilion; what is “new and impressive,” though, he claims, and what 
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makes the work significant, is the “in- depth” and “invisible” collaboration “of 
men and  women from so many diff er ent professions, trades, and cultural back-
grounds” (Lindgren 1972, 3). Although  things did not go smoothly, he admits, 
it was the “pro cess by which the Pavilion was realized” that was the “key ingredi-
ent” (3, original emphasis). The purpose of Lindgren’s narrative, and indeed of 
the book as a  whole, is to provide evidence of how a collaborative proj ect works 
by detailing the practical, theoretical, and interpersonal negotiations under-
went in order to complete the proj ect. Much as Klüver had stressed from the 
outset, the real experiment in bringing art and technology together was orga-
nizational. The stress E.A.T. placed on open- ended inquiry meant that  there 
was  little in the way of a defined outcome, and  every aspect of the proj ect, in-
cluding the del e ga tion of tasks and the relation between individual expertise 
and interests and group objectives, had to be worked out collectively.
Getting artists and engineers to work together posed its own challenges, 
but Lindgren’s initial discussion of collaboration focuses on the ostensibly more 
straightforward task of facilitating collaboration among artists. In the first 
meetings between the lead artists on the expo proj ect, Klüver’s orga nizational 
strategy was to employ the Delphi method developed at rand by Olaf Helmer, 
Norman Dalkey, and Nicholas Rescher. The purpose of the Delphi method is 
to generate pathways  toward unknowable outcomes by soliciting the judgment 
of an assortment of experts, which is then circulated and modified through 
what Dalkey called “iteration with controlled feedback” (Dalkey 1969, 15). In 
the context of the E.A.T. proj ect, Klüver tasked the artists to concentrate on 
the design of the  whole pavilion rather than their preferred approach, which 
was to each concentrate on their own area. The intention, Lindgren explains, 
was to “enrich the possibilities in the final convergence” (1972, 16). However, 
the Delphi method (“an ancient method for modern consensus” is how Lind-
gren subtitles this section of his account) did not work very well, according to 
Lindgren, in part  because it rubbed hard against “our modern artistic tradi-
tions in the West” (17), which privilege the unique contribution of the indi-
vidual rather than the routinely critiqued collective effort. Exposing artists to 
rand- style groupthink challenged, in Lindgren’s account, some deeply held 
notions about artistic  labor and resulted in some revealing strategies for pro-
tecting professional integrity. The best and most inventive ideas an artist might 
produce could easily be dismissed or compromised by  others, so it might be 
best to hold back and offer less good ideas in order to maximize the chance of 
the best work being accepted. This self- interested strategizing, though Lind-
gren does not say so, sounds like a version of the prisoner’s dilemma, that other 
rand- generated theory of decision- making, but what it reveals decisively for 
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Lindgren is that “collaboration between artists is a direct attack on tradition” 
(17). It is  here, we are asked to consider, rather than in what the proj ect fi nally 
produces, that the key to E.A.T.’s radicalism is situated. “For  those who are on 
the threshold of such a culture change,” writes Lindgren, “ there is also the anxi-
ety connected with a sweeping aside of established ground. To a certain extent, 
one is left floating anxiously” (17).
The assault on individual authorship, in Lindgren’s telling, is more than a 
local orga nizational strategy and part of a broader re orientation of the culture 
away from individual self- interest and  toward collective problem- solving. The 
Delphi method may not have been very effective at yielding results, but as a 
means of exposing the conventional thinking of the participants it appeared 
to work very well. As such, by peeling back the protective skin insulating the 
traditional notions of creativity and owner ship harbored by the artists, Klüver, 
in Lindgren’s terms, was able to sweep away hidebound expectations and open 
up a less comfortable— but presumably, as a consequence, more dynamic— 
imaginative space for collective practice.
The experimental dimension of Klüver’s orga nizational strategies comes 
across in Lindgren’s, at times, almost so cio log i cal or anthropological tone, as if 
he is reporting the results of a field observation. “In talking with the artists,” he 
writes, “it becomes obvious that each in his own way was struggling to wrap his 
own conceptions around what was already given, or supposedly given. Follow-
ing this pro cess, we get insights into how  these artists thought of themselves 
and of their functions” (Lindgren 1972, 17). Certainly, the focus of the account 
positions the development of the pavilion as a test case for Klüver’s E.A.T. ex-
perimental r&d ambitions.  After a few weeks of discussion, Lindgren writes, 
something begins to happen: the participants discover “how to work with one 
another” (19). At this point, when it seems that “perhaps the Delphi Method 
worked better” than Klüver initially thought, he introduces “a new ingredient” 
(19) in the form of architect John Pearce, who soon concludes that the artists 
have achieved nothing since they “ didn’t even seem to realize they  were  really 
building a building” (Pearce, quoted in Lindgren 1972, 19).
Klüver emerges from the narrative as a mixture of social engineer and 
proj ect man ag er, at once impatient that pro gress is not being made while en-
couraging, and even adding new ele ments to, a swirl of open- ended dialog. The 
work does eventually begin to cohere, however, and Lindgren claims that by 
“thrashing out their ideas, the artists became increasingly committed to true, 
noncompetitive collaboration, discarding ideas, triggering new ideas in each 
other, and acting as catalysts for each other” (20). As they learn to adapt to the 
new working conditions, “the artists began to feel that they  were onto a beauti-
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ful  thing” (21), and Pearce, while keeping his involvement “relaxed,” acted as a 
kind of real ity check by assessing design features for architectural plausibility 
and managing the schedule. Though the Japa nese  were expecting delivery of a 
completed proj ect, the expo pavilion was, writes Lindgren, “si mul ta neously a 
research proj ect, a development proj ect, and a construction proj ect” (22), the 
outcome of which would not be fully known  until it was finished.
From a collaborative point of view, the pavilion at Expo ’70 yielded mixed 
results. Two of the main aspects of the design, a large inflatable mirror and a 
fog sculpture,  were effectively delivered through the successful collaboration 
among a range of artists, scientists, and engineers able to resolve a number of 
logistical and aesthetic issues. Composer David Tudor (on the Black Moun-
tain faculty from 1951 to 1953) and musician Gordon Mumma’s plans for creat-
ing a distinctive sound environment for the pavilion, however, fared less well, 
with the engineer charged with facilitating the complex plans, Bell Labs’ Larry 
Owens, having to make a series of what, to Tudor,  were unacceptable compro-
mises regarding Tudor’s design in order for it to work on bud get and on sched-
ule. Owens found it a “real learning pro cess,” according to Lindgren. What 
Owens learned was that artists did not want to make up their minds months in 
advance, even though the use of technology might require such decisions to be 
made (57). He also learned that, when working with artists, “you are not mak-
ing decisions based on facts. Sometimes you are making decisions based on the 
absence of facts!” (57). Faced with this situation, the engineer has “to invent 
facts, make a decision, implement the decision, and then come back to the artist 
and say ‘Is this what you meant?’ ” (58). Owens concluded that artists did not 
know what engineering was, while Tudor, for his part, found the engineering 
solution to prob lems unable to accommodate nonengineering interventions, 
which  were considered “meddling” (58). Smoothing  things over, Lindgren re-
marks that “one should not lose sight of the fact that this was an ongoing ex-
periment in a pro cess that is attempting to bring together long- separated areas 
of endeavor” (59). He also, importantly, recognizes that the pavilion was more 
than a collaboration between artists and engineers, but also demanded collabo-
ration between an art- and- tech group and a corporation, and between the US- 
based E.A.T. and Pepsi and Japa nese business, art, and industry. Scaling up in 
this way illustrates for Lindgren not only the possibilities implicit in E.A.T.’s 
attempt to yoke together art and tech research, but also reveals the complexity 
of negotiating not only across disciplines but across sectors, nations, languages, 
and economic and cultural differences. From this perspective, the prob lems, 
mis haps, and deflated expectations appear minor setbacks in such an ambitious 
experiment in restructuring the way creative thinking- as- doing happens.
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Calvin Tomkins notes that some of Klüver’s art- world friends had urged 
him not to get involved with Pepsi, which, Tomkins observes skeptically, “they 
somehow seemed to regard as part of the military- industrial complex” (1972, 
111). Though  there is certainly an ele ment of paranoid countercultural suspicion 
in such warnings, it was,  after all, Pepsi- Cola that Nixon invited Khrushchev 
to drink at the first American trade exhibition ever held in the Soviet Union in 
1959, and the scene of the famous “kitchen debate,” a publicity coup engineered 
by the com pany’s international head, Donald Kendall. However, E.A.T. had 
very  little to say about politics, American foreign policy, or the Cold War in 
general.  Whether or not this was a strategic decision intended to keep the lines 
of communication clear between E.A.T. and potential sponsors or a function 
of a deeper ac cep tance of the post- ideological rhe toric of American consensus 
culture is hard to say. Even in Barbara Rose’s art historical contextualization of 
E.A.T. in Pavilion, a survey that sought to position E.A.T. as the inheritor of 
centuries of art and technology collaboration in the public interest that reaches 
back to antiquity,  there was a resolute avoidance of the po liti cal ramifications of 
art or technology (Rose 1972). Noting the divorce of art and life brought about 
by industrial modernity and the rise of social fragmentation and disciplinary 
specialization, Rose had remarkably  little to say of the po liti cal strug gles driv-
ing the dissenters she named, from Mary Shelley, William Morris, and John 
Ruskin through the Futurists, Constructivists, Dadaists and Surrealists. The 
line Rose traced from the historical avant- garde through the Bauhaus, Black 
Mountain, and on to Kaprow and Cage is clear and accurate yet devoid of the 
strife and conflict that might render the narrative meaningful. Instead, Rose’s 
art history, like Alfred Barr’s torpedo diagram, implied the structural necessity 
of the pre sent delivering an achieved synthesis of what has come before, in this 
case, “a new system of values” (61), embodied by E.A.T.’s collaborative pro cess, 
based on “social interaction, control of technology  toward fulfilling  human 
needs, re spect for the natu ral environment and its potentials and limitations, 
and a belief in the ability of individuals to take responsibility in demo cratic, 
noncoercive, nonhierarchical situations” (61).
By now we should be able to recognize this as art- and- technology boiler-
plate, and though Rose was right to note E.A.T.’s internationalism—in contrast 
to “the growing chauvinism of the New York School” (96)— its untypical willing-
ness to employ  women in “high- level positions” (98), and its ability to introduce 
the “values and goals” of art to executives, technicians and scientists (98), it must 
have been hard for many to see the PepsiCo pavilion, as Rose did, as the “re-
alization of the vision of generations of modern artists” (98). The  grand claims 
Rose made for the pavilion— for instance, that the mirrored dome is the modern 
103
equivalent of one of the ancient Seven Won ders— are underpinned, as they often 
 were in Klüver’s own purple passages, by a sense that the American pre sent rep-
resents a historic turning point. “The collaborative pro cess by which the Pavilion 
was realized,” she wrote, “was a specifically American experiment in demo cratic 
interchange. The pro cess by which it was created . . .  , of  people taking responsi-
bility without an authoritarian chain of command, acting within the area of their 
own competence as the need arose, learning new techniques of communicating 
with each other and with members of a culture vastly diff er ent from their own, 
may be a model for social interaction” (102). Rose insisted that the pavilion was 
designed for social and aesthetic, rather than commercial, purposes, and, in con-
fident consensus fashion, that the participating artists and engineers “served no 
given po liti cal ideology” (99). For  these reasons, the result should not be seen as 
a “ simple ‘bread and circuses’ experience for a passive, bored public” (99). Instead, 
Rose insisted, the pavilion is a work of art that “makes an impor tant statement 
about the  future of society as a cooperative enterprise” (99). Forget Pepsi- Cola 
and the Cold War, the pavilion is utopia in action, part of “the tradition of the 
Gesamtkunstwerk or Total work of art” that  will in the  future be recognized as 
“the American equivalent of Tatlin’s Monument to the Third International, the 
 great ambitious proj ect, which met with similar hostility and misunderstanding” 
(101). The pavilion, for Rose, therefore stands as a compromised but heroically 
utopian monument to “values American society and the corporate structure that 
manages it are as unwilling to embrace as the bureaucrats who brought Tatlin’s 
proj ect to a halt  were unable to understand his meaning” (101).
It is a wonderful piece of temporal legerdemain to position the PepsiCo 
pavilion proleptically as the Tatlin Monument of the  future, and Rose did an ef-
fective job situating the structure, which was even then “a gradually deteriorat-
ing wreck on a desolate ruin outside of Osaka, Japan” (102), as tragic evidence 
of a utopian vision too virtuous to withstand the indifference of the instru-
mentalized society into which it was placed. The pavilion may not have turned 
out to be, she wrote, the “monument to American enterprise and advertising 
the Pepsi- Cola com pany bargained for,” but the attempt  here to position the 
corporation as the author of the pavilion’s ruin overlooks the fact that without 
Pepsi funding  there would be no ruin at all. Klüver’s insistence that the pavil-
ion was a work of art, a claim he did not make at the outset but increasingly 
pursued as the proj ect unraveled, is an attempt to save the reputation of the 
Osaka proj ect from the compromises enforced upon it by its sponsors. As a 
work of art, Pepsi’s rejigged promotional program becomes more than a com-
mercial enterprise salvaging something from its investment and starts to look 
like philistine desecration. On this point, Tomkins is more proportionate in 
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his assessment of Pepsi’s position, which he explains in terms of a mixture of 
concerns regarding finance and public relations. PepsiCo was only willing to 
spend so much and bend so far in terms of what it thought its audience would 
accept. In each case, the corporation de cided E.A.T. had overreached.
Given that, according to Tomkins’s account, the entire enterprise hinged 
on keeping Pepsi, with the willing involvement of insider David Thomas as go- 
between, at arm’s length, it is remarkable that the pavilion ever got built at all. 
It is con ve nient,  after the fact, to position PepsiCo as the short sighted com-
mercial interest resisting the “new system of values” Rose  imagined the pavilion 
represented, but, aside from the warnings Tomkins claimed Klüver received 
about getting into bed with corporations,  there is  little sense that Klüver or 
 others gave much thought to the implications of working on a proj ect that 
would be meaningless to its sponsor if it was not promoting Pepsi- Cola and 
the broader values of American capitalism the com pany represented.
In her essay, Rose dismissed the pessimism of critics of technology like 
Jacques Ellul and the “nihilism” of Conceptual Art in  favor of the optimism 
of Cage, Fuller, and McLuhan. In the face of an institutionalized avant- garde 
and the “establishment of a world art market for rare decorative objects” that 
converts “risk or critique” into “commercial investments” (98), Rose’s defense 
of E.A.T. ideals— “group effort, collaboration, integration of the vari ous 
spheres of artistic and scientific thought, submersion of the individual ego 
in the ser vice of a common goal, and art as an active agent of social change” 
(97)— powerfully captures the progressive legacy that the 1960s art- and- tech 
proj ects embodied. Yet the expo pavilion was not the outcome of a Works Pro-
gress Administration proj ect; it was (albeit by default) the winning bid in a 
corporate sponsorship deal. As such, the maneuvers that made the Expo ’70 Pa-
vilion pos si ble reveal the fundamental disjunction between proj ects like E.A.T. 
and the corporate world they sought to win over. If Tomkins is right, the only 
time E.A.T. received serious money for a proj ect, it was by accident.
E.A.T. outside Art
While the Expo ’70 pavilion survived, the compromised E.A.T. proj ect did 
 little to enhance the organ ization’s fortunes. It did, however, lead E.A.T. to 
explore bold non- art ave nues,  under the banner Proj ects Outside Art, in areas 
such as education and the environment, and in the developing world, though 
proper funding was never forthcoming.
Proj ects Outside Art developed some fairly modest proj ects, such as 
 Children and Communication, which introduced  children to communica-
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tions technology; City Agriculture, featuring a hydroponic roof garden at 
E.A.T. hq; and Recreation and Play, a Los Angeles- based investigation. A 
symposium and instructional exhibition  were held at the afae’s Automation 
House in New York. With funds from the John D. Rocke fel ler Foundation, 
E.A.T. or ga nized a cultural exchange called American Artists in India dur-
ing 1970 and 1971, which allowed artists to travel and work for a month. Par-
ticipants included dancers and choreographers (Trisha Brown, Steve Paxton, 
Yvonne Rainer), composers (Lowell Cross, Terry Riley, La Monte Young) and 
visual artists ( Jared Bark, Jeffrey Lew, Kate Redicker, Marian Zazeela).
More ambitious was a plan to broadcast Indian- made educational tele-
vi sion programming to rural India by satellite, a proj ect developed in 1969 
by Klüver, Robert Whitman, and Vikram Sarabhai of the Nehru Foundation 
for Development (Delhi, India). In December of that year, the group traveled 
to the Anand Dairy Cooperative and set up educational assistance programs 
for female dairy farmers. The Nehru Foundation and E.A.T. proposed using 
half- inch video equipment to collect on- site visuals to be shown in educational 
tele vi sion shows. In 1971, another E.A.T. telecommunications system (Telex: 
q&a) was set up in Stockholm at an exhibition themed around the Paris 
Commune called Utopier et Visioner 1871–1981. Teleprinters connected New 
York City, Stockholm, Ahmedabad, and Tokyo and participants in each city 
 were asked to comment on what they thought the world in 1981 would be like. 
Also in 1971, E.A.T. worked with Bell Labs psychologists to conduct compara-
tive studies on advanced technologies used in statistical analy sis, a proj ect called 
Multi- Dimensional Scaling, and coordinated the cable broadcast of artists’ videos 
in New York. Further explorations of pos si ble satellite tele vi sion proj ects during 
the early 1970s, with the El Salvador education department and with the United 
Nations, and a Klüver design for a giant- screen video projection system for the 
facade of the Centre Georges Pompidou in Paris, remained at the design stage.
For all the optimism about new modes of creativity being generated 
through a collaboration between artists and engineers, Klüver’s model remained 
an individualistic one: the lone inventor and the solitary artist rather than the 
emerging mega- teams  running Big Science proj ects. The Bell Labs Murray 
Park notion of the industrial lab as campus masked the increasingly manage-
rial and hierarchical aspect of Cold War scientific and technological research. 
The popularity among American artists for new materials and pro cesses rarely 
developed beyond innovative ways of fabricating objects, and the performa-
tive, improvisational, and po liti cally radical directions of the Fluxus- oriented 
wing of the New York art world had  little interest in support from corporate 
sponsors. The bigger, often unrealized or incomplete E.A.T. proj ects geared, in 
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keeping with  Great Society ambitions, to social issues tended to move away 
from the emphasis on art as such and  toward a more so cio log i cal intervention 
that they  were nevertheless financially and or gan i za tion ally ill- equipped to 
support. In one way, Klüver’s conception of an expanded E.A.T. shares Black 
Mountain’s exploratory progressivism, yet Klüver’s desire and need to court 
corporate sponsorship, not to mention his tendency, despite the rhe toric of 
collaboration, to elevate the status of the artist as creator, left E.A.T. awkwardly 
placed between the corporate administrative model and the patron- dependent 
entrepreneurial economy of the art world. The sharp decline in E.A.T. activity 
 after 1971 was part of a broader shift in attitudes  toward technology that, as 
 will become abundantly clear in the context of lacma’s Art & Technology 
Program, effectively cut off the oxygen from art- and- tech collaborations.
04
Feedback
Expertise, LACMA, and the Think Tank
The most in ter est ing and creative art of our time is not open to the gener-
ally educated; it demands special effort; it speaks a specialized language.
— Susan Sontag, “One Culture and the New Sensibility”
Edward Kienholz, the Los Angeles– based artist famous 
for his found- object assemblages, used to drive a truck 
with the legend “ed kienholz— expert” painted on 
the door. Kienholz worked as a handyman to pay the bills, 
suggesting something of the resourcefulness and entre-
preneurial spirit that made the Ferus Gallery, which he 
opened in 1957 with Walter Hopps, the hub of the emerg-
ing LA avant- garde. As a form of self- promotion, Kienholz’s claim to be an 
“expert” is both a joke and a statement of fact. It pokes fun at the notional value 
of an expertise that can stand as a proclamation of superior knowledge or skill 
without anywhere announcing the area of specialism to which it refers. The 
idea of a generic expert makes  little sense, yet it does speak to the expanded 
domain of the post- medium artist, where expertise in art as such is not bound 
to specific materials, skills, traditions, or content. The Duchampian spirit ani-
mating much of the LA scene (Hopps would go on to curate the influential, 
and first, museum retrospective of Duchamp’s work at the Pasadena Art Mu-




The idea of the expert, though, has a broader valence in 1950s US culture. 
The defense of science that developed in the early postwar period by Vanne-
var Bush and  others was intended to shape a public perception of specialized 
expertise as a necessary and desirable condition for the full realization of mo-
dernity’s demo cratic promise. The emphasis on interdisciplinary collaboration, 
while in a sense at odds with the increasingly focused research undertaken by 
scientists and engineers, answered the charge that narrow specialization led to 
the creation of a cloistered scientific priesthood. If the cultivation of elite ex-
pertise was an affront to a more Deweyan notion of scientific democracy, col-
laboration among experts allowed for a diff er ent, albeit more exclusive, sense 
of science as a collective endeavor in the ser vice of the  people. With scientific, 
technological and social scientific expertise increasingly presented as enablers 
of social efficiency and prosperity, meritocratic Cold War educational and sci-
entific institutions could remain on the side of democracy, charged with recog-
nizing and nurturing the capacities of any citizen willing to learn.1
It is  here, perhaps, in the demo cratizing of creativity as the source code 
for the expert, that the military- industrial articulation of scientific and tech-
nological innovation as a creative proj ect undertaken by specialists drawn from 
a common pool converges with the avant- garde’s expanded field of artistic en-
gagement. The rejection of the production of objects, along with the singular-
ity of the artist as individual genius, and the emphasis instead on collective, 
pro cessual investigations across multiple sites and platforms, made the prac-
tice of art an embodied realization of demo cratic possibility (along Deweyan 
lines) that broke down barriers between work and audience, participation 
and spectatorship. At the same time, the capacity to understand such pro-
cesses and engagements as art required a par tic u lar stance  toward the work 
that implied a kind of expertise of the sort Kienholz mobilized in his own 
self- promotion. In other words, the expanded field of the neo- avant- garde did 
not so much remove the notion of expert knowledge and skill from art as it 
repositioned such a notion. The definition of what constitutes art underwent 
a radical restructuring, yet the notion of art as the domain of a distinctive set 
of specialists remained, even as the terms of what that specialism amounted 
to changed. Although  there may have been  little common ground between 
research scientists and engineers and artists in terms of background, working 
practices, and operating assumptions, what art and technology collaboration 
advocates like Billy Klüver recognized was that the general terms upon which 
postwar American society was premised— terms like creativity, expertise, and 
innovation— served, in a broad sense, to describe what scientists, engineers and 
artists  were all about.
109
expertIse, lAcmA, And the thInk tAnk
It is for this reason, we think, that  there is  little mention by Klüver, Kepes, 
and  others of the po liti cal ramifications of their efforts to align technology and 
art beyond a general, all- purpose utopianism. Any re sis tance or suspicion among 
artists or engineers  toward the other camp is massaged away through an appeal 
to the virtues of collaboration and a stress on finding common ground.  There 
appears to be no forum at proj ects like E.A.T. within which the challenges of 
working alongside prominent military- industrial institutions might be addressed 
beyond formal or technical difficulties. In many ways, the shared technocratic 
embrace of a generalized notion of expertise made it pos si ble for scientists, en-
gineers, and artists alike to perceive themselves and their work within a context 
that erased the bound aries between the professionalized sites of laboratory and 
studio while protecting the distinctiveness and importance of what they thought 
they  were  doing. In short, the cultural capital enjoyed by American scientists, 
engineers, and artists during the 1950s and early 1960s allowed each group to ben-
efit in relatively uncomplicated ways through their association with other fellow 
experts. Scientists and engineers could indeed be said to be creative since artists 
sought them out; artists could imagine their work as investigative and experi-
mental by virtue of their proximity to the apparatus and personnel of science.
Despite this broadly welcoming context of mutual professional re spect, 
however, and regardless of the efforts of organizers to downplay clumsy or un-
successful collaborations, it was often in the friction that the real heat was gen-
erated in 1960s art and technology proj ects: when artists and their hosts and 
collaborators did not get on; when planned collaborations fizzled out or col-
lapsed; when the results of collaborations  were dismissed or challenged. This is 
most obviously the case with the Los Angeles County Museum of Art’s Art and 
Technology Proj ect, which shared something with both cavs and E.A.T. in 
terms of vision and ambition but which, especially in its culminating exhibition, 
came to mark the moment when the art- and- technology vanguard became, 
almost overnight, the vilified embodiment of complicity with the American 
military- industrial state. The proj ect was also, as we  shall see, responsible for 
pushing the art- and- technology brief beyond an investigation of materials and 
devices and into, intriguingly, the area of corporate thinking itself.
The Center of a New Civilization
Maurice Tuchman, a twenty-seven- year- old research fellow at the Guggenheim 
Museum in New York City, became the first curator of twentieth- century art 
at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art (lacma) in 1964, a year before the 
institution moved to its site on Wilshire Boulevard. The three- building museum, 
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constructed at a cost of $11.5 million, is suggestive of the growing cultural con-
fidence of a city that had experienced nearly two de cades of massive population 
growth and urban development since World War II. Despite the work of Kien-
holz, Hopps, and  others during the 1950s, though, LA art had remained subor-
dinate to the power of the New York art world. Part of Tuchman’s mission was 
to put LA art on the map— the city was set to become, the curator told Life 
magazine, “the center of a new civilization” (Wernick 1966, 116)— and secure 
lacma’s place as the center of the LA art world. To do this, in 1966 he con-
ceived of a program that explic itly sought to bind the museum into Southern 
California’s booming Cold War technology sector. By hooking up the museum 
to the financial mainline, Tuchman’s proposed Art and Technology Program 
(a&t) would secure the position of art as an integral part of the Southern 
California success story.
Tuchman’s strategy was to stress the minimal cost involved to sponsors, 
compared to their contributions to other organ izations, and to highlight the 
benefit to business from “proximity to thriving cultural resources in attract-
ing talented personnel” (Tuchman 1971, 9), as well as the bonus for employees 
from exposure to creative  people. All artworks produced as part of the program 
would be given to the corporations involved. With the help of Missy Chandler, 
the wife of the Los Angeles Times publisher who had read about the proj ect in 
a newspaper feature, Tuchman recruited forty corporations, some merely as 
financial contributors,  others hosting artists in factories, labs, and offices. Many 
of the participating corporations  were aerospace companies (Lockheed, Pan 
American, Jet Propulsion Laboratory), major players in computing (Hewlett- 
Packard, ibm), entertainment (Universal, 20th  Century Fox), and electronics 
(Ampex, Philco- Ford), as well as construction (Kaiser Steel, American Ce-
ment) and think tanks like rand and Herman Kahn’s Hudson Institute— the 
organ izations that built and sustained the Cold War United States.2
Unlike E.A.T., which encouraged artists to apply to the organ ization, 
Tuchman approached artists directly, resulting in a wide spectrum of activi-
ties ranging from unproductive exploratory meetings and stalled plans through 
to the fourteen completed proj ects that ended up in the exhibit that concluded 
the program in 1971. Seventy- six participating artists  were listed in the Report on 
the Art and Technology Program of the Los Angeles County Museum of Art 1967–
1971, the extensive document published to accompany the lacma show that 
attempted to rec ord exhaustively the history of the program from its inception 
(Tuchman 1971). Most of the artists  were well- known; more than half  were 
based in New York; fifteen  were Eu ro pean (or working in Eu rope); eigh teen 
 were local LA artists. All of the artists  were men. The fourteen who exhibited 
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in 1971  were largely high- profile stars, including R. B. Kitaj, Roy Lichtenstein, 
Claes Oldenburg, Robert Rauschenberg, Richard Serra, and Andy Warhol. 
Only twenty- eight out of the seventy- six  were placed in residencies;  those who 
did not make it into the show  either had not finished in time, ran out of money, 
never planned to produce work to exhibit, or had fallen out with their sponsor.
The reception of the lacma a&t show was not helped by the fact that 
it ignored female artists, favored established New Yorkers over LA artists (only 
Frederick Eversley and Newton Harrison, among the exhibited artists,  were 
local, though Tuchman had tried to recruit more), and produced  viable work 
from only a small fraction of the collaborations a&t had or ga nized. The Los 
Angeles  Free Press published a challenge to lacma’s white male bias by the 
recently founded Los Angeles Council of  Women Artists (lacwa), who 
also produced a seven- page report on lacma (Fallon 2014, 17). Questions of 
repre sen ta tion, however,  were only part of a broader prob lem faced by a&t 
and other art and technology initiatives by the end of the 1960s as US public 
opinion shifted sharply away from the technocratic model of corporate liberal-
ism. Like E.A.T., Tuchman saw international expositions as obvious sites for 
the pre sen ta tion of art- and- technology collaboration, and eight a&t artists 
 were shown at the American pavilion at Expo ’70 in Osaka. The LA press was 
happy to promote the “demo cratic ideals of co- operation and interaction be-
tween vari ous levels of the society” (quoted in Goodyear 2008, 170) that a&t 
displayed at Osaka, but Cold War public relations of this kind  were increas-
ingly unfashionable and suspect.3
In a context of rapidly changing fortunes for art- and- technology proj ects, 
the role of documentation became an impor tant way for organizers to explain 
and secure the reputation of their activities. The in- house and public- facing 
stream of bulletins issued by E.A.T. created a sense of momentum and coher-
ence surrounding the aims of the organ ization, but it is the Pavilion book, more 
than the proceedings and reports, that gives Klüver the chance to demonstrate 
the depth and complexity of what E.A.T. was trying to accomplish (see Klüver, 
Martin, and Rose 1972). Similarly, it is the Report on the Art and Technology 
Program, rather than the exhibition, that most effectively captures the spirit of 
a&t. Tuchman’s report is in many ways the most in ter est ing outcome of the 
lacma proj ect, a document David Antin was already calling, in his 1971 re-
view of the a&t show, a work of “conceptual art” (Antin 2011, 61). In order to 
give a full account of what Tuchman describes as “the emotional complexities 
and the sheer logistical difficulties” of the a&t Program (Tuchman 1971, 29), 
the report pre sents the business case, the contracts, the list of companies and 
their log os, the works completed and, more revealingly, the incomplete, the 
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impossible, the miscommunication, and the breakdown of relations among art-
ists, engineers, and businesses. It details conversations, phone calls, negotiations, 
drawings, and diagrams produced in the course of interactions among museum 
staff, 76 artists, and over 225 corporation employees. Like the vari ous E.A.T. bul-
letins and press releases or a Fluxus work on ste roids, the a&t report positions 
the program of ongoing art and technology investigations itself as the proj ect’s 
core experimental practice. Tuchman is right to do this inasmuch as he was 
aware from the outset that the final exhibit would never properly represent the 
range of explorations that had been undertaken, though as a proj ect supported 
by a major museum the necessity of a show of completed work was clear enough.
It is in the daily negotiations among participants, then, that the ramifications 
of collaborative or residential work are most properly tested. This is clearly the 
case in two of the a&t residencies that are distinctive, both among the a&t proj-
ects and more widely among the other art and technology ventures, in that they 
involved organ izations explic itly concerned with Cold War intellectual and theo-
retical formations rather than corporations, businesses, or institutions engaged in 
the physical investigation or manipulation of materials. Nowhere is the discourse 
of expertise more vividly revealed than in the placement of John Chamberlain at 
the rand Corporation and James Lee Byars at the Hudson Institute.
Most of the placements arranged for a&t artists had a clear practical di-
mension and involved consultation with technicians and engineers over the 
feasibility, cost, management, and delivery of fabricated structures. At rand 
and the Hudson Institute, by contrast, the business of the organ ization was 
the generation of ideas. As such, a&t introduced a new dimension to the no-
tion of the artist placement, since  there was no obvious material assistance that 
the corporation could supply. The inclusion of think tanks in the category of 
organ izations concerned with technology also recognized the extent to which 
mathe matics, statistical and policy analy sis, and planning had become inte-
grated into the industrial system. While  there had been think tanks in the US 
since the Progressive Era, rand and Hudson represented the new postwar 
generation of what are often called universities without students: institutions 
charged with developing strategy and innovative policy programs outside of, 
but often paid for by, government.
The Think Tank and the Memo
The first national organ izations that would, by the 1960s, become known as 
think tanks, emerged in the early twentieth  century, during the Progressive Era’s 
growing confidence in the application of social scientific expertise to solve social 
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prob lems and inform government decision- making. Demand for policy research 
and analy sis intensified during the 1930s (including President Roo se velt’s “brain 
trust” of experts), and by World War II the use of nonprofit advisory organ-
izations to provide expertise to government and the military expanded. Among 
the first and best known of the post–World War II think tanks was the rand 
Corporation, which began as a Douglas Aircraft subsidiary that provided re-
search to the United States Air Force.  After the war, rand became an in de-
pen dent nonprofit think tank based in Santa Monica, California, almost en-
tirely dependent on government contracts. With government intervention in 
the management of a widening array of social and economic affairs, the think 
tank became a significant means of developing and planning policy. As James 
Allen Smith observes, rand “became the prototype for a method of organ-
izing and financing research, development, and technical evaluation that would 
be done at the behest of governmental agencies, but carried out by privately run 
nonprofit research centers” (1991, 116). During the 1950s, rand was deeply 
engaged in nuclear strategy and the development of systems analy sis, produc-
ing its most notorious alumnus in Herman Kahn, whose scenario planning for 
nuclear conflict provoked disquiet when he published On Thermonuclear War in 
1960, a book famously described by Scientific American as a “moral tract of mass 
murder: how to plan it, how to commit it, how to get away with it, how to justify 
it” (quoted in Rich 2004, 45).  Because rand was less than happy with Kahn’s 
growing public profile, he left the organ ization to form the Hudson Institute in 
1961, where again the Department of Defense was his biggest customer.4
The rising status of the policy analyst benefited from the general post-
war high regard with which science was held, and researchers like  those at 
rand presented themselves, and  were presented in the mainstream media, as 
experimental scientists of a sort, able to invent and engineer new social and 
orga nizational forms (see Smith 1991, 14). The wide range of analytical tools 
developed at rand, James Smith argues,  were a source “of extraordinary con-
fidence in policy making,” and the expert during the 1960s “gained new heights 
of prestige and po liti cal influence” (121).5 At the same time, the suspicion of 
ideology prevalent during the early 1950s and early 1960s presupposed an intel-
lectual environment that focused on the technical assessment of means rather 
than challenging the broader structures within which solutions to prob lems 
might be addressed. In other words, the elevation of the expert was framed 
within an understanding of the role of expertise delimited within the terms of 
a consensus that saw abstract ideas as po liti cally dangerous.
The New York- based artist John Chamberlain was contacted by lacma 
in April 1969, and curator Jane Livingston met him in New York. The possibility 
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of a film proj ect with Ampex, rca, or cbs was discussed, and Chamberlain 
visited Ampex in Los Angeles in May, though nothing came of it.  After another 
proj ect, involving packaged odors, failed to connect with corporate sponsors, 
Chamberlain was offered the option of a placement with a division of Norris 
Industries, a manufacturer of porcelain bathroom fixtures, or the rand Cor-
poration. Chamberlain chose rand.
Larry Bell had already been placed at rand  earlier in the year by a&t, 
but despite his initial sense of the “romance” of an organ ization engaged in 
all sorts of top secret work, nothing happened and Bell was out of rand by 
July. In August, Chamberlain was given an office and some secretarial help, and 
left to navigate the organ ization. Chamberlain explained to a&t in Septem-
ber, around three weeks into his residency, that the  going had been tough; he 
“ couldn’t make any headway at the beginning” and the rand  people had thus 
far been unresponsive (Tuchman 1971, 71). On the face of it, rand  ought to 
have been receptive enough: the previous year, the corporation’s assistant to 
the president had written a&t that “rand has something special to offer the 
creative artist: an intellectual atmosphere and the stimulation of being amid 
creative individuals working in many disciplines” (71). This promise of inter-
disciplinary creativity was what Chamberlain hoped to find, and what he had 
come to expect given rand’s reputation. “I’m not  really against the concept 
of rand,” he explained, “its uniqueness since 1946, through ’56, even  until 
1960” (71). Since  those early days, though, the corporation, in Chamberlain’s 
assessment, had become “somewhat stodgy and constricting” and instead of 
intellectual brilliance he found mostly “sort of dumb fifth grade attitudes about 
every thing” (74).
It is telling that the sense of disappointed belatedness in Chamberlain’s 
remarks, that he had somehow missed the golden age of rand, is explained 
by an awareness that  there had been something unique about the corporation 
 until 1960— around the time Herman Kahn left to found the Hudson Insti-
tute. Chamberlain does not mention Kahn but it is Kahn and his freewheeling 
intellectual audacity that had come to define rand during the 1950s. It was 
also in response to the artist that a&t had placed at the Hudson Institute, 
James Lee Byars, that Chamberlain came up with the notion of sending rand 
employees memos asking for “answers.” Byars had begun his involvement with 
the Hudson Institute in May 1969 and continued to work  there through mid- 
July, returning periodically  after that  until the end of the year.
What Byars was mainly interested in was “questions”: the key aspect 
of his four- pronged investigation was to gather the “one hundred most in-
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ter est ing questions in Amer i ca at this time” (Tuchman 1971, 58), which he 
planned to glean by telephoning influential  people from what he called the 
World Question Center. The other three points he intended to pursue sug-
gest a somewhat awestruck Byars: “the exultation of being in the proximity of 
extraordinary  people,” “the next step  after E = MC2,” and “one thousand su-
perlatives about the Hudson Institute” (58). Byars communicated with Hud-
son staff mainly through internal memos and questionnaires, the first being a 
request from Byars for “one hundred superlatives on Herman Kahn.” Answer-
ing his own question, Byars’s top superlative was: “I- fell- in- love- with- Herman 
Kahn- because- I- knew- in- advance- that- he- could- speak- four- hundred- words- 
a- minute” (60).
Like Chamberlain, Byars knew in advance that Kahn was extraordinary— 
the myth of the genius “defense intellectual” framed his expectations. Unlike 
Chamberlain, though, Byars got to play in Kahn’s sandpit, and Byars was 
clearly electric with excitement in the presence of greatness while Chamberlain 
was deflated  because he believed he had missed the boat. Chamberlain’s memo 
requesting “answers” at rand had to acknowledge a prior question he did not 
get to ask, and  there is a certain testiness to the memo that exceeds the feigned 
bureaucratic mode Chamberlain adopts:
TO: Every one at RAND
FROM: John Chamberlain, Artist in Residence
SUBJECT: ANSWERS
I’m searching for ANSWERS. Not questions!
If you have any,  will you please fill in below  
and send them to me in Room 1138.
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
THANXS




 Whether the impatient tone  here (the emphatic “answers,” and the curt, 
exclamatory dismissal of questions) is a mea sure of Chamberlain’s frustration 
with rand or an attempt to engage with (and outflank) Byars is unclear. The 
a&t report explained that the two artists did not coordinate their proj ects, 
even though Chamberlain “felt in the beginning that the answers might corre-
spond to Byars’ questions, and perhaps even be used in conjunction with them 
as an art work” (Tuchman 1971, 74). What the report did concede, though, is 
that, despite Byars’s awestruck pronouncements about Kahn and the Hudson 
Institute,  things did not go smoothly for  either think tank- based artist: “Both 
 were to some degree unsuccessful in drawing enough in ter est ing material from 
their ‘subjects’ to constitute a satisfactory artistic product,” and had to rely on 
“their own inventions” to complete their respective proj ects (74).
The kind of proj ects Byars and Chamberlain sought to initiate at the think 
tanks and the difficulties they faced reveal a fascination with the notion of an 
intellectual hot house environment, and also with the modes of communica-
tion they took to be the common practice within them. The Hudson Institute 
and rand represent at once a deep establishment commitment to the proto-
cols and hierarchies of the bureaucratic state and a new model of creative in-
quiry plugged into the mechanisms of policy- making. The think tank, at least 
as it is reflected in Byars and Chamberlain through their respective exulted 
and dejected responses to their placement within one, is where ideas become 
actions, where creativity has leverage, and where the exceptional and vision-
ary are cultivated. According to this conception, which the popu lar media 
nurtured throughout the 1950s and which Kahn’s celebrity status seemed to 
confirm, rand and the Hudson Institute represented the triumphant fusion 
of the studio, the laboratory, and the country club: they  were creative, experi-
mental, and exclusive, full of “extraordinary  people,” as Byars  imagined them, 
making the  future happen. The prob lem, as both artists found, was that the 
extraordinary  people  were less than impressed by the presence of the artists.
The think tank is among the institutions to develop out of, and to cru-
cially shape, the emergent information society of the postwar period. John 
Guillory defines information “as any given (datum) of our cognitive experi-
ence that can be materially encoded for the purpose of transmission or storage” 
(2004, 110). Guillory argues that information is more than fact but less than 
knowledge; fact becomes information, he suggests, “when it is, so to speak, 
value- added” (110)— when the fact comes to be known in a certain context. 
Information is less than knowledge  because it has not yet been or ga nized into 
a structure of intelligibility. What is distinctive about information, then, is that 
its value lies in transmission: “Information demands to be transmitted  because 
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it has a shelf life, a momentary value” that, if missed, requires that the informa-
tion “be stored to await its next opportunity” (111). The storage of information 
is a key aspect of what Michel de Certeau (1984, 131–153) calls the “scriptural 
economy,” since the management of written documents is at the heart of mod-
ern bureaucracy and its rules for the administration of the files containing the 
drafts, letters, memos, and reports that comprise the rec ord of the business of 
the office (see Weber 1978, 957–958).
Guillory’s notion of information as fact valued in transmission provides 
a strong indication of the function of the think thank, where ideas and the-
ories are produced and circulated out of a perceived need to answer specific 
questions. Unlike scholarly or scientific research, think tanks like rand are 
not tasked with the disinterested production of knowledge; they are precisely 
concerned with the delivery of information or data that can be applied to ad-
dress par tic u lar issues. For Guillory, the quin tes sen tial information genre is the 
memorandum, a document that is “both ephemeral and permanent” (2004, 
113, original emphasis): the memo “might have an audience of one, or none; it 
might be read once, or never. But however vanishingly ephemeral its interest, 
it must nonetheless be preserved, that is, filed” (113, original emphasis).7 The 
memo “gives directions, makes recommendations, but, above all, it is a means 
of transmitting information within the large bureaucratic structures organ izing 
virtually all work in modernity” (112). Memos are often regulated according to 
the dictates of standardized forms, and as such their content may be marked by 
the expectations and practices required by an organ ization. The memo, in this 
sense, represents a management of expression according to the shape imposed 
by the rules and procedures of a business. The circulation of memos is com-
monly restricted to communications within an organ ization, suggesting that 
they constitute an ongoing transcription of its communicational culture— 
what JoAnne Yates calls “orga nizational memory” (Yates 1990).
For Guillory, the memo, as a genre of writing that emerges during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, along with the emergence of modern 
large- scale business organ izations, coincides with the demise of the rhetorical 
tradition associated with oral communication, eloquence, and persuasion. In 
contrast, the memo reduces scope for persuasion— due to the demands of what 
Guillory calls an “economy of attention” (2004, 125)— “in  favor of permit-
ting a certain instruction to speak for itself ” (120). This does not necessarily 
mean that  there is not desire to persuade, only that “persuasion is implicit . . . 
in simply transmitting information” (120). A memo, when it “directs  others to 
act,” is received “as information, as the answer to the subaltern’s question, What 
should I do?” (121, original emphasis). Where action “is recommended to equals 
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or superiors and argument is supplied, the weight of the argument must be 
carried by information, and contestation occurs around the question of what 
course of action the information actually implies” (121, original emphasis). In-
formational writing is, then, an expression of control where individuals within 
large organ izations with complex communicative networks are “dependent, 
what ever their rank, on the transmission of information possessed by  others 
and where all functionaries are equally compelled, whenever they write, to sub-
mit their writing to certain generic constraints” (122). Chamberlain’s interest 
in the memo as a mode of information generation and dissemination shares 
something with aspects of Conceptual Art, namely a focus on constraint, pro-
cedure, and seriality.  These same concerns are pursued exhaustively by Fluxus.
Chamberlain’s call for answers through the use of memos came  after his 
initial failed attempts to engage rand personnel. He suggested dissolving the 
corporation, cutting off the phones for one day, and taking photos of staff on 
the patios. Then he de cided to screen his film The Secret Life of Hernando Cor­
tez, a typically late 1960s art film featuring stalwarts from Warhol’s Factory and 
hallucinatory soft porn, in the cafeteria.8 Cortez was shown once a day for three 
days before the screenings  were canceled due to complaints. This is the point at 
which Chamberlain dispatched his first memo.
Some responses  were mea sured, if gnomic (“A cautious balance between 
cataclysmic optimism and discerning myopia”),  others facetious (“2 + 2 = 4”; 
“pi to the twenty- forth digit”), dismissive (“quit wasting rand paper + time”) 
and downright hostile (“the answer is to terminate Chamberlain”). More than 
one respondent displayed expert math chops by scratching out a complex 
equation, while another stayed resolutely on message by reflecting on the ratio 
of  actual to estimated costs of weapons systems and the speed of computer 
runs before and  after “debugging.” One carefully wrote out a very long word 
(“pneumonoultramicroscopicsilicovolcanoconiosis”) with a condescending 
parenthesis (“in any dictionary”), while another provided a short essay on the 
current “sex revolution.” Many betrayed confusion (“no comprende!”) and un-
certainty about what question exactly they  were being asked to answer, leading 
a number of respondents to provide an assessment of the Cortez film (“stop 
making movies— stick to sculpture”) or make suggestions about how rand 
decor could be improved. One of the more lengthy replies provided a review 
of the film and requested more color and some pictures in the hall (as well as 
correcting the spelling of “thanxs” in red ink).
What Chamberlain expected to receive beyond this mixture of pointy- 
headed bureaucracy, literal- mindedness, philistinism, and snark is unclear, but 
he was dissatisfied enough with the responses of rand staff to issue a clari-
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fying (and somewhat admonitory) bulletin, sent on his behalf by his rand 
contact Brownlee Haydon:
TO: Every one at RAND
FROM: Brownlee Haydon
SUBJECT: JOHN CHAMBERLAIN’S MEMO (ATTACHED)
Before he left for the East, John Chamberlain gave me the 
attached memo for distribution.
 Because of some of the responses to his  earlier memo asking for 
“answers,” I think every one should understand:
1. John has nothing to do with the experimental redecoration of 
RAND’s halls and offices (see Roger Levien).
2. John is a guest artist- in- residence, sponsored by and paid 
for by the Los Angeles County Museum of Art.
3. His question about answers was not intended to elicit reviews 
of or comments about his film.
In a further memo, with the subject heading “more answers,” Chamber-
lain thanked the previous respondents and explained that he would now “like 
to be more explicit.” Unfortunately, the explanation he provided of what he 
was  after is far from clear: “I had hoped for a more specific poetic imagery to 
induce, or suggest, an alternative to thinking if or when asked to pair with it, 
a question or statement. The altruistic answer is nice, but less in ter est ing . . . 
the challenging being from without rather than within.” One respondent to 
this memo underlined the word “explicit” and wrote in the margin “Aw, come 
on!” Another provided a dictionary definition of the word (“characterized 
by full clear expression”) and, in a typed note, instructed Chamberlain that 
“one of the functions of the artist is to communicate. I  can’t find one person 
who understood  either your first communication or your second. We would 
be happy to share our spiritual experiences with you if we knew what you are 
trying to express. Could you please rephrase paragraph #2 (Ernest Hemingway 
you  ain’t!) so we can understand what the hell you are driving at—or do you 
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know yourself ?” This is a fair criticism—it is hard to tell from Chamberlain’s 
explanation what he is  after.
Despite his disappointment with the pedantic, and sometimes puerile, 
responses to his memos, a fair number of rand staff did attempt to genuinely 
engage in Chamberlain’s exercise, even if they could not fathom the purpose. 
One response, for example, managed to provide a sharp sketch of the rand 
experience from the inside:
rand atmosphere = above average intellectual honesty + personal isola-
tion in white cubicles = a bright bunch of non- communicative neurotics— 
Now you come up with a question.
 There is a combination of openness and guardedness  here, as well as a willing-
ness to identify the tension between collective  labor and compartmentaliza-
tion. This respondent understands the function of the memo as a mode of com-
bat at one remove— employees screened off from one another but accustomed 
to receiving (and returning) hurled challenges. What Chamberlain’s rand 
experiment begins to explore,  whether deliberately or not, is the bureaucratic 
mode of communication as a man ag er, as well as the medium, of information 
exchange. The memo encourages, and is the condition for, a certain kind of 
terse exchange, but responses are of necessity delayed. This delay provides an 
opportunity for reflection but not for the effective correction of misunder-
standings. As Chamberlain’s  limited success in communicating clearly with 
rand staff suggests, the memo as a form of communication is just as effective 
at blocking exchange as it is at enabling it. For Chamberlain, the memo was also 
presumably an unfamiliar mode of address, and no small part of the cause of 
his inability to explain what he wanted to do at rand was down to a failure to 
communicate using the preferred professional form and idiom.
In an a&t questionnaire Chamberlain completed at the end of the proj-
ect, he explained that the first person he met at rand told him that the cor-
poration made “no product except paper.” This, Chamberlain goes on, “proved 
to be incorrect as it took me four weeks to figure that their product was response 
or feedback.”9  Here, Chamberlain reveals a more sophisticated awareness of the 
memo culture than is first apparent in his awkward communications with rand 
staff. It may have taken a few weeks to work out, but what Chamberlain’s memos 
kick into action is the rand feedback machine. Pro cessed through and resitu-
ated within Chamberlain’s art- world context,  these irritable scraps collect a 
form of found poetry that stands as the scratchy transcript of the limits of art- 
and- technology interaction.
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While he clearly was not much of a writer, Chamberlain had spent a year 
during the mid-1950s at Black Mountain College, where he worked mainly 
alongside poets, including Charles Olson, Robert Duncan, Robert Creeley, 
and Fielding Dawson, as well as paint ers like Joseph Fiore and the musician 
Stefan Wolpe (see Waldman 1971, 17). He was aware of the benefits of collabo-
ration across disciplines, and the expectations he brought to rand may well 
have been colored by his experience at Black Mountain, where exceptional tal-
ent was gathered and given  free rein. Chamberlain’s inability to generate pur-
poseful dialog at rand was, in his view, a mea sure of the staff ’s “constriction,” 
though it is apparent from his memos that part of the prob lem lay in an opac-
ity all his own. Accustomed to working among the most advanced artistic and 
literary prac ti tion ers in the country, Chamberlain seems unable to recognize 
his own mode of communication as itself a specialist discourse, and concludes 
that it is his hosts who are intellectually  under par. The notion that rand staff 
might have a working knowledge of con temporary art and aesthetics is as opti-
mistic as the prospect that Chamberlain could follow the calculus he received 
among his “answers.” The frustration with rand employees, then, is due to 
Chamberlain’s sense that, as a member of what Habermas (1987, 397) calls 
an “expert culture” (the upper echelons of the US art world), he  ought to be 
conversant with and treated on a par with other expert cultures—in this case, 
rand. That this patently was not the case not only challenges Chamberlain’s 
personal sense of professional status and competence but also, more seriously, 
puts in question the operating assumptions of the interdisciplinary collabora-
tion underpinning art- and- technology proj ects like lacma’s.
What Was the Question?
Someone who might have been able to follow Chamberlain’s cryptic requests 
was Herman Kahn, whose own unruly oral pre sen ta tions had to be hammered 
into coherence for publication by dutiful associates. By 1968 Kahn’s per for-
mance style had turned the defense intellectual (a category of exotic specialist 
he came to embody) into a kind of star turn, as admired for his manner of 
delivery as for what he had to say about thermonuclear war. A New York Times 
Sunday Magazine feature from that year described Kahn as possessing “com-
puterlike capacities” that, in public per for mance, enable him to “reach into 
his prodigious repertoire for a series of appropriate ‘routines’— explanations, 
arguments, responses, dramatizations or anecdotes that he has developed in 
previous lectures and conversations” (quoted in Pickett 1992, 10).  Here was the 
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kind of brain and charisma to match Charles Olson’s or Buckminster Fuller’s 
famously unruly and erudite lecture style. Chamberlain may have been right 
that rand had lost its maverick spirit  after 1960, but on the other side of the 
continent it was that spirit of which James Lee Byars was so enamored at Kahn’s 
Hudson Institute.
At Hudson, Kahn was beginning to expand the range of think tank ac-
tivity beyond defense concerns into the new field of future- oriented analy sis, 
a realm of enquiry as abstract and unmanageable— and as reliant, in Kahn’s 
mind, on speculation and outrageous vision—as nuclear deterrence theory. 
Khan hired on instinct and preferred insight and imagination over academic 
qualifications. He wanted to shred conventional wisdom and admitted that 
while his eclectic staff could be “impossible,” they  were also “extremely in ter-
est ing” (quoted in Pickett 1992, 7).  Here, surely, was the germinal environment 
within which an artist might work— Byars’s effusive early praise for Kahn cer-
tainly seemed to suggest as much. Nevertheless, as the a&t report explains, 
Byars experienced “a general attitude of hostility” to his presence from the in-
stitute’s staff, who thought what he was  doing was a waste of their, and his, 
time (Tuchman 1971, 60).  After the first few weeks,  there was  little interac-
tion between Byars and the staff, and he spent much of his time “wandering 
about in the halls, chatting to  people at random” (60). Byars was able to spend 
around twenty hours in total with Kahn during his time at the Hudson Insti-
tute, though when asked by a&t curator Jane Livingston about the value of 
Byars’s presence  there, Kahn was circumspect in his appraisal. The World Ques-
tion Center, for Khan, was “a totally undisciplined and uninformed proj ect.” 
For someone well known for his interest in disruptive intelligence, Kahn was 
less sure about the purpose of hosting Byars: “Why are we bother ing with Jim?” 
he wondered. “ After all, I want the organ ization to run right. The presence of 
someone like Jim is theoretically subversive of that goal” (60). Livingston 
suggests that Kahn left the question of why it was worth bother ing with Jim 
unanswered, though given Khan’s propensity for amateur insight as a means 
to crack open received ideas it is surprising that the potential subversion Byars 
offered was not more fulsomely embraced. Byars himself seemed to sense the 
prob lem, which is that Kahn did not see art “as a category of enormous interest 
for himself or for the world—he tends to view it as a luxury” (60).
One of the a&t team, the assistant curator Hal Glicksman, was able to 
make a firsthand assessment of the Byars- Kahn interaction when he attended a 
policy seminar at Hudson in July. For Glicksman, though Kahn was responsive 
to Byars,  there was an evident grinding of gears when Byars’s mode of think-
ing met the analyst’s response: “somehow when a person is that rational and 
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is asked a nonsensical question, the question and answer just  don’t jibe” (62). 
Asked by Byars what the most impor tant question of the twentieth  century 
might be, Kahn’s response, according to Glicksman, was to break down the 
question  until it became manageable: “Kahn says, ‘Well, this question is on 
three levels. First of all  there are cosmic questions like, How is the world cre-
ated, does God exist and this sort of  thing. We can dismiss  those.’ Then he goes 
on to outline the three most impor tant questions of the current day. I forget 
what they  were . . .  Viet Nam and this and that” (62). The sense  here is that 
Kahn  handles the unruly nature of the initial question by bracketing off the 
imponderable, allowing him to reframe the issue as a policy  matter. In other 
words, all questions lead back to the business of the Hudson Institute. It is not 
so much, perhaps, that the question and answer “ don’t jibe” but that Kahn ap-
pears less interested in addressing a question he can see no purpose in answer-
ing and practiced enough to convert an open enquiry back into terms relevant 
to himself and his business. As Hudson staffer Frank Armbruster explained to 
Byars, “Most of the world is concerned with prob lems which they think have 
imminent solutions” (62). Byars insisted that he was not interested in solutions 
as such and complained that “no one could get this through his head, includ-
ing Herman Kahn” (62). The World Question Center would have failed, Byars 
conceded, if he had restricted himself to Hudson. To keep the proj ect  viable he 
had to step out of the tank.
The sense  here is of Hudson as an echo chamber, where unpredictable 
and left- field ideas are encouraged only inasmuch as they feed the narrative of 
“thinking about the unthinkable.” The point of Kahn’s well- known phrase is 
not so much to articulate, in the faux Zen form popu lar among the counter-
culture of the time, a paradox as it is to convert the unthinkable into thinkable 
terms. In this regard, despite the freewheeling style cultivated by Kahn, the 
instrumentalization of thought remains paramount: only that which can be 
made amenable to thinking about policy is worth thinking about. For Kahn, 
the organ ization  will not run right if it concerns itself with questions without 
answers or prob lems without solutions. If  there is anything “subversive” about 
Byars being at Hudson, it is in his desire to break the causal link between ques-
tion and answer and to fixate on the question itself as the object of enquiry. 
Chamberlain, despite having no contact with Byars, clearly grasped what Byars 
was  doing at Hudson and pursued the idea from the opposite direction. It is the 
orphaned term (for Chamberlain, the answer without a question; for Byars, 
the question without an answer) that spooks the think tankers, disrupting the 
problem- solving apparatus and resisting resolution. What is surprising is not 
that the rand and Hudson employees saw this as a waste of time and resources, 
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but that Byars and Chamberlain thought it might go the other way. Both Byars 
and Chamberlain entered the think tanks anticipating high- intensity, high- 
status intellectual engagement, yet neither of them found it  there. Their cred-
ibility and reputations as artists counted for  little in the policy world, and their 
interactions with staff rarely moved beyond bemusement and condescension. 
Strangely, given the anti– Vietnam War movement and the growing radical cri-
tique of the military establishment  after 1968,  there is no sign from Byars or 
Chamberlain that rand or the Hudson Institute might be po liti cally toxic. 
The sabotaging of rationality that their orphaned questions and answers enacts 
would fit well into a subversive narrative about art infiltrating and undermin-
ing the logic of the military- industrial complex. Yet this is a claim neither artist 
seems interested in making. Neither is the fetishization of expertise that each of 
them appears to lean  toward seriously interrogated or admitted.
When Byars began his Hudson residency in May  1969 he had already 
been working on the notion of questions for some time. In Antwerp in the 
spring of 1969, Byars persuaded the Belgian national broadcaster Belgische 
Radio en Televisie to air a live program devoted to the World Question Center. 
He lined up a range of  people prepared to receive his phone call during the 
broadcast, where he would ask them for a question. The show was broadcast on 
November 28, 1969, and filmed at the Wide White Space Gallery in Antwerp. 
The broadcast opens with a shot of Byars sitting, flanked by two young  women 
on  either side, inside a wide circle of thirty  people perched on the floor of an 
empty studio. It is  silent and every one is covered in an im mense white swathe 
of fabric (actually pink silk, but the show was broadcast in black and white). It 
looks like some sort of religious ceremony, perhaps a coven meeting or a gather-
ing of angels. As the camera slowly pans to reveal the  faces of the group, a young 
 woman’s affectless voice introduces the program with a series of statements 
and questions such as: “Do you have an affection for questions?” “What is the 
speed of an idea?” “Which questions have dis appeared?” “Is all speech inter-
rogative?” “Do questions require more energy than other sentences?” “Think 
yourself awake.” Byars, in his signature wide- brimmed hat, announces himself 
as the “self- appointed World Question Center.” The artist asked variations of 
the same question— “Could you pre sent us a question that you feel is perti-
nent with regard to the evolution of your own knowledge?”—to a number of 
intellectuals, artists, and scientists. Some are sitting within the circle, most are 
speaking over the telephone.10
The experts Byars was able to persuade to participate constitute an odd 
but reasonably representative mix of vogueish late-1960s figures. Among the 
Belgian contingent are Ferdinand Peeters (the man responsible for developing 
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the first contraceptive pill outside the US), the writer Georges Adé, and art-
ists Jean Toche and Marcel Broodthaers. Also participating are, among  others, 
John Cage, Luciano Berio, Walter Hopps, Cedric Price, Reyner Banham, Jerzy 
Kosinski, Arthur  C. Clarke, and Robert Jungk. Cage, for his part, spoke by 
phone, and instead of asking a question used the satellite- echo laden transmis-
sion to beseech the audience to follow Buckminster Fuller’s plans to create a 
“comprehensive design science” that would create a world for “living rather 
than killing.”
The World Question Center broadcast fulfilled many of the requirements 
of McLuhan- era techno- utopian global- village theatrics, but as R. John Wil-
liams suggests, it is also marked by the influence of Kahn’s and Byars’s expo-
sure to the futures- oriented speculation of the Hudson Institute (see Williams 
2016, 516). Byars had been in attendance at a Hudson briefing with King Baud-
ouin of Belgium when Kahn asked, “What is the question?” This was a pivotal 
moment for Byars, by his own account, not least  because it reminded him of 
Gertrude Stein’s deathbed query (Byars was fond of announcing that his influ-
ences  were Stein, Einstein, and Wittgenstein). “What is the answer?” Stein is 
supposed to have asked. Receiving no reply, she is said to have continued, “in 
that case, what is the question?”
Byars’s attraction to the Stein- Einstein- Wittgenstein triad is revealing 
not just of the artist’s ability to bundle a linguistic accident into the strapline 
for a  career but also  because it locates the literary, scientific, and philosophical 
nexus of his enquiry in the form of the names of celebrated individuals. The 
names Stein, Einstein, and Wittgenstein stand for expertise in three distinctive 
domains of intellectual  labor, and the network that Byars creates out of them 
provides a shorthand for complexity and experimentation without having to 
probe too deeply into what the connections between Stein’s Jamesian experi-
ments in literary temporality, Einstein’s theory of relativity, and Wittgenstein’s 
explorations of logic and philosophy of mind might actually be. Similarly, the 
Belgian tv staging of the World Question Center is all about the form and the 
per for mance; the discussion itself is fragmented, beset with technical difficul-
ties, and often boring. As a performed instantiation of how technology can 
bring  people together, it is uninspiring. More problematic than the staginess of 
the enterprise, though, is Byars’s need to call on the experts, as if, in true think 
tank fashion, creating an interdisciplinary space within which  great minds can 
come together  will substitute for coherent critical thought.
 There is a facetiousness to Chamberlain’s request for answers that appears 
to be entirely absent from Byars’s mystically inflected asking for questions. 
Chamberlain was clearly disappointed that rand employees did not fire back 
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in an appropriately sophisticated manner, but he is not in thrall to the culture 
of expertise in the way that Byars appears to be. What Byars’s World Question 
Center reproduces more than the interdisciplinary collaboration of the think 
tank, or, in a more utopian register, the collective intelligence of the global vil-
lage, is the media sound bite, whereby complexity and debate are substituted 
for celebrity bromides. If Byars could have included Stein, Einstein, and Witt-
genstein in his teleconference, what might they have been permitted to say, 
given the serious limitations of the format? An expert is an expert is an expert.
Stephanie Young is right to conclude that Chamberlain and rand  were 
each skeptical of the function of the other. Neither Chamberlain nor rand 
materially produced anything, notes Young: “The technologists did not work 
with materials, and the artists did not make objects” (2017, 314). The move, 
in think tanks and in the art world,  toward a technical expertise uncoupled 
from the material challenges and specificities of physical  matter, was supposed 
to reconstruct the relation between knowledge and action  under the condi-
tions of postwar modernity. Defense intellectuals proclaimed the redundancy 
of conventional military strategy in the face of the nuclear threat; artists re-
jected medium- specificity and the production of unique objects as outmoded 
responses to the modern world. The challenge posed to the notion of the art-
ist as skilled craftsperson, which reached its apotheosis in the Conceptual Art 
produced around the time of Chamberlain’s and Byars’s think tank residencies, 
is, of course, driven by a po liti cally, as well as philosophically, motivated insti-
tutional critique, but it is also a move that perversely aligns the artist with the 
expert bureaucrat who never sets foot in the theater of conflict. The failure of 
think tank solutions to the Vietnam War and to President Johnson’s War on 
Poverty came, soon enough, to be seen as a catastrophic failure of theory to 
relate to practice, and that experts themselves, in their air- conditioned offices, 
 were in no small part responsible for the outcomes of proposals they could only 
theoretically imagine. The assault on art- and- technology proj ects came largely 
from within the art world, as artists and critics began to identify precisely the 
failure of participants to  factor their complicity with defense- related institu-
tions into their relations with them. The won der is not that rand and a&t 
became the targets of radical challenges to the Cold War status quo but that it 
took so long for that challenge to manifest itself.
Neither Chamberlain nor Byars seem concerned with the ideological un-
derpinning of rand or Hudson, and they are prepared to take them at face 
value as thinking factories, not as ideology factories. The communication of-
fice at rand cited Chamberlain as saying: “rand’s business is information” 
(quoted in Young 2017, 313), and  after he left rand, Brownlee Haydon said 
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that “John Chamberlain saw rand as an answer machine: what  else did a re-
search organ ization do besides provide answers?” (quoted in Young 2017, 313). 
Among the many questions Chamberlain and Byars failed to ask is the obvious 
one of what constitutes a question in the first place, not to mention the issue of 
who is asking, what constitutes information, and what is at stake when infor-
mation is a business? Chamberlain and Byars largely reproduce the conditions 
of objectivity, neutrality, and disinterest that validated think tanks as the intel-
lectual equivalent of scientific expertise during the early Cold War. In the wake 
of constructionist and Foucauldian analyses of how knowledge is produced, 
their unreflective ac cep tance of the think tank as  little more than the venue 
for the exercise of expertise appears hopelessly inadequate as a response to the 
complexity of how cognitive authority is established and disseminated within 
a hegemonic institution. More than this, however, the work Chamberlain and 
Byars put in at rand and the Hudson Institute reveals the extent to which 
expertise had become a normative category to which even fairly wayward art-
ists could subscribe. The main beef the artists had with the think tanks was that 
their own specialist knowledge was not adequately respected.
Corporate Art
By the time the a&t exhibition opened in 1971, what utopian spirit  there might 
have been in the original ambitions for the proj ect  were unable to withstand 
the Vietnam War, Richard Nixon, and the shooting of students at Kent State 
University. The idea that US corporations could plausibly collaborate with art-
ists to create new worlds of social pro gress was now evidence of complicity and 
corruption— technology was the prob lem and not the solution. The lacma 
exhibition was taken apart in the art press, notably by both Jack Burnham and 
Max Kozloff in Artforum (Burnham 2015b; Kozloff 1971), and David Antin in 
ARTnews (Antin 2011). The reviews by Burnham and Antin both flagged the 
“corporate” nature of  things in their titles, while Kozloff, in a review Burnham 
would  later call “the most vicious, inflammatory, and irrational attack ever 
written on the art and technology phenomenon” (Burnham 1980, 210), called 
his response “The Multimillion Dollar Art Boondoggle.”
Burnham, for one, was clear that the prob lem with the a&t exhibition 
was timing:
If presented five years ago, a&t would have been difficult to refute as 
an impor tant event, posing some hard questions about the  future of 
art. Given the effects of a Republican recession, the role of large in-
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dustry as an intransigent beneficiary of an even more intractable fed-
eral government, and the fatal environmental effects of most of our 
technologies, few  people are  going to be seduced by three months of 
industry- sponsored art—no  matter how laudable the initial motivation. 
(Burnham 2015b, 187)
Although Burnham recognized that  there was an ele ment of posturing in-
volved in showing outrage at the idea of artists working with industry (“it is 
permissible,” he noted, “to have your fabrication done by a local sheet- metal 
shop, but not by Hewlett- Packard” [2015b, 186]), he was nonetheless clear that 
the po liti cal climate made it impossible to justify what was now summarily 
dismissed as “industry- sponsored art.” At this point, the theoretical apparatus 
of interdisciplinary collaboration had fallen away and art and technology was 
viewed merely as a case of suspect patronage.
For Kozloff, it was precisely the easy seduction of money and power that 
was so contemptible about the proj ect: as the country was falling apart, he 
wrote, “the American artists did not hesitate to freeload at the trough of that 
techno- fascism that had inspired them” (1971, 72). Even Burnham admitted 
 there was “something grossly immodest” about the amounts of money poured 
into the proj ect, and was also skeptical of the notion that corporations had any 
interest in genuine research symbiosis between art and industry—at best, he 
thought, companies might get a bit of good publicity for appearing “forward 
looking.” Billy Klüver and Maurice Tuchman  were more than willing to exploit 
the public relations benefits available to a com pany willing to sponsor an art- 
and- technology initiative, but they also  imagined, following Kepes, that the 
arts could exercise a more thoroughgoing transformation of industry if such 
collaborations  were able to multiply and develop. As Burnham’s and Kozloff ’s 
unforgiving assessments of a&t show, however, the idea of art and technology 
as a depoliticized zone was an unsustainable and damaging illusion.
One of the reasons it was damaging was  because it meant that awkward, 
frustrating, or failed collaborations like Chamberlain’s at rand  were not given 
the prominence they might other wise deserve. While a&t had to maintain a 
sense of productive symbiosis between art and industry, the in ter est ing or re-
vealing proj ects that cut out spaces or sat inert and offered only undeliverable 
outcomes  were likely to be marginalized. It is to the credit of Tuchman and the 
a&t team that they understood this well enough to make the report as deep a 
reflection on the multiplicity of responses to the proj ect as pos si ble. Indeed, it 
is precisely when a&t did not run as promised that it genuinely started to do 
some serious cultural work.
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Burnham and Kozloff may have caught the dominant cultural mood by 
aligning a&t with the  enemy, but the challenge of generating collaborations 
with business was not so straightforward, and far from conspiratorial. Most 
corporations showed no interest in Tuchman’s proj ect, as Burnham suspected, 
and for a&t, like E.A.T., the main prob lem was getting their attention. Before 
Missy Chandler’s intervention, Tuchman admitted, just making it through the 
front door was a challenge; even with Mrs. Chandler’s considerable influence, 
over three hundred corporations declined to take part. Tuchman insisted that 
the response from se nior management was positive once initial contact had 
been made, though among  those companies willing to participate in the pro-
gram, he conceded that it was rare to find anyone in  middle management who 
understood what was  going on with a&t.  People could not believe, Tuchman 
explained in an interview with Pacifica Radio, that they “ won’t get burned by 
their higher ups if they co- operate” (Spark 1971). The “special kind of intermin-
gling” between the arts and sciences Tuchman and Klüver wanted to achieve 
was only  really pos si ble, Tuchman acknowledged, with the support of a much 
more power ful body, such as the federal government,  behind it. Despite his 
best efforts, Tuchman explained that he had received  little support from mu-
seums, colleagues, and even lacma’s board of trustees. His hope had been to 
make pos si ble in affluent Southern California the kind of collaborative work 
that lack of resources had prevented the Rus sian Constructivists and the Bau-
haus from achieving. Like Klüver’s staging of 9 Eve nings at the same venue as 
the 1913 Armory Show, Tuchman  imagined a&t as the inheritor of a radi-
cal tradition; like Klüver, Tuchman believed that Amer i ca could fi nally deliver 
what the Old World squandered.
Tellingly, Tuchman’s assessment of a&t at the time of the radio interview, 
made in early 1971 before the exhibition opened, was already restrained by his 
awareness of recently changed economic and po liti cal circumstances. Business 
was cautious; antiwar sentiment had hardened public opinion against corpo-
rations and technology more generally. Like Burnham, Tuchman reckoned 
that a&t was too late, in Tuchman’s estimation by two years. Billy Klüver and 
Maurice Tuchman appeared to take seriously the notion that the United States 
had become the natu ral home of the artistic avant- garde, and each pursued 
his vision of art and technology collaboration in a manner that conceived of 
it as a continuation and an enlargement of proj ects that had failed in the Old 
World due to insurmountable po liti cal and economic obstacles. While Klüver 
and Tuchman undoubtedly achieved a not inconsiderable amount in drawing 
together some of the most influential artists of the time with some of the big-
gest corporate players in American business, neither E.A.T. or a&t was able 
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to pick up enough support, finance, or critical momentum to see the proj ect 
through the eco nom ically and po liti cally hostile environment of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. What their own understanding of their respective proj ects re-
veals, though, is a largely unquestioned assumption that American art should 
be considered on an equal footing with other professional fields of activity. 
As such, when businesses seemed uninterested or uncooperative, Tuchman’s 
tetchy complaints about risk aversion in  middle management served to ac-
count for corporate indifference as an orga nizational weakness in line with 
popu lar notions of American conformism. This is another version of Cham-
berlain’s disappointment with the rand staff—if only they  were not so bour-
geois, something brilliant might have happened. To an extent, then, while the 
national economic and po liti cal climate provided a compelling explanation for 
the deflated ambitions of art- and- technology proj ects like E.A.T. and a&t, a 
more painful assessment, and one that Tuchman was unwilling to face, was that 
business just could not care less about them.
At this point, if the attempt by Klüver and Tuchman to hook their proj-
ects up to the remains of the Eu ro pean collectivist avant- garde did not already 
seem far-fetched, it must by now be seen as, at the very least, willfully decontex-
tualized. What is most peculiar about the Americans’ desire to align themselves 
with aspects of Constructivism and Futurism, though it is quite in keeping with 
broader US cultural strategies during the Cold War, is the absence of any dis-
cussion of the po liti cal implications of  either the work of Eu ro pean and Rus-
sian precursors or the new American art- and- technology proj ects themselves. 
During the Pacifica Radio interview, Tuchman is asked directly by interviewer 
Clare Spark  whether he thinks the “lack of po liti cal content in modern art” 
has made it pos si ble to achieve collaborations with government and industry 
in ways that would not have been previously pos si ble. Tuchman’s response is, 
disappointingly, formalist boilerplate: “Stalin found that  there was enormous 
po liti cal content in abstract art and so did Hitler. And they  were right. I think 
 there is terrific po liti cal content in a Frank Stella painting” (Spark 1971).  There 
is no direct discussion by Tuchman of what the po liti cal ramifications of an art- 
and- technology proj ect might be (or, for that  matter, what is po liti cal about a 
Frank Stella painting), but Spark had asked the right question.11
In her contribution to the a&t report, curator Jane Livingston also 
positioned the proj ect as an inheritor to collaborative tendencies among the 
old- world avant- garde, yet her assessment, like Tuchman’s, also remained aloof 
from politics and instead focused on limitations that seem rooted in their at-
tachment to pre industrial or aristocratic (that is, premodern and therefore 
pre- American) forms. Constructivism and Futurism, for example, despite their 
131
expertIse, lAcmA, And the thInk tAnk
“attempts to embrace a socialist technology,”  were not, according to Liv-
ingston, able to fully realize the formal implications of machine technology and 
mass production, and tended to focus on stylistic ele ments, representing merely 
the appearance of industrial forms. The Bauhaus emphasis on craft, likewise for 
Livingston, was a “serious ideological limitation” since it tended to “reduce art 
to craft” and saw the role of “or ga nized technology” as enabling the elevation 
of craft to art (Tuchman 1971, 43). In the end, for Livingston, though  these pre-
cursors continued to exercise an influence, it was one that remained “identified 
with a Eu ro pean sensibility,” which she obliquely associates with the “tradition-
ally aristocratic” stress on the “unique object” that can then be condescendingly 
“mass- produced for public consumption” (43). Like Alfred Barr’s torpedo 
diagram, modern art for Livingston proceeded by way of geo graph i cal dis-
placement, with the Eu ro pe ans and Rus sians, saddled with inhibiting residual 
attachments, giving way to the full- throated modernity of the American scene.
If Tuchman and Livingston (and Klüver)  were right and the United 
States was the proper heir to the Eu ro pean art- and- technology avant- garde, 
not least by virtue of having never been premodern, why was American indus-
try so indifferent to the promise of such a collaboration? Spark’s question in-
vites one way of attempting an answer, but the vocabulary with which a proj ect 
like a&t might be described that keeps it a  viable proposition for American 
business and, at the same time, a  viable po liti cal challenge to bourgeois aesthet-
ics does not seem available to Tuchman, if it exists at all. Neither capable of 
convincing corporate Amer i ca that working with artists would lead to an as yet 
unimaginable  future of innovation, nor willing to directly acknowledge and 
cultivate the radical underpinning of the movements they claimed as precur-
sors, proj ects like a&t and E.A.T. failed to appeal, consistently and persua-
sively, to enough artists, scientists, or business leaders.  There is a whiff of the 
old New Deal collectivist spirit in Tuchman’s passing comment that a bigger 
organ ization, like the Federal government, might have made it work, but it is a 
phantom remark out of step with rising anti- government sentiment on the one 
hand, and bureaucracy’s increasingly defensive crouch on the other.
James Lee Byars’s love affair with the charisma of expertise,  whether it 
emanated from Herman Kahn, Stein, Einstein, or Wittgenstein, and his desire 
to work himself into an equation that included them all, is of a piece, it seems 
to us, with John Chamberlain’s defensive response at not being respected by 
rand employees and Maurice Tuchman’s frustration with  middle manage-
ment’s philistinism. The artists wanted re spect; they wanted their world recog-
nized as professionally rigorous; they wanted their contribution to stand equally 
alongside that of scientists, engineers, and businessmen. Their disappointment 
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and humiliation, however muted or disguised, is a mea sure of their own fas-
cination with, and desire to bathe in, the lustrous aura emanating from high- 
status, high- powered Cold War elites. Burnham and Kozloff may have also 
overestimated the relevance and influence of art in American life, but they did 
see clearly how asymmetrical the relationship between art and technology was 
in proj ects like a&t.
What is missing from Tuchman’s assessment of a&t, and what might 
have saved it from the mauling the exhibition received, is a sense of irony. It 
is irony that makes Chamberlain’s proj ect in ter est ing; it is lack of irony that 
renders Byars’s World Question Center pompous and absurd. A broader aware-
ness, and an embrace, of limitations, failures, reversals, insufficiencies, and ac-
cidents would allow the contradictions and tensions in a proj ect like a&t to 
breathe and a critical space to develop within which they might be interrogated 
and explored. The a&t report saves a&t from itself, in a sense,  because it 
undermines the bland affirmations of the a&t brand and addresses, to an ex-
tent, Tuchman’s inability, or unwillingness, to think directly about the po liti cal 
ramifications of the proj ect. The cover of the report, with its grid of hairy artists 
and clean- cut organ ization men, provides a compressed signal of the contra-
dictions contained within that is  either the smartest summative statement of 
the proj ect available or among the most supremely oblivious designs ever to 
adorn the front of an exhibition cata log. With a&t, a disappointing lack of 
self- awareness makes it difficult to hold out in  favor of the former. At the same 
time, the unflinchingly extensive documentation of all aspects of the proj ect 
in the report indicates that the notion of the enterprise as an experiment has 
been preserved, even if the deadpan delivery offered by Kienholz’s promise of 
expertise is, unfortunately, beyond detection.
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How to Make the World Work
earth piece
Listen to the sound of the earth turning.
1963 spring
— Yoko Ono, “Earth Piece”
I now see the Earth realistically as a sphere and think of it as a spaceship.
— Buckminster Fuller, Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth
 Those scientists who ushered in the Atomic Age felt 
 responsible to humanity.  Whether they worked on the 
Manhattan Proj ect or not, and even if they helped the 
war effort in socially justifiable ways, they felt responsi-
ble. The dawn of a new postwar world had left  behind the 
 Great Depression and created a country with a clear lead-
ership mandate on the global stage but without a clear 
strategy to articulate the mandate. It was also a nation that found the  bottle of 
technology and science empty and the genie nowhere to be seen. That which 
had enabled victory in the war partially hobbled the  future in peacetime. Most 
scientists had carried out a given task and had plowed a narrow furrow in the 
larger research field, head down and duty tasked, but once successful as a col-
lective, the individual felt a need to save civilization, perhaps again, without the 
specter of war driving the agenda— even as the Cold War darkened the new US 
horizon.  These scientists knew they could do better.
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It was with such determination and muted optimism that the Macy con-
ferences got underway again in the postwar period. The participants had been 
keen to pursue ideas raised during meetings before the war and did so during 
the conflict through letters while stationed around the globe fighting and 
contributing to the war effort as asked. They knew when they assembled 
again  after the conflagration had ceased that they would face new demands 
with regard to civilization that needed to be addressed through their col-
lective, interdisciplinary scientific, technological, and aesthetic experimenta-
tion. Such concerns had long been the purview of the token anthropologists, 
Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead, who indeed spent their entire lives 
pursuing such experimentation. As exemplified by the Macy conferences and 
their principled pursuit of cybernetics as a kind of unified science model, 
they prioritized research that helped us understand how the world worked. 
Bateson and Mead explored how  humans worked in relation to larger environ-
mental and ecological systems while also developing increasingly experimental 
means of representing to other academicians and the interested general pub-
lic  these systemic relations in their glorified diversity and fundamental unity. 
Bateson’s photographic and film work, though predating the Macy confer-
ences, influenced a new set of experimental ethnographic filmmakers as well as 
artists seeking to address a war- damaged society. Stan VanDerBeek and Gene 
Youngblood, as well as Buckminster Fuller, took inspiration from this work, 
and Bateson and Mead both spoke eloquently on  these practices and their limi-
tations to an  eager audience of counterculture, avant- garde, social, and artistic 
engineers.
In the first paragraph of Norbert Wiener’s The  Human Use of  Human Beings: 
Cybernetics and Society (1950), he claims the changes in historical conditions 
in the shift from the nineteenth to the twentieth  century  were responsible for 
“the marked break” in art, lit er a ture, and science between the two centuries. 
Unlike some aspects of Dewey’s occasionally synchronic vision of science as 
a semi- universal endeavor impervious to the vicissitudes of time and context, 
Wiener argued for it as being in the mix and driving history as much as being 
driven by it. Alongside Einstein, who fully supported Wiener’s ethical stances 
in relation to science/technology and its military applications, Wiener per-
ceived science as operating in larger systems than itself, and playing in fields 
demarcated by aesthetic practice and experience as much as by scientific debate. 
Steve Heims, writing in the introduction to the second edition of Wiener’s ap-
plication of cybernetics to society and history, argues that Wiener resembled 
Dewey insofar as he understood technology not so much as applied science 
but as applied social and moral philosophy (1980, xii). And Heims describes 
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Wiener’s book as one that “might have been made by an artist as readily as by a 
creative scientist” (xv).
As with many of the other Macy conference participants, Bateson, Mead, 
and Wiener held that the imperative of the moment was to salvage civilization 
 after World War II through scientific, technological, and aesthetic experimen-
tation and interdisciplinary exploration of the interrelatedness of the  human, 
natu ral, and machinic worlds. For Bateson, this meant a literally endless en-
gagement with “mind” as an evolving and evolutionary set of systems linking 
the individual to society and nature in an aggregate of ideas: “an ecol ogy of 
mind” or “a science of mind and order.” Citing the work of Wiener, von Neu-
mann, and Shannon on communications and information prob lems, Bateson 
saw a glimmer of hope for a devastating half  century of world wars when he 
states that “cybernetics is, at any rate, a contribution to change— not simply a 
change in attitude, but a change in the understanding of what an attitude is” 
(2000, 483). The attitude  toward science as an epistemology geared  toward te-
leological autocratic ends was the anti- Deweyan hubris of science in the twen-
tieth  century, and cybernetics applied to individuals, socie ties, and ecosystems 
offered a way to alter this consistently failed enterprise.
The larger pedagogical impulse that drove the ethical and intellectual in-
terdisciplinary imperatives of cybernetic research and researchers profoundly 
influenced the multifaceted works produced by the Eames Office, headed by 
the designers Charles and Ray Eames, and the de cades of visionary writings and 
designs by Buckminster Fuller. Similarly, the experimental ethos of avant- garde 
techniques and aesthetics, practical engagement with materials and technolo-
gies, and a general eschewal of goal- oriented pro cesses  shaped the pedagogical 
enterprises of  these three thinkers and designers as they sought, like the Macy 
conference scientists, to examine how the world worked and how to make the 
world work— and to share the results of this examination with the general pub-
lic in as effective and experimental way as pos si ble. New knowledge required 
new articulations of it.
The Eames Office as Cold War Design Lab
Through a number of commissions for global fairs and representing US and/or 
corporate interests, the Eames Office designed visions of a technological and 
informationally  shaped  future using avant- garde techniques of the early part 
of the twentieth  century. The Eames Office operated as an IT, media, arts, and 
design lab avant la lettre, not unlike  those officially founded around the same 
time such as E.A.T. and cavs. The Eames Office, though, held no singular 
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institutional frame or constituency, while such was not the case for Klüver’s 
proj ect at Bell Labs or Kepes’s center at mit. The Eames Office’s ability to work 
with and for a range of clients across the corporate, university, entertainment, 
and government sectors echoes the relationships between  these sectors emer-
gent in and essential to the new Cold War world, relationships connected by 
technology, aesthetics, global computing, and geopo liti cal agendas.
The Eameses stated in 1969 that their “interests have included many as-
pects of communication— photography, exhibitions, writings and motion pic-
tures. Our work in education has intensified this and has provided a natu ral 
overlap with several governmental agencies” (quoted in Lipstadt 2005, 151). 
This overlap essentially transformed the Eameses into “cultural ambassadors” 
during and for the Cold War repre sen ta tion of the US  because “their design 
agenda aligned with the po liti cal agenda the US government wished to com-
municate” (Schuldenfrei 2015, 43)— and communication became their new 
mode of design as well as its content. They  were designers of the immaterial 
world of information and think- tank concerns, partnering with rand, Metro- 
Goldwyn- Mayer (mgm), MoMA, and ibm. Many designers as well as occu-
pants of the government expressed surprise that the outwardly “nonideological” 
and “cutting- edge” design firm/lab would fit with and continue to work for 
the US federal government for many years (Lipstadt 2005, 151–152). It is dif-
ficult to distinguish cause from effect with regard to the Eames Office and its 
vari ous patrons or commissions and its interests, especially when one consid-
ers the Eameses’ stated position that they would not work on proj ects with 
which they did not ethically agree. The Eames Office served as a singularly 
well- positioned platform that allowed for deft movement across educational, 
corporate, governmental, entertainment, and technological collaborations, all 
of it grounded on a solid fine- arts base. The Eames Office received much high- 
profile patronage from numerous corporate clients, while maintaining links to 
many university scientists, heads of major corporations, and public as well as 
private cultural institutions.
The US Information Agency (usia), the State Department, the Depart-
ment of the Interior, the Smithsonian, Pan Am, the Ford Foundation, Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, Cummings Engines, Westing house, and Herman 
Miller Furniture counted among their clients. Long- time collaborators in-
cluded architect Eero Saarinen, designer and US government exhibition or ga-
nizer and design theorist George Nelson, film director Billy Wilder, film score 
writer Elmer Bern stein, and designer Alexander (Sandro) Girard (Lipstadt 
2005, 152). Buckminster Fuller  housed Eames installations in pavilion settings, 
and György Kepes provided them influential direction with regard to visual 
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language, social pro gress, and education. The rand Corporation links, in par-
tic u lar, proved pivotal for the Eameses in their work on vari ous US pavilions 
abroad for exhibitions of technology, urbanism, postwar visions of the  future, 
and US consumer market economy as the exemplification of demo cratic beliefs 
during the Cold War.
From their geo graph i cally marginal site in Venice, California, the influ-
ence of their office marked a larger shift in the US begun during World War 
II from East Coast control to the West. The war efforts in aerospace indus-
tries both in terms of design and manufacture, not to mention the siting of the 
rand office, Hollywood, and tele vi sion production all loosened the hold of 
East Coast power. In the early days of their marriage during the first years of 
the 1940s, Charles worked as a set designer for mgm while also experiment-
ing with molding plywood for a range of uses in the war effort, ranging from 
plane parts to splints for wounded limbs, thus emphasizing design and materi-
als in the ser vice of applications from military technology to field medicine to 
cinema production and art. The biomorphic shapes afforded by molded ply-
wood made their way into Ray’s sculptures before shaping their influential and 
lucrative chair designs. Some of  these sculptures featured on the cover of an 
issue of Arts and Architecture in September 1942. The convoluted and folded 
wooden structures evoked a Möbius strip of planes that aesthetically bore the 
same interest in perspective found in Braque’s and Picasso’s cubist sculptures 
(Giovanni 2005, 60). The pro cess of molded plywood also found its way on to 
mgm sets, as well as into furniture and industrial design, so that from the outset 
the Eameses’ work cut across art, architecture, and cinema, and military and in-
dustrial production: a materiality that physically links the military- industrial- 
university- entertainment complex. The plasticity of the material allowed it the 
potentialities plasticity provides. And plasticity of materials and aesthetics, as 
well as topics, ideas, and clients, proved central to the Eames Office.
The Eames Office occupied a noninstitutional site that operated chron-
ologically and intellectually between the New Bauhaus and cavs, with the 
work, ideals, and spirit of Moholy- Nagy but operating in ways more attuned 
to the predominant corporate culture. With lab and studio seamlessly merg-
ing, the sculpted plywood chairs that populated the 1946 MoMA show “New 
Furniture Designed by Charles Eames”  were tested physically and aesthetically 
at the Eames Office in laboratory conditions. Photos of the chairs  were taken 
next to works by Alexander Calder to underscore their abstract, sculptural, and 
biomorphic qualities, as well as to place the Eames Office’s design work explic-
itly in dialog with con temporary art (61). Greatly inspired by information and 
communications theory in the early 1950s, the Eames Office, led by Charles’s 
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enthusiasm for  these research areas, turned from primarily working on furni-
ture design to films, information visualization, and multimedia installations. 
The 1953 Eames film A Communications Primer was essentially an animated 
version of Claude Shannon’s 1949 book, The Mathematical Theory of Commu­
nication.1 The films also served as experiments in the filmic medium, as well as 
its installation, engaging technologies of vision that altered the scale of seeing 
as well as the scale of projection. At the same time, the films suggested the 
Eames Office was the embodiment of a creative and experimental lab, deliver-
ing information theory in a profit- led model of benign US corporate and Cold 
War idealism of pro gress.2 The Eames Office was a platform of experimenta-
tion for the materiality of ideas and the immateriality of thought articulated 
through objects and images capable of effecting sociopo liti cal change.
The Eames Office shared with more institutionally formalized art and 
technology labs a strong and sustained link to some of the larger aesthetic and 
formal concerns of early twentieth- century avant- garde movements, but mark-
edly in their case without explic itly progressive pedagogy and radical social 
agendas. As we have seen, in each instantiation of the art- and- technology lab, 
a dilution of the more adventurous social concerns of the Bauhaus or Dada, for 
example, appeared in the US versions that drew on their traditions. Charles 
Eames might have gotten the most credit for the Eames Office’s success and 
been its public face, but it was Ray’s background in and knowledge of the syn-
tax found in the avant- garde and experimental art milieu of NYC in the early 
part of the twentieth  century, in which she was deeply involved, that provided 
much of the visual and technological knowledge they updated, recontextual-
ized, and domesticated. In much the same way that Surrealism became part 
of the Disney studio and popu lar culture toolbox, the Eames Office brought 
this same domesticated syntax to vari ous institutions and spaces. The vari ous 
forces at play in the emergence of Cold War geopo liti cal par ameters and bor-
ders made it difficult to maintain fully any alternative po liti cal agendas for the 
vari ous art and design movements that provided inspiration for the Eames 
Office and other experimental labs. Nonetheless, the idealistic belief in art’s 
efficacy for social change barely wavered. André Breton, vigilant to the end, de-
voted his aptly titled final publishing endeavor, The Breach, to such larger goals. 
 Running from 1961 to 1965 and offering images and new art by vari ous art-
ists still involved in Surrealism’s transformations, the publication also included 
discussions of Pop Art and film as well as pieces about the increasing po liti cal 
demands and pressures of the Cold War (Gale 1997, 414–415). The Eames Of-
fice, vari ous po liti cally charged art movements and art- and- technology labs in 
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university and corporate settings  were clearly not alone. All of  these enterprises 
held varying agendas, though with an oddly singular goal: to make peace per-
petual during a nuclear standoff through aesthetic, technological, and informa-
tion experimentation.
The idealistic (and post- ideological) spirit of the Eames Office remains 
in the pre sent. Although no longer functioning, the Eames Office still main-
tains an official website with links to archival material, photo graphs, films, and 
historical information about the Eames  house and their exhibitions. The site 
includes the ethos of the Eames Office, which reads: “Charles and Ray’s work 
was a manifestation of one broad, all- encompassing goal: to positively impact 
 people’s lives and environments.”3 The site also provides a shop where  people 
can purchase products such as prints, toys, books, furniture, memorabilia, and 
an Eames app— the singular vision of a collective  future made material and 
consumable.
Powers of Ten: The End of Interiority  
and the Effect of Adding Another Zero
Public education regarding technological developments that  were rapidly 
shaping the postwar world played an impor tant role in the Eames Office’s work 
in film. Powers of Ten, their most famous and still most influential such work, 
went through three diff er ent iterations, starting in 1963, and again in 1968 and 
1977.4 The 1968 version was made at the behest of an mit physics professor 
working on the Kepes institutional agenda to update and upgrade visual tools 
at mit as a means for more effective pedagogy. When presenting the film at 
Harvard in 1970, according to Schuldenfrei, Charles Eames framed the film 
as linking economics and ecol ogy to collective responsibility. The application 
of cybernetic theory to ecosystems as found in Bateson and Fuller, as well as 
to society and history as articulated by Wiener, exerted its influence on the 
Eameses’ 1977 revision of their film. Schuldenfrei connects some of the nasa- 
sourced images to the emergent ecological movements of the time (2015, 137–
140). Powers of Ten addresses, in Martin Heidegger’s phrase, “the age of the 
world picture” when Spaceship Earth, as Buckminster Fuller called our planet, 
got its own er’s manual (courtesy of his own polymath erudition and certitude) 
as well as an environmentally driven libertarian cata log for the counterculture 
from Stewart Brand (1968). The Eameses  were in the mix too, and used their 
platform to reframe and recontextualize their film to raise environmental con-
sciousness. The final version, completed in 1977, sports the subtitle: A Film 
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Dealing with the Relative Size of  Things in the Universe, and the Effect of Add­
ing Another Zero. Underscoring their ecological concerns, some new lines  were 
added to the voiceover— lines that read like the prophetic insights of Fuller 
or Brand but intended for the masses. When the film has reached the outer 
edges of the universe, and the world picture becomes a black screen with the 
illuminated planet now no longer even a speck, the narrator states: “We pause 
to start back home. This lonely scene— the galaxies like dust—is what most of 
space looks like. This emptiness is normal. The richness of our neighborhood 
is the exception” (quoted in Schuldenfrei 2015, 140). The multitude of images 
showing our lonely planet in its exposed unique fragility became an impor-
tant strand of the perspective on rapidly rescaling  human vision the Eameses 
offered in this piece of popu lar visual pedagogy. Home is the place where we 
start adding zeros and powers of ten to our corporeal vision; it is a dwelling of 
singular qualities.
The Eameses’ film explic itly moves up into the atmosphere through visual 
technologies multiplied by powers of ten, and then takes audiences into the 
deepest reaches of outer space, before plunging us back to Earth and eventually 
into the nucleus of a carbon atom found in the  human body. The macro and 
the micro, and the astronomical and the nano, that constitute the scopic move-
ments of the film chart a history of Western technoscientific power as primarily 
visual in source and manifestation. The triumph of the visual in the Western 
sensorium and its empirical power to overturn received doxa (and thus create a 
new world in which science had sway) meant that seeing not only equals know-
ing but also that seeing equals power over the seen, as satellite technology and 
other Cold War tele- technologies of surveillance manifest.
Just as their films exploited the most recent innovations of visual tech-
nologies and their explosion of scales, so too  were they interested in scales of 
projection and exhibition. An immediate and influential precursor of Pow­
ers of Ten can be found in an  earlier Eames film called Glimpses of the USA, 
a multiscreen pre sen ta tion at the 1959 Moscow Exhibition.5 As the undesig-
nated designers of the Cold War through their numerous films, exhibitions, 
and multiscreen experimentations, the Eameses helped pop u lar ize scientific 
and technological innovation, consumer culture, and the powers of abstrac-
tion operative within complex systems. Glimpses provides their first foray into 
displaying the optic capacities made by satellites, using the zooming-in tech-
nique that they display in Powers of Ten—in fact, some of the imagery of Earth 
seen from space found in Powers of Ten comes from Glimpses. The film tracks 
from the tele- technological won ders of a satellite vision of Earth down to the 
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mundane start of the day within “the average” US  house hold, zooming rapidly 
in increments from the space view down to the quotidian making of breakfast. 
Both films offer the power of the micro and macro technological amplification 
and production of vision, with universal computation providing the means to 
scale rapidly up or down.
In Powers of Ten, the midway point of the 1977 version arrives with its 
return from the outer reaches of space back to the  human scale before moving 
into the body and the atomic formation of it. When the film enters the micro- 
level of prosthetically enhanced vision, it marks the end of a certain kind of 
 human interiority. The site of moving from the macro to the micro is through 
the epidermis of the hand, that  grand metonym for  humans as makers. The 
 human is what gets repositioned in  these new technologies of scales of vision. 
Writing contemporaneously with the production of the film, Jean Baudrillard 
argues for the slow dissolution of  human scale and psychological possibility of 
interiority. He claims that “with the tele vi sion image— the tele vi sion being the 
ultimate and perfect object for this new era— our own body and the  whole sur-
rounding universe become a control screen” (1983, 127). The cybernetic desire 
of control and homeostasis within an individual, society, ecosystem, or ma-
chinic operation becomes a control- room screen. The very liberatory possibili-
ties the Macy conference participants, as well as Fuller and the Eameses, espy in 
cybernetics as potentially capable of derailing Western scientific epistemologi-
cal hubris has been hijacked, according to Baudrillard, for the very technoscien-
tific ends  these experimentations sought to resist. Baudrillard places televisual 
technologies and media/information theory within three larger “irreversible” 
trends of the con temporary moment: “an ever greater formal and operational 
abstraction of ele ments and functions and their homogenization in a single vir-
tual pro cess of functionalization; the displacement of bodily movements and 
efforts into electric or electronic commands, and the miniaturization, in time 
and space, of pro cesses whose real scene (though it is no longer a scene) is that 
of infinitesimal memory and the screen with which they are equipped” (128–
129). The technicities that Baudrillard charts would be systems that undercut 
homeostasis or the potential for pro gress within Western science, turned as 
they are  toward instrumental ends for which the  human scale and its potential 
for interior self- reflexivity is obliterated, much as the  human body as pivot for 
the nano and macro scaled modes of scientific seeing passes right through the 
power of zero. Powers of Ten performed the new scales of vision made pos si-
ble by intensive military technological research, work that further reframed 
 human existence on the face of Earth.
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Fluxus, Abel Gance, and the Eames Office:  
Another Bauhaus Moment in the Techno- Avant- Garde
Ken Friedman, regional outpost co- chairman (San Francisco) of Fluxus at the 
time of the Eames Office in its full glory, called the movement “an interna-
tional laboratory of ideas— a meeting ground and workplace for artists, com-
posers, designers and architects, as well as economists, mathematicians, ballet 
dancers, chefs, and even a would-be theologian” (2011, 35, original emphasis). 
The Eames Office as lab experimenting with developing technologies, designs, 
media, theories, educational aspirations, and collaborative proj ects finds elec-
tive affinities with Fluxus, as well as cavs, E.A.T., and lacma, especially 
when the larger, transcendental or ideological rationale for  these endeavors 
is explored. One strand of Fluxus experimentation draws its genealogy from 
the Soviet avant- garde loosely bundled  under the 1920s Rus sian journal lef 
and Constructivism back to Dada (36). Friedman further links Fluxus- as- lab 
to American pragmatism and American transcendentalism, with its influences 
on Emerson and Thoreau (37). The heady eclectic mixture of pragmatism, tran-
scendentalism, hermeneutics, and “intermedia” highlighted a desire to uncover 
larger po liti cal and existential truths lurking in the quotidian. The combina-
tion also foregrounds the discipline of daily routine and instruction that Fluxus 
artworks perform.
The social effects of such making  were explic itly in play with the Fluxus 
group, as much as it was in the Eames Office’s pedagogical mission. In terms 
of near con temporary artistic influence, Marcel Duchamp’s influence on the 
Fluxus group proved most impor tant, especially his attempt to “reconcile art 
and the  people,” as Apollinaire put it in 1912 (Apollinaire 2002, 183). Referring 
to Duchamp’s then emerging The Large Glass, Apollinaire suggests “art such 
as this could produce works of unimagined power. It might even have a social 
function” (77). Dada also si mul ta neously held anarchistic and idealistic beliefs 
regarding the transformative powers of art and aesthetics confronting failed 
sociopo liti cal institutions and values that  were articulated through technological 
change. This schizoid belief held that we could turn the tools of war and vio lence 
into sources of liberation and revolution. A repetition of such thinking could be 
found in the ways in which Fluxus and the Eames  Office attempted, in rather dif-
fer ent ways, to engage a general public facing a new techno- military moment. 
If Apollinaire felt the seams of society and culture coming apart on the eve of 
World War I, and if the Fluxus movement felt a similar technological- aesthetic 
shift in Cold War Amer i ca reverberating on a global scale, then György Kepes 
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saw the same strains from within the heart of US military- technological inno-
vation achieved through university r&d at mit.
Repetitions and recycling of avant- garde techniques and strategies can be 
found in the multiscreen immersive experiences used by the Eameses in the 
1959 usia- sponsored pavilion in Moscow, and most intensively in the ibm 
pavilion at the 1964 New York World’s Fair. Especially influential for them was 
the narrative avant- garde cinematic developments of Abel Gance in the first 
de cades of the twentieth  century.6 The points of comparison between Gance 
and the Eameses film work are vast, including editing techniques, screen expan-
sion on horizontal and vertical planes, and innovations in projected film and 
image work. Most importantly for both,  these formal experiments served the 
significantly idealistic, conservative, even melodramatic nature of the content 
of the works. Both Gance and the Eameses  were lauded for their formal inno-
vation while si mul ta neously derided for their capitulation to genre demands, 
nationalist cheerleading, and general cele bration of bourgeois values. Norman 
King describes Gance’s work as “reactionary innovation” in so far as it wedded 
melodrama with formal innovation (1984, 3)— both a phrase and a critique ap-
plicable to the Eames Office’s screen productions as well. The links with Gance 
proved to be substantial for the Eames Office, and they shared many formal 
and content- related qualities. Other avant- garde influences made their way 
into international pavilion displays during the 1950s and likewise influenced 
the Eameses. Although  these experiments operated with significantly diff er ent 
Cold War agendas, they  were nonetheless often recycled by the Eames Office 
for their governmental and corporate clients in pavilion settings.
The multiscreen strategy the Eameses first used in Moscow with Glimpses, 
and again  later for Think (1964),7 clearly draw on specific strands of Eu ro pean 
avant- garde theater and per for mance, more recent iterations of which they en-
countered at the 1958 Brussels World’s Fair.  There, Le Corbusier’s multimedia 
show entitled Poème électronique provided an explicit display of Philips tech-
nology in the ser vice of social commentary and po liti cal critique of twentieth- 
century injustice.8 Also at the Brussels fair, installations by the Czech avant- 
garde theater designer Josef Svoboda, such as Polyekran, part of the ongoing 
multimedia project Laterna Magika, arranged screens with unconventional 
 angles, shapes, and sizes for projection, allowing the viewer to be bombarded 
by projected images in an immersive and disorienting manner. Both Le Cor-
busier and Svoboda owed a  great deal to the projection experiments by the Bau-
haus designer Herbert Bayer and the projected theater works from the 1920s 
by Erwin Piscator in collaboration with Walter Gropius and Moholy- Nagy 
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in Berlin. Piscator emigrated to the US and continued his projected- image 
and live- actor stage- set experimentation into the 1940s. Vari ous scholars have 
traced specific ele ments of  these long- range influences displayed by Le Corbus-
ier and Svoboda, back to early twentieth- century avant- garde experiments in 
projective technologies. Such display techniques also found their way into the 
Eameses’ installations (though in a much tamer fashion and with a markedly 
diff er ent ideological agenda in 1959, and again, and more explic itly in 1964).9
Gloria Sutton astutely observes that although the Eameses’ films have often 
been labeled as experimental, they used very few “untested ele ments” (2012, 
154), and many of  these ele ments operate in Gance’s early twentieth- century 
films. Gance had commercial and critical success with his rapid montage and 
varied and contrasting rhythms of film, which seemed to point  toward areas in 
which cinema could compete with poetry and  music in terms of artistic and 
aesthetic expression (King 1984, 4). Working from a spot squarely within and 
contributing to the burgeoning experimental avant- garde of the early twenti-
eth  century, Gance’s close friends and collaborators included Antonin Artaud, 
Blaise Cendrars, and Max Honegger, while his experimental works  were in con-
versation with  those by Apollinaire, Delaunay, Léger, and Picasso (Abel 1987, 
4).10 Richard Abel calls Gance part of “the narrative surrealists,” or the First 
Avant- Garde (1919 to 1924), along with Louis Delluc, Germaine Dulac, and 
Marcel L’Herbier. The films by  these directors mixed styles and modes, gener-
ated complex narrative structures, and used patterns of images for rhetorical 
purposes (280–281). Gance melded melodrama with “polyvision” (multiple 
screens), allegorical image superimposition, wild camera movement, montage 
editing, and color- filter overlays for emotional resonance— techniques that the 
Eameses deployed in Glimpses and Think (Kirkham 1995, 328). All of the narra-
tive surrealist filmmakers  were interested in image perception and how sensory 
data provided by technologically generated means could be deployed as a goal 
in and of itself. Abel argues that the more experimental avant- garde that left 
narrative  behind completely— including iconic  later films such as René Clair’s 
Entre’acte (1924), Buñuel and Dali’s Un chien andalou (1929), and Léger’s Bal­
let mécanique (1924)— found many of its strategies and tools in this  earlier mo-
ment (Abel 1987, 281). The poetic or impressionist avant- garde admired Gance 
for “his work on the sensations constructed by the image” (King 1984, 21). But 
this  later avant- garde also found his output deeply schizophrenic, with Clair, 
for example, writing a 1923 article on Gance’s experimental melodrama La roue 
that offered a very early take on the form and content split that dogged Gance’s 
 career. Similar criticisms  were leveled against the Eameses’ work for ibm and 
the US government, as well as the proj ects generated by Kepes in the late 1960s.
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At the time of the initial screening of Gance’s epic Napoléon in the late 
1920s, Émile Vuillermoz wrote two articles about the film that praised the di-
rector’s cinematic vision and formal achievements with editing, superimposi-
tion, multiple screens, and general refusal to treat cinema “as a slave to a profit-
able and demagogic Taylorism” (quoted in King 1984, 43), while at the same 
time deploring his knuckling  under to “the law of genre”— a narrative technol-
ogy inherited from Hollywood (42). About Gance’s use of multiscreen projec-
tions and their effects in the film, Vuillermoz at the time wrote: “ There is an 
extremely valuable ele ment of polyphony and plurality of rhythms  here which 
completely transform our traditional conceptualization of visual harmony. The 
monody of the optical melody is supplemented by the possibility of a notation 
of  music of images on three staves. That is truly revolutionary” (quoted in King 
1984, 48). But at the same time, the critic derides the director for not moving 
cinema away from Hollywood’s narrowing of narrative options, as well as for 
the conservative cele bration of France’s imperial past. The nostalgic nationalist 
politics displayed in the film actually received less attention than the apparent 
aesthetic betrayals. Clearly Gance’s formal experimentation served diff er ent 
ends aesthetically and po liti cally than the works of other avant- garde artists.
Gance’s experimentation and theorization about cinematic experimenta-
tion nonetheless provided a profound base for thinking through the capacity 
of images to create a new visual syntax. In 1923, Gance wrote: “One has to judge 
images not on their material quality but also on what they express— the value 
of cinema is to be found not in the photography on the surface of the images, but 
in the rhythm between the images, and in the idea,  behind the image” (quoted 
in King 1984, 56, original emphasis). The new art that cinema could represent 
relied, according to Gance, on montage and superimposition (57), yet  these 
formal ele ments, and a theoretical interest in the potential of image- generation 
in the mechanical age, are about all he  really shared with the avant- garde. Like 
the Eameses, but contra the avant- garde he helped form, especially the Dadaists 
and Surrealists, Gance was deeply committed to the “demo cratic,” “popu lar” 
and “universal” possibilities of cinema (57). In a similar fashion, the Eameses’ 
exhibition work on behalf of science and technology also steered a po liti cally 
suspect terrain geared for the masses: science without destruction, technology 
without devastation, a brave new frontier led by benevolent governments and 
corporations working hand- in- glove to deliver Cold War propaganda about a 
promised, brighter tomorrow.
The montage editing developed fully by Gance emerged most powerfully 
in the work of Sergei Eisenstein, who acknowledged the debt. Eisenstein’s cor-
respondence with Ezra Pound linked montage with Imagism as an explic itly 
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symbolic and nonnarrative means of juxtaposing images to create meaning in 
the minds of the audience through spatial proximity. The rapid cutting of im-
ages intended to overwhelm and affect the senses not by the logic of argumenta-
tion but by an onslaught of information and perceptual input became essential 
to the Eameses’ Glimpses and Think. The formal editing capacities and op-
portunities afforded through Gance’s innovations resulted in both immersive 
efficacy and rather frequent befuddlement on the part of pavilion attendees. 
When Stan VanDerBeek writes about experimental cinematic interests in the 
mid-1960s, at the same moment that Think is up and  running, he lists “simulta-
neous images and compression, abstractions, superimposition, discontinuous 
information, social surrealism, [and] episodic structure” as being among the 
most telling concerns of filmmaking of the moment (1966a, 338–339). The list 
speaks to the past and to VanDerBeek’s pre sent, just as it perfectly describes the 
work of Gance and, to a large extent, that of the Eameses.
While Think was flashing away inside the ibm dome on Flushing Mead-
ows, a special issue of Film Culture was published that contained an “expanded 
arts diagram” by George Maciunas.11 The diagram provided a de facto geneal-
ogy of Fluxus. Maciunas turns some of his explanation of the diagram into a 
thinly veiled shot at E.A.T., but more directly at the  whole technology- and- 
art lab collaborative moment when he writes that “pseudotechnology, or ‘en-
gineering’ (in quotes) has been derived from the fact that artists at best can 
acquire technological knowledge or understanding comparable to that of a 
technician (tv repairman) rather than that of an engineer or a scientist who 
spends many years studying his specialty (just as artists spend many years pro-
ducing art).” In this scenario, Maciunas can envision only a dumbing down of 
techno- scientific knowledge  because, “(1) artist’s new ideas or concepts  will 
be affected or  limited by his own past and recent scientific knowledge rather 
than the uncommunicated knowledge of the engineer. (2) the collaborating 
engineer meanwhile cannot very well communicate a sophisticated technical 
and scientific knowledge to the artist without giving him a four year university 
course on related subjects.” For all of his general dismissiveness of such fash ion-
able endeavors, he found some collaborations of this sort more palatable than 
 others, and in his diagram he offers  under “International Exhibitions” a section 
listing  those working on “Expanded Cinema,” which he places in bold.  Here 
the Fluxus founder lists Stan VanDerBeek, Harry Smith, and Charles Eames as 
“artists” capable of holding their own with engineers.
If Charles Eames could keep up with current engineering knowledge, ac-
cording to Maciunas, then Ray Eames could certainly stay on pace with the 
neo- avant- garde work of the time, thus positioning the Eames Office at the fe-
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cund intersection of the two avant- gardes we are examining in this book. If one 
 were to look for the most influential avant- garde influence on the Eames Of-
fice, one would find it in Ray Eames and her artistic  career in early twentieth- 
century New York, and this influence permeates all aspects of the varied areas 
the Eames Office engaged in. Ray Eames, according Joseph Giovanni, was an 
integral player in an impor tant moment of US abstraction and its development 
out of the Eu ro pean avant- garde through the American Abstract Artists move-
ment. This movement, largely populated by students of Hans Hofmann, began 
meeting in 1936, and sought to explore and combine “Expressionist, biomor-
phic and geometric ele ments” with a thorough knowledge of, but ultimately an 
eschewal of, Realist and Surrealist tendencies (Giovanni 2005, 58). Ray Eames 
worked with this group for years and was at its core when the 1941 Abstract 
Expressionism show was held, an exhibition that featured works by Léger and 
Moholy- Nagy, among  others. The group also kept close ties with Willem de 
Kooning and Arshile Gorky. All of this grew out of Ray Eames’s full- spectrum 
interaction with the early 1930s New York avant- garde and artist- as- activist 
scene, taking classes with Hofmann and visiting exhibitions by Boccioni, Ce-
zanne, Picasso, Matisse, Miró, Léger, and Calder (45). She also had a profound 
interest in dance (both modern US and classical Indian), working with form 
and movement in space as it pertained to bodies and the built environment, 
which become hallmark attributes of the conceptualization of pavilion expe-
rience the Eames Office brought to the US government and major corpora-
tions. Studying dance, architecture, design, painting, and  music as iterations of 
the same kinds of impulses, Ray Eames charted a multifaceted and immersive 
 career in the arts prior to meeting Charles and starting up the Eames Office.
Hofmann, for his part, had lived in Paris from 1904  until 1914, convers-
ing with the Fauvist and Cubist movements and circulating with Braque, 
Delaunay, Picasso, Picabia, and Matisse.  After getting his own classes up and 
 running in New York, he counted among his students Gorky and de Koon-
ing, along with Jackson Pollock and Clement Greenberg (56). Giovanni argues 
that Hofmann provided an integral link between pre– World War I Paris and 
post– World War II New York (56). Hofmann taught Ray Eames a  great deal 
about space, within the plane of the image but also with ways in which the 
image can be broken into parts and redistributed to create diff er ent senses and 
sensations of space. Both Glimpses and Think bear the signature of critically de-
ploying vari ous ways of breaking frames of the image (moving or still) as well as 
that of the exhibition space. Similarly, the plasticity of molded plywood finds 
some initial theoretical and formal engagement in Hofmann’s classes about the 
plasticity of the image, the plane, and the frame.  These ideas about plasticity 
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proved especially useful for Ray Eames as Hofmann encouraged students “to 
test color tensions by moving and pinning small pieces of colored paper on 
their canvases” (56). This method foreshadows the ways in which the Eame-
ses broke with single- projector filmic images and scattered screens about a 
space of installation (in Moscow and New York) to alter relationships between 
spectators, space, and the images being viewed. For Hofmann, perspective pre-
sents prob lems  because it is only concerned with “one movement in depth, 
while plastic experience goes in and comes back to the observer” (quoted in 
Giovanni 2005, 57).12 With Ray Eames neatly moving between diff er ent genres 
and kinds of depth, the Eames Office brought the avant- garde past and pre sent 
to the promotional aid of ibm and the US government, an avant- garde in form 
and to a certain extent in spirit, but by no means revolutionary. This was an 
art- and- technology collaboration that corporate Amer i ca found more palat-
able, and indeed desirable, unlike lacma’s a&t. The Eames Office unlocked 
a formula that provided more purchase for their “experimental” pavilions than 
E.A.T. could ever hope to muster for its contribution in Osaka.
Think: Communicating Comfort with Universal Computation
As the crowds at the New York World’s Fair in 1964 flowed around the Uni-
sphere and stared at the  future of robotics- as- entertainment provided by Dis-
ney for the General Electric exhibition “The Carousel of Pro gress,” they also 
headed to the ibm pavilion to partake in the last and most extravagant im-
mersive multiscreen event the Eames Office would generate. The Eames Of-
fice continued to make films, but Think,  housed in the “Information Machine,” 
proved to be the last in a pavilion setting. It would also be their last to raid the 
avant- garde exhibition, projection, and moving image larder for a general spec-
tatorship in a thoroughly designed and controlled environment.
In its attempt to change its image as a corporation primarily producing 
defense computation for the military to one generating universal computation, 
ibm knew that it needed to educate the general public (that is, stockholders 
and taxpayers) about how their new product (computation) would change 
 every aspect of their daily lives. The com pany unveiled its new look at the 
World’s Fair in their pavilion. The ibm pavilion was largely the product of the 
Eames Office in cooperation with regular collaborators. From the multimedia 
experience of Think to the robotic puppet display, to the large- scale informa-
tion boards complete with photos and timelines, to the signage and graphics 
and down to the furniture that tired fair- goers  were able to relax on, the pa-
vilion essentially provided a 3d multisensory display of the Eames Office in 
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action. The highlight of their offerings was Think, a multimedia projection and 
immersive educational experience that furthered the overall pavilion theme 
of computing and daily problem- solving. The building’s design replicated an 
ibm Selectric typeball that bore only the letters ibm and not the full alpha-
bet.  Those entering the pavilion inhabited the corporation’s latest innovation 
in typewriter technology. The centerpiece, Think, used a hydraulic lift called 
“the  people wall” that pushed some 500 spectators 50 feet in the air into the 
suspended theater. The audience was physically thrust into the theater, itself 
strung with randomly arranged non- uniformly sized screens (fourteen long 
and eight smaller ones in the shape of rectangles, circles, squares, and trian-
gles). The Eameses had been experimenting for several years with expanding 
the cinematic technological format with lenses, throw (the distance between 
projector and screen), and screen shape, as well as editing and narrative tech-
niques. The effect of the space was like being in a control room or tv studio 
(Colomina 2001, 7–8), and thus anticipates our dashboard- driven computer 
navigation. The  earlier film Glimpses provided a similar, less ambitious attempt 
at fully immersive high- tech, avant- garde inflected public relations, with the 
client in Moscow being the State Department.
The Moscow exhibition brought together a number of notable Eames col-
laborators  under the auspices of their old friend George Nelson. The  others in-
cluded Billy Wilder and Buckminster Fuller, whose geodesic domes protected 
the US missile- siting perimeter and early- warning- system stations, but also 
projected US construction and engineering prowess in international forums. 
Fuller constructed a massive golden dome on site in Moscow, a construction 
proj ect that Khrushchev watched intently. The usia team was hired to exhibit 
highlights of US “science, technology and culture,” with Nelson receiving the 
commission from usia to put together the US exhibition.
Housed near Disney’s 360- degree film projection system Circarama— yet 
another projection experiment— and Edward Steichen’s The  Family of Man 
photo exhibit, the Eameses’ film Glimpses was projected onto seven screens 
(each 20 feet by 30 feet) suspended inside Fuller’s geodesic dome. The film 
showed a “typical work day” in nine minutes, and a “typical weekend day” in 
three minutes. Schuldenfrei (2015, 71) connects Glimpses to the city symphony 
genre of the 1920s, the early twentieth- century nonfiction genre that loosely 
includes Dziga Vertov’s classic 1929 avant- garde paean to posthuman vision, 
Man with a Movie Camera. George Nelson described the series of images as 
not so much a film but “a projection of data,” rapidly moving and on such a 
scale as to prevent Soviet criticism that the objects portrayed on the screens 
 were but a Potemkin film set (F. Turner 2013, 250). The purpose of the usia 
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exhibit was to promote the advantages of consumer goods within the mate-
rial economy of the US (as the Nixon- Khrushchev kitchen debate displayed). 
In what amounted to a sustained act of “product placement” with the daily 
 doings of US life being augmented by its massive bounty of gadgets and appli-
ances, the Eameses’ multiscreen film contained images of many of the objects 
on display in the pavilion. Some 2,200 still and moving images with saturated 
editing  were shown on the massive screens by seven interlocked projectors, 
with each screen showing a diff er ent but occasionally synched scene. Still im-
ages constitute most of the film, with the majority of the movement resultant 
from the rapid editing that deployed Gance- and Einstein- inflected montage to 
create a near hallucinatory kind of audiovisual immersion.13 Glimpses worked 
with scale and speed, such that the term “glimpses” in the title refers not only 
to the brevity of the “average day of life” synecdoche approach but also more 
importantly to the fast- cutting technique deployed for the shifting images. The 
“high- speed technique” is designed to overwhelm the viewer with detail and 
rapidity in a deluge of evanescence.
Glimpses contains images almost exclusively viewable through the ad-
vanced optical technologies of telescopes, zoom lenses, airplanes, night- vision 
cameras and so on, projecting “a hyperviewing mechanism” (Colomina 2001, 
13). The visual technological prostheses perform and display the visualizing 
power resultant from intensive high- tech research, and the per for mance of 
 these visual technologies is what is on display as much as the material economic 
contents. Though the film played with scale and the operations of the quotid-
ian, it did so in an age of viewing technologies of surveillance deployed for the 
Cold War. Of Glimpses, Beatriz Colomina states that “intimate domesticity is 
suspended within an entirely new spatial system— a system that was the prod-
uct of esoteric scientific military research that had entered the everyday public 
imagination with the launching of Sputnik in 1957” (12). Emerging from the 
Eameses’ multimedia events comes a new visual and spatial norm, one in which 
the vast scales of micro and macro viewing found in Cold War tele- technologies 
become the basis of ubiquitous screen culture as the source of information and 
control. The merging of the corporate sphere and the geopo liti cal agenda de-
ployed in the Moscow and New York pavilions show the Eames Office (and 
 others) as interfaces for the avant- garde of military r&d investment and the 
artistic avant- garde.
Prior to the Moscow event, the Eames Office had begun to shift increas-
ingly  toward experiments with space and the built environment. They concen-
trated their focus on modeling and imaging work and away from Re nais sance 
architects such as Filippo Brunelleschi in order to address what they believed 
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to be the pressing demands of twentieth- century architecture: “organ ization 
of information.” As cybernetics, systems theory, and information theory began 
to change the intellectual landscape, so the Eames Office responded with a full 
engagement of how best to visually and spatially convey  these developments. 
Think becomes their most direct, and indeed audacious, manifestation of  these 
concerns. In addition to educating the public about problem- solving through 
universal computation, Think intended to make the public feel more “at home” 
with an increasingly “changing and complex” world (Schuldenfrei 2015, 162–
163). Further, it connected information theory and communication theory to 
larger systems that supposedly allowed for individual choice in spite of their 
scale and complexity. Their  earlier film A Communications Primer contains a 
voice- over ideologically laden with the assertion that “no  matter where it oc-
curs, communication means the responsibility of decision all the way down the 
line” (F. Turner 2013, 255). The strident reinforcement of the individual and 
choice in a Cold War world of automated weapons systems attempts to rescue 
demo cratic ideals clearly in peril. By explaining how universal computation 
could be used in daily life as well as for military purposes, ibm hoped attend-
ees would come away from the exhibition with an image of the corporation 
as helping the average citizen attain “the negative capability” (to borrow from 
John Keats) required to be comfortable in a world guided by information, ab-
straction, consumer wealth, material gain, and nuclear destructive capability— 
while con ve niently eliding the fact that the same systems and technologies 
made pos si ble all of  these contradictory con temporary phenomena.
***************************************************
In order to achieve this pr sleight of hand, the Eameses dug deep into the 
avant- garde aesthetic store of formal experimentation. Beyond reaching back 
to Svoboda’s innovations of screen placement, arrangements, and relationships 
from the 1950s, they looked to Herbert Bayer’s 1935 design sketch “Diagram of 
360 Degrees of Vision” (figure 5.1) for their own fully immersive space deter-
mined by communication and information (Turner 87–90). As with Think, 
Bayer’s 1930 Paris exhibition at the  Grand Palais was intended to overwhelm 
the audience with images and evoke a visual gestalt. This general exhibition 
ethos was carried forward to his work during the next de cade. Bayer’s design for 
MoMA’s Road to Victory exhibition in 1942, led by Edward Steichen, exploited 
the potential plasticity of the exhibition space and materials that he had pro-
moted in the previous de cade. The opened traditional exhibition space offered 
a walk- through collage environment with angled images surrounding viewers. 
Ele ments of this kind of display remained in effect in Eu rope in the 1940s and 
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Figure 5.1.  Herbert Bayer, 
“Diagram of 360 Degrees of 
Vision” [1935], in Visual 
Communication, Architecture, 
Painting (New York: Reinhold 
Publishing, 1967), p. xx.
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1950s, including specific postwar pavilions, and then found their way into the 
Eames Office’s own pavilion work for the State Department and ibm. Such 
display experimentation also caught VanDerBeek’s attention, as exemplified by 
his Movie- Drome. For Bayer and the Eameses, the control of information had 
intentional, and propagandistic, agendas in contrast to the more liberatory and 
open- ended desires that marked VanDerBeek’s proj ects. With Think, cinematic 
and anti- cinematic, as well as gallery and anti- gallery, exhibition techniques 
came together, and the experience proved si mul ta neously disorienting and 
comforting for spectators. With Bayer’s influence on the Eames installation 
for ibm, along with the long- established dialog between the Eames Office and 
Kepes, the spatial imaginary of the Bauhaus as well as the socio- visual imagi-
nary of a post- historical ideology geared  toward a techno- future of communi-
cation and control permeates the exhibition.
The early part of the twentieth  century contained an abundance of experi-
mental forms of exhibiting images (still or moving or both) that found echoes 
in Think. El Lissitzky’s 1926 piece Kabinett der Abstrakten (Cabinet of Abstract 
Art) and Frederick Kiesler’s Raumbuhne (Spatial Theater) from 1924 offer spec-
tators an exploded spatial relationship between the act of viewing and the dis-
played works (Sutton 2012, 148–150). Think took forward the Bauhaus desire 
for “total environment” as articulated by Walter Gropius and Bruno Taut in 
the 1920s, itself a kind of updated kindred aspiration of Wagner’s Gesamtkunst­
werke. The Eames Office control of the exhibition space clearly moves  toward 
the kinds of effects the E.A.T. Pepsi pavilion in Osaka hoped to achieve. Ex-
tending this Bauhaus princi ple of “total environment,” Bayer’s brief 1939 “fun-
damentals of exhibition design” booklet provided alternative display strategies 
for public exhibitions, ones he utilized  later for his influential US installations 
during World War II and immediately  after. Bayer’s usage for  these display 
techniques included avant- garde attempts to undermine bourgeois assumptions 
about art engagement. For the Eames Office pavilions, however, such viewing 
and exhibition strategies actually found form as bourgeois infotainment that 
furthered the shared po liti cal and economic horizons articulated by the US 
government and major corporations.
VanDerBeek, writing in Film Culture at the time of Think, expressed an 
ethos for expanded cinema and the new language of vision resultant from the 
increased speed with which  humans, images, and information moved. “Man 
as mobile- man suddenly discovering tremendous amounts of communications 
consciousness, communications aesthetics and communications instinct” is 
his audience, VanDerBeek claims (1966b, 15). This audience would contribute 
to his expanded cinema proj ects and benefit from them by fully engaging the 
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global community wrought by real- time technologies. The issues expressed  here 
pertain explic itly to the  future of expanded cinema while also looking back 
a few de cades to Moholy- Nagy’s Vision in Motion (1946b). VanDerBeek and 
the Eameses  were covering similar aesthetic and technological terrain, using 
similar strategies, techniques, and technics. Their rhe toric also echoed one 
another: VanDerBeek called Movie- Drome “an experience machine” and the 
Eameses called Think an “information machine.” A residual Deweyan progressive 
view of experience is evident in both, with VanDerBeek aligning with the techno- 
liberatory potentialities of Kepes and the Bauhaus, and the Eames Office leaning 
 toward corporate- driven futurist visions. Movie- Drome ran from 1962 to 1965 but 
also was fired up again for the 1966 NY film festival, and thus operated contempo-
raneously with Think. Just as the Eames Office understood itself as a laboratory 
for general education of con temporary, cutting- edge scientific theory, at least 
through their films, VanDerBeek said he wished for the Movie- Drome space 
to function as “a sight and sound research center” (VanDerBeek 1966a, 339).
VanDerBeek and the Eames Office operated in a larger New York scene 
of multiscreen experimentation, some for avant- garde artistic purposes and 
 others for the kind of corporate promotions and geopo liti cal agendas found at 
the World’s Fair. Andy Warhol’s experimental multiscreen films from the mid-
1960s include Inner and Outer Space (1965) and Chelsea Girls (1966). Similarly, 
Smithsonian Folkways collector Harry Smith created a four- screen experimen-
tal art piece, Mahagonny, which Smith called “a mathematical analy sis of Du-
champ’s The Bride Stripped Bare” expressed in terms of “Kurt Weill’s score for 
Aufsteig und Fall der Stadt Mahagonny with contrapuntal images (not neces-
sarily in order) derived from Brecht’s libretto for the latter work” (quoted in 
Friedberg 2006, 212). At the New York World’s Fair, the Eames Office had other 
multiscreen competition with Francis Thompson and Alexander Hammid’s To 
Be Alive!, for the Johnson Wax pavilion, which used three screens to depict life 
in Africa, Eu rope, and the US. The eighteen- minute film won the 1966 Acad-
emy Award for Best Documentary Short Subject. Thompson and Hammid 
provide exquisite examples of turn- of- the- century aesthetic practice co- opted 
for mainstream ends, having traveled from avant- garde experimental film work 
to the first imax via World’s Fair pavilions with their multiscreen work. Prior 
to  these multiscreen extravaganzas for the general public, Thompson directed 
the city- symphony- inspired film, N.Y., N.Y. (1957), which employed refracted 
images made through Moholy- Nagy techniques, and Hammid codirected with 
Maya Deren the vastly influential Meshes of the After noon (1943). Following 
their Oscar- winning hit in New York, Thompson and Hammid made an epic six- 
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screen extravaganza for Montreal Expo ’67 called We Are Young. The projec-
tion included a sly sequence that sent up Think by featuring shots of the ibm 
Selectric as a symbol for the boredom created by soulless corporate office work.
Usefully, Colomina likens the Eameses’ multiscreen displays to the grid 
space of a newspaper, “a space where continuities are made through ‘cutting’ ” 
(2001, 22). Of course Gance’s and Eisenstein’s montage and nonlinear editing 
 were in visual dialog with the earliest of Picasso’s and Braque’s collage works, 
which used the newspaper grid as inspiration, structure, and content. Although 
the “ people wall” for Think provided enforced immersion in the media and me-
diated environment, the rapid editing on the oddly shaped screens flashing con-
tradictory images sometimes overwhelmed the method of explaining complex 
universal computing in the  simple manner that the Eameses wished to convey. 
In spite of half a  century of collage- driven aesthetics in a host of print and vi-
sual culture works, the speed of this enclosed environment and the expanded 
frame of cinematic projection made for an uncanny experience for many who 
witnessed it. Trained as they  were within the single- screen image space of cin-
ema (and tv) and the singular narrative trajectory of popular- culture produc-
tion, it is no won der audiences found it all somewhat bewildering.
Colomina argues that the Eameses created a space with their multiscreen 
images that emerges out of a Cold War mentality in terms of architecture, ex-
perience, space, and imagination that has become a norm for us in the pre sent 
(25). Think becomes the model of the control room: the multimedia/multi-
screen space of the war room/control room for space flight, situation rooms, 
tele- governance of the globe, tv studios, avant- garde “happenings” and “ex-
panded cinema” (7–8). The kind of multimedia experience the Eames Office 
generated in Moscow and New York belong to a larger trajectory of media and 
ideological formation that Fred Turner calls “the demo cratic surround” (2013), 
but which we argue has even larger geopo liti cal ramifications through the per-
petuation of the material and immaterial effects of universal computing and 
the normative constitution of Cold War systems.
To be thrust up in the air and into Think was to enter a sphere of knowl-
edge, influence, and control made pos si ble by universal computation, a sphere 
of near- future technological controls resultant from military research spending 
crossing over into the consumer market and presented through domesticated 
avant- garde techniques. It was to enter a sphere of immaterial pro cesses render-
ing the world as a sphere, a globe, a self- contained monad of information and 
screens birthed during, and becoming constitutive of, the Cold War, which has 
only been exponentially accelerated and amplified ever since.
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Buckminster Fuller: Maker of Domes,  
Counterculture Visionary, and One- Man Lab
Utopia or Oblivion: The Prospects for Humanity is the title Buckminster Fuller 
gave to his 1969 collection of essays about the fate of our species on the planet. 
Very much of its moment, the title reflects the Manichaean options generated 
by the Cold War arms race and the de cades of dread that the Macy conferences 
considered immanent and yet hoped to stave off. The standoff between nuclear 
powers, though still a cold and not a hot war (except in proxy sites), exerted 
its influence on the emergence of art- and- science/technology labs, as we have 
seen, but more importantly the institutions that  housed them and the rationale 
that they had for funding them. In this moment, Fuller, the one- man lab freed 
from institutional constraints, emerged as what he had always  imagined him-
self as being: a visionary for humanity. Fuller held an understanding of human-
ity’s place within a history driven by a technological development of humanity’s 
own making but without much consideration of its consequences or potentiali-
ties. The long historical view Fuller insisted upon helped contextualize pre sent 
concerns and design plans for the  future. In one of the essays in this collection, 
“A Citizen of the Twenty- First  Century Looks Back,” Fuller, who was born in 
the nineteenth  century, looks backward and forward from the chronotope of 
his writing and concentrates on “the world- transforming and world- shrinking 
developments” of technological change that largely determined geopolitics 
(1969, 17). From this perspective, “politics is, inherently, only an accessory 
 after the fact of the design- science revolution” (17). The most serious side ef-
fect found in geopo liti cal thinking, he consistently argued, was the a priori of 
the zero- sum game in which the self is pitted against the other in a Malthusian 
strug gle over  limited resources. In order for the other to gain, the self must lose 
and vice versa: in other words, the Cold War strug gle of nation- states played 
out as larger metonymic collectives of the individual and the other. Such as-
sumptions and their destructive, oblivion- creating operations emerge in his 
late writings with  great frequency, guiding his ever- alternative thoughts away 
from status quo concerns. The large systems of self- destructive global pro cesses 
he addressed  were often generated as much by the unintended consequences of 
military r&d as they  were the intended results of geopo liti cal policies.
Relying on the work of friends, colleagues, and collaborators at the Macy 
conferences, he too wished to use their insights for a peaceful and prosper-
ous world for all humanity through the application of global design science. 
“Norbert Wiener’s and Claude Shannon’s cybernetic ‘feedbacks’, which imple-
ment their ‘information theory’, ” Fuller writes, “ will swiftly and progressively 
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correct the decisions and thereby the historical course of world- around citi-
zenry evolution. Very swiftly all humanity  will learn to think about total Earth, 
total humanity, and total accumulated knowledge, total resources,  etc. and 
 will begin to make some power ful omnihumanity, omni- Universe- considerate 
decisions” (1981, 342). Like the Macy conference thinkers, and like the Dada 
movement before them, Fuller intended to turn the innovations found for 
warfare into universal betterment through critical reverse engineering and al-
ternative applications. Speaking to the audience he had garnered through Stew-
art Brand’s boosterism—an audience that comprised a kind of counterculture 
modernist movement desirous to start afresh in communes or individually  free of 
governmental dictates— Fuller highlights how fortunate it is that the “do- more- 
with- less invention initiative does not derive from po liti cal debate, bureaucratic 
licensing or private economic patronage” (1969, 16). Taking terminology from 
Big Science, which constitutes the polar opposite of the innovation ethos Fuller 
espouses, he claims that “the license comes only from the blue sky of the inven-
tor’s intellect” (16). “Blue sky research,” that is non- instrumental research, may 
be the ideal of Vannevar Bush and the purview of massive governmental funding 
and coordinated proj ects, but for Fuller, the “blue sky research” that  really counts 
depends on nothing but the unfettered imagination of anyone. The do- more- 
with- less initiative, he claims, has developed in de pen dently from and in opposi-
tion to the arms race, which was designed to kill the greatest number of  people 
from the farthest away with the greatest accuracy and with the least effort. This 
is what Big Science and governments have delivered to us in spite of the  human 
evolutionary capacity for boundless innovation. Using his own design work as an 
example, Fuller explains that he de cided, as early as the 1920s, to use his energy 
and intellect for the common good, in this case to create cheap and effective 
housing, with the “scientific dwelling- service industry as the preferred means 
of transferring the scientific do- more- with- less capability from a weaponry to 
a livingry [sic] focus” (17). The opposition between weaponry and “livingry” is 
one that Fuller liked to toss about in his late lectures and writings— another 
binary option facing humanity and its goals. And it is in this dynamic that 
Fuller’s potential utopia might emerge through his mantras of designing on 
micro and macro scales to save Spaceship Earth and  those who travel on it.
The other essays in the book lay out this program. The titles of the essays 
reveal the changes he believes humanity can achieve by redesigning existence 
at all scales: “Prevailing Conditions in the Arts,” “The World Game— How to 
Make the World Work,” “Geosocial Revolution,” “How to Maintain Man as a 
Success in the Universe,” and “Curricula and the Design Initiative.” If the goals 
and pedagogical means of realizing them seem familiar, they are. This is the 
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Deweyan progressive line charted in the Bauhaus transplants in the US, espe-
cially that of Moholy- Nagy and Kepes. Fuller ends “A Citizen of the Twenty- 
First  Century Looks Back” with claims that neither he nor any other  human is 
a genius, while si mul ta neously stating that all  children might be born geniuses 
and become “degeniused” by the world (22). Negroponte’s answer to this was 
to prosthetically outfit the child with digital tools and re- genius youth. The 
progressive trajectory that Fuller echoes, though no less enthusiastic about 
technology’s potential, is to retrofit the child’s view of humanity and its place 
in a globe of  limited but adequate resources. Fuller further claims that the ac-
colades and the recognition of his work that arrived late in his life are due to 
the “world’s youth” seeking “world peace” and understanding that to accom-
plish this utopian ideal, they must use alternative strategies to  those offered by 
establishment economic, governance, and instrumental teleologies for techno-
logical development and innovation (20)— alternatives and steps he had been 
honing his entire and very active life.
The proj ect Fuller both proposed for Expo ’67 in Montreal (see Marches-
sault 2017, 210–215) and pursued in his ongoing research at Southern Illinois 
University, a proj ect that exemplified his global design science and its repurpos-
ing of systems of control as systems for liberation, is explained at some length in 
the essay entitled “The World Game— How to Make the World Work.”14 The 
World Game proj ect was not built for the Expo, but it features Fuller’s futurist 
pedagogical design tendencies on full display. Structured as a game intended 
to be accessible by anyone— not just the ruling elite who control the earth’s 
resources— the simulation education platform that Fuller envisioned pitted 
teams in noncompetitive engagement to solve pressing global issues. In a  later 
discussion of the World Game, published in his last book, Critical Path, and in 
the full flush of a few de cades of game theory’s predominance in geopo liti cal 
planning, he calls his game the antithesis of “World War Gaming.” The roots 
for rand- generated game theory, Fuller argues, lay in the British Empire’s use 
of data and calculations from them devised by Thomas Malthus, the chief stat-
istician for the East India Com pany.  These assumptions concentrated on “the 
lethal inadequacy of life support on our planet” as the bases for calculation, 
planning, and action (Fuller 1981, 202–203). Using data visualization, real- time 
information, and statistics, as well as programs for scenario planning, Fuller’s 
game aimed to “make the world work.” Success entailed making “ every man a 
world citizen and able to enjoy the  whole earth,  going wherever he wants at any 
time, able to take care of his of needs of his forward days without interference 
with any other man and never at the cost of another man’s equal freedom and 
advantage” (183). Fuller argues that the goal of the game is not to improve hu-
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manity per se, but merely to up its productivity with regard to resource invest-
ment and use. Thus, the game deploys secondary data collection by piggyback-
ing on extant technologies engaged in other operations, for example using spy 
satellites that are “inadvertently telephoning the whereabouts and number of 
beef  cattle around the surface of the entire earth” (184).
In this way, the game anticipates some of the most current cutting edge 
deployments of multi- scaled remote sensing systems, such as the Planetary Skin 
Institute. Initiated by nasa and Cisco Systems, the Planetary Skin Institute 
provides a multi- constituent platform for planetary eco- surveillance (Beck 
and Bishop 2016, 18–19, 273–288). The site operates as a nonprofit means of 
gathering real- time information from remote- sensing systems regionally and 
globally to create replicable and scalable big data information about ecologi-
cal and environmental conditions. It is the current altruistic avatar of Fuller’s 
World Game, but with a twist. As with all of the technologies deployed for 
the World Game or the Planetary Skin Institute, unintended consequences 
arise. Just as Fuller wanted to skim secondary inadvertent information off spy 
satellites, so too can the information generated by the Planetary Skin Institute 
be used as the basis for resource  futures investment, using the same real- time 
technologies to track environmental conditions and  futures markets.
If military technology can be converted to peaceful and progressive use, as 
delineated in the essay and game, so could Fuller’s “scientific dwelling- service 
industry” be deployed for military aims in the ser vice of the arms race fur-
thered by Big Science. This was a fact Fuller knew all too well but often chose 
to repress. We only need to look at some of the vari ous uses and deployments 
of his signature structure, the geodesic dome, to understand this repression. 
The geodesic dome moved from housing for antiaircraft and missile defense 
positions along the Distant Early Warning (dew) Line to housing State De-
partment expo events (including Brussels in 1958 and Moscow in 1959— both 
involving the Eames Office) to being the architecture of choice for countercul-
ture, antiestablishment, diy, Whole Earth Catalog–influenced communities. 
Using some design princi ples he had developed for his Dymaxion  house in the 
1920s, the structure sprang from Fuller’s time teaching at the Design Institute 
in Chicago in 1948. At Black Mountain College that same year Fuller brought 
a large geodesic dome from Chicago to rural North Carolina, literally provid-
ing a structural linkage between one Bauhaus institution and another, while 
fueling immaterial and intellectual links.
The dome received its first public viewing in 1954 at the Milan Triennial, 
built out of corrugated cardboard. The Italians called it “architecture out of 
the laboratory” (Krausse and Lichtenstein 1999, 374), but Fuller thought of 
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this incarnation as “anticipatory rather than  actual,” despite carry ing off the 
top prize at the exhibition (Marks and Fuller 1973, 61). Commercially, and 
therefore one must assume “actually,” the first dome using Fuller’s patents was 
built by the Ford Motor Com pany starting in 1952, using it to cover its new 
headquarters in Dearborn, Michigan. Fuller therefore claimed his first cus-
tomer was “Mr. Industry himself ” (61). What would become in the late 1950s 
and into the 1960s “official pavilion typology” in architecture (Scott 2007, 155) 
entered US government use, in the field as well as in the imagination, for Cold 
War defense and propaganda. Thus the impetus to provide affordable shelter 
for humankind shifted to commercial and defense uses and then back again in 
the utopian futurist design plans offered late in Fuller’s life.
The US government’s deployment of geodesic domes for both propagan-
distic and defense purposes emerged almost si mul ta neously in the mid-1950s. 
In 1956, for a fair in Kabul celebrating the in de pen dence of Af ghan i stan, usia 
commissioned (through Jack Massey, who worked often with the Eames Of-
fice for similar events) a dome 100 feet in dia meter for the US stand. As men-
tioned, a massive dome  housed the US pavilion at the 1959 Moscow World’s 
Fair, which proudly displayed the Eameses’ Glimpses and Edward Steichen’s The 
 Family of Man (for which Herbert Bayer provided the original display design). 
Khrushchev reportedly said,  after visiting the pavilion displaying Glimpses, 
that he was more impressed with the dome than anything  else in the US pa-
vilion and wanted to have Fuller come to the USSR to teach their engineers 
his techniques (Marks and Fuller 1973, 63). And again in Montreal in 1967, 
Fuller’s dome, though without the World Game geoscopic display, provided a 
pivotal moment for US architecture on the international stage. As the Kabul 
dome was  going up, Fuller was providing other parts of the government with 
domes for use along the dew line, which operated through surveillance and 
information. An ad touting the technologies deployed for this system explains, 
“Basically an early warning radar line is a communications system.” Further, the 
ad, ironically published in Life magazine, claims that Western Electric worked 
with Bell Telephone and Lincoln Laboratories at mit to develop the system. 
The inset image of the geodesic dome in situ reads “dew line radar station 
in the Arctic.” The ad provides a public- directed articulation of the increased 
roles of information and communication technologies and theories in provid-
ing for the military defense of the country. The immaterial and somewhat de-
terroritialized nature of global surveillance emergent in the mid-1950s became 
materially manifest in systems like the dew line.
The Fuller archives indicate that the designer had even grander ideas 
than simply providing shelter for radar equipment and the personnel required 
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to run  these remote sensing stations. Fuller’s files include blueprints for the 
domes to have multipurpose functionality, including rotating rocket bases and 
launching pads that would fuse detection and response (figure 5.2).
The Department of Defense did not take up this specific usage of Fuller’s 
structures in arctic climes or elsewhere, just as the Soviet Army did not follow 
through on its interests in his 1920s Dymaxion living quarters, about which 
much correspondence between the Red Army procurement office and Full-
er’s own office was exchanged (the Fuller archives).  These suggested deploy-
ments of his designs clearly fall more on the “weaponry” side of the systems, 
resources, and economics ledger than the “livingry” that Fuller championed 
in the 1960s. To be fair, Fuller moved easily between domains with a designer’s 
understanding of the client’s needs regardless of ideological consideration, and 
it was through  these work experiences that he constituted a kind of holistic vi-
sion of alternative thinking about resources in a more expansive manner, one 
Figure 5.2.  Buckminster 
Fuller, detail from a plan 
for the US Department of 
Defense, M1090 Series 2, 
Box 90 (1955–56), Fuller 




outside of the geopo liti cal and economic systems at play in the Cold War while 
still holding on to thinking globally and materially. His “do- more- with- less” 
mantra, though, was at play even in his earliest designs. As we see with the 
blueprints for the rotating geodesic domes as arctic shelters, however, he took 
the military mission one step further by combining apperception and defense 
with corresponding retaliation built into the same structure. This was in step 
with the development of most weapons systems at the time of the Cold War, 
and it reveals how Fuller’s idealistic reversibility of global military surveillance 
technologies for  human betterment and maximum resource exploitation in the 
World Game could be flipped the other direction as well: altruism (“livingry”) 
easily converted to killing (weaponry). Fuller knew this  because,  after all, he 
had designed them. He wrote about his structures and design princi ples other-
wise, perhaps aware that his audience also understood fully that reversibility 
obviously goes both directions, no  matter what, and in an age of constant wea-
ponization, his domes, as was the World Game, could be used for military aims.
Although Fuller did not get his proposed, fully operational, large- scale, 
real- time electronic version of his World Game at Expo ’67  in Montreal, he 
did get a Jasper Johns painting of his “Dymaxion Air- Ocean World Map” to 
hang in the massive geodesic dome erected  there. Johns’s painting, Map (Based 
on Buckminster Fuller’s Dymaxion Airocean World), was a multipieced and 
multi- shaped canvas mea sur ing more than 30 feet long and over 15 feet high. 
As with Fuller’s cartographic vision, the icosahedron Dymaxion map created 
by Johns could be disassembled or assembled at  will, a result of it being too 
large to work on in full in his studio. Fuller’s map could be folded together to 
create a sphere or unfolded, origami- like, to be a flat two- dimensional object. 
Cocreated with Shoji Sadao, the map provided the model for the interactive, 
data- driven version used in the World Game. Fuller and Sadao’s map moved 
easily, then, between 3d and 2d repre sen ta tions of the earth’s continents.  These 
 were represented in size based on population distribution and resource usage 
instead of the standard cartographic nod to land mass. While Fuller’s optimis-
tic vision of the map’s pedagogical ele ments was at odds with Johns’s more pes-
simistic view of the geopo liti cal agonism that marked the moment, the map 
mimetically reproduces fully “the age of the world picture,” to quote Heidegger 
(2002). The telecommunications technologies developed to provide constant 
real- time surveillance of the earth necessary to conduct the Cold War and en-
force the Truman Doctrine si mul ta neously converted the earth into a globe (a 
bounded sphere vis i ble at all times) as well as into a flattened world without 
horizon (due to the use of “over the horizon” visualizing technologies and com-
plete surveillance of the entire planet all at the same time). The globe as stage 
163
how to mAke the world work
for Fuller- inflected neighborliness also became a site of contiguous land masses 
locked in Johns- depicted animus: 3d holistic vision coupled with 2d Cold War 
strategically generated economic inequities.
Telecommunications technologies, such as satellites, metonymically man-
ifest many of the ways that modern technoscientific culture in the post– World 
War II moment began to create new visions of the planet and shape the meta-
physics of the imaginary in terms of what the earth could and should be. In 
the first few paragraphs of Heidegger’s essay about the world picture (2002), 
he argues that modernity’s essence coalesces around a series of seemingly dis-
parate phenomena including science’s most vis i ble manifestation as machine 
technology, itself using specific forms of mathe matics to realize its visibility 
and power. This situation aligns modern science with modern metaphysics. 
Further, he argues that within the late modernity of the  middle part of the 
twentieth  century, art moves into the domain of aesthetics and thus becomes 
a means for si mul ta neously creating and articulating  human experience. All 
of this culminates in  human action being understood as culture, which then 
means that culture articulates the highest point of  human achievement and 
care, with care being converted into “the politics of culture” (57). Heidegger 
brings mathe matics, science, machine technology, art, aesthetics, culture, and 
metaphysics together in a penetrating view of the legacies of twentieth- century 
trajectories that bespeak the themes found in Fuller’s writings and his map, as 
well as in Johns’s interpretation of the latter. Both Fuller’s global design science 
and Johns’s painting responded to the same sets of concerns that Heidegger 
did: concerns that  were advanced by the avant- garde of US military spending.
The cultural politics of Heidegger’s interpretation of modernity’s gener-
ated metaphysics can be charted in the capacity for repre sen ta tion to equate 
with both experience and the real, for the map to create the territory and the 
technological means for cartographic repre sen ta tion to become the tools for 
 human crafting of the earth as globe, or as flat observable plane, or as Spaceship. 
The visualizing tele- technologies on display in Powers of Ten and the universal 
computation of Think, as well as in the World Game and Dymaxion map, are 
just such tools, for they chart a trajectory in which the world traveled from 
being construed as plane to orb to globe to flat, surveilled entity again. Our 
capacity to see and render the planet  whole erased the horizon of the world and 
made it capable of being held in our collective tele- technological grasp. The age 
of the world picture is evoked in  these maps made by Fuller and Johns, and it is 
so in the means by which we have enframed, delineated, and curtailed potential 
 futures, realized or not.
06
Heritage of Our Times
If / we get through 1972, Fuller says,  we’ve / got it made
— John Cage, A Year from Monday
The move away from a monolithic model of federally 
funded r&d defense labs  toward a complex public- private 
model of symbiotic entrepreneurship has, since the late 
1960s, massively redistributed and dispersed relations 
among science, technology, business, and government to 
the point where  there is often no clear distinction be-
tween private tech entrepreneurialism and federal spon-
sorship. The free- market model of defense r&d, though, is entirely in keeping 
with the broader reshaping of economic and institutional life along neoliberal 
lines that has occurred since the 1970s.  Here, as Philip Mirowski has made 
plain, Cold War math and physics and the theoretical models they produced 
leaked into economics through the influence of cybernetics and interactions 
between the Cowles Commission at the University of Chicago and rand 
(Mirowski 2002, 215–222; see also Christ 1994; Van Horn and Klaes 2011). 
Among the key participants  here was economist and mathematician Kenneth 
Arrow, who, with Gérard Debreu, developed formal proof of “general equilib-
rium,” a model of the perfect  free market (see Amadae 2003, 83–132). As mar-
kets came to be seen as too complex to be understood (and thus managed), the 
notion of the autonomous and self- correcting market not only appealed to the 
cybernetically inclined but also seemed to confirm suspicions that the New 
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Deal model of a planned economy was, like its Soviet cousin, not only ideologi-
cally dubious but unscientific. Public choice theory, developed by Mont Pel-
erin Society members James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, which applied 
economic tools to the study of po liti cal be hav ior, drew directly on the rational 
choice models worked out at rand that concluded that rational individuals 
do not cooperate to achieve common goals  unless coerced.
As we have seen, progressive liberalism delivered a conception of sci-
ence and technology as coterminous with democracy and creativity that was 
realigned during and  after World War II as a mode of expert technocratic 
managerialism. The emerging neoliberal conception of the rational individual 
preserves the Enlightenment virtues of rationality and the  free individual that 
underpinned progressivism but effectively jettisons the notion of the public 
sphere and its associated attributes (deliberation, cooperation, the idea of 
a common good) that  were taken to underpin the liberal proj ect. Rational 
choice liberalism delivered a scientific understanding of  human interaction 
as a riposte to the purported scientific theory of Marxism and communism 
but, as S. M. Amadae notes, it is “not without historical irony that the ideo-
logical front of American society’s hard- fought war against communism and 
the Soviet Union may, inadvertently, have eroded the meaningfulness of the 
term ‘American society’ ” (2003, 4). The restricted neoliberal conception of 
the state— that it serve largely as the guarantor of  free competition—is already 
 there in the late 1960s realignment of the military- industrial complex accord-
ing to the entrepreneurial model.
One of the effects of growing public challenges to the entwined mili-
tarized relation between government and science during the late 1960s and 
1970s was the retreat of the direct military funding of university research. 
The Mansfield Amendment to the Military Procurement Authorization Act 
of 1970 (Public Law 91-121), for example, required agencies to divest them-
selves of non- mission- oriented research. Though this led the military to cancel 
a number of proj ects that  were not obviously related to defense, while allow-
ing directly defense- oriented research to continue, other organ izations such as 
the National Science Foundation (nsf) took over the funding of programs 
previously supported by the Defense Advanced Research Proj ects Agency 
(darpa). Student protests during the period also led some universities to 
formally separate themselves from military- funded research units (such as 
the Stanford Research Institute, and the Draper Laboratory at mit), which 
 were reconstituted as in de pen dent not- for- profit organ izations that continued 
to receive military support (see Weiss 2014, 36). A commercial rerouting of 
funding streams also occurred in biotechnology. Antiwar sentiment in the US 
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led President Nixon to ban the development of offensive biological weapons in 
November 1969, and the UN Biological Weapons Convention, aimed at pro-
hibiting the development, production, and stockpiling of such weapons, was 
ratified by the US in 1972. Nevertheless, aware that a secretive state like the 
USSR would have the advantage in any biotech arms race, the US kick- started 
a commercial dual- use biotech industry, shifting over into the commercial sec-
tor the research previously undertaken in government labs (34–35).
This realignment, however, did not solve the growing sense, during the 
1970s, that the US government was no longer the dominant force in tech-
nological innovation. The most enterprising firms in electronics increasingly 
preferred the commercial market to the government sector. The economic 
challenges of the 1970s and the rising technological leadership of Japan, along 
with recognition by US intelligence in 1977 that the Soviet Union had reached 
parity with the US in terms of nuclear capability and shrinking government 
investment in r&d, demanded a new strategy through which the US could 
recapture its dominant position. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown charged 
William Perry, deputy director of research and engineering, with implementing 
what Brown called the Offset Strategy. Focusing on information technology, 
Perry had to find new ways for the DoD to tap into the advanced technologies 
no longer generated by big government defense contractors but by commercial 
tech companies (Weiss 2014, 37). Through the 1980s, programmatic, procure-
ment, and institutional reforms  were introduced that  were designed to create a 
more effective fit between defense and commerce. This included two reforms 
of 1980, signed into law by the out going President Car ter, that incentivized 
both the DoD and the commercial sector to work for their mutual benefit. The 
Bayh– Dole Act allowed small companies and universities to retain owner ship 
over government- sponsored innovations (Crow and Tucker 2001, 7–8), while 
the Stevenson– Wydler Technology Innovation Act was the first in a series of 
laws designed to encourage the Department of Energy’s National Laboratories 
to commercialize their research (Mirowski and Sent 2007, 657). From the end 
of the 1970s, defense research became increasingly conceived as an entrepre-
neurial activity (Weiss 2014, 40).
Although the emphasis has changed over subsequent de cades, with Reagan 
militarizing technology during the 1980s and Clinton civilianizing technology 
in the 1990s, the broad effect of each approach recognized the interrelation-
ship of commercial and defense r&d and their combined importance in 
furthering US strategic dominance. The Reagan administration pushed hard 
 toward commercial innovation as a way to maintain technological leadership 
through patent, procurement, and orga nizational reforms, the promotion of 
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US semiconductor, silicon- based, and software research and development, 
and by revamping Department of Energy labs as  drivers of entrepreneurial and 
commercial innovation. The trend since the 1980s has been less about finding 
commercially relevant applications for military technologies, one of the main 
public justifications for military r&d expenditure during the 1950s and 1960s, 
and more about the military making greater use of commercial or nontradi-
tional suppliers. By the end of the twentieth  century, as Linda Weiss explains, 
the US military technology enterprise “embraced a vast array of innovation 
hybrids, national labs, industry, and university contractors” (47).
As the Cold War binary model gave way to perceived multiple threats 
to national security, including pandemics, environmental crises, terrorism, and 
cyberattacks, new bureaucracies and new hybrid forms of research innovation 
have proliferated. Post-9/11, the surge in funding for security and antiterrorism 
allowed the newly formed Department of Homeland Security, for example, to 
form its own r&d agency, the Homeland Security Advanced Research Proj-
ects Agency (hsarpa), in 2003. Modeled  after darpa, hsarpa was charged 
with developing transformative innovations in homeland security technol-
ogy. Other darpa- like agencies appeared within the intelligence sector, the 
Department of Energy, and the army. Among the latter’s innovative hybrids 
 were a venture capital fund called On Point Technologies and an mit- based 
nanotechnology development institute focused on high- tech combat equip-
ment (47–48). As Weiss argues, the national security state’s willingness to sup-
port and even run venture capital initiatives demonstrates “the critical role of 
government- backed venture funding for the majority of high- risk startups and 
early- stage technology enterprise— the very entrepreneurial activities in which 
the United States reportedly leads” (53).
The rise of the 1960s art- and- technology collaborations is most easily 
understood as an example of corporate liberalism’s faith in the deployment of 
expertise and public funding to intervene in solving social prob lems and build 
an American  future according to the benign management of accelerating tech-
nological innovation. The fall of the art- and- technology proj ects can equally 
be understood as a consequence of the collapse of confidence in that vision of 
the  future. The escalation of the war in Vietnam undermined LBJ’s proj ect of a 
 Great Society masterminded by think tank research and science and technol-
ogy, the main planks of the postwar platform for American (and, through the 
de- ideologized rhe toric of demo cratic virtue, global) modernization, came to 
be seen, as technological pessimists had long feared, as agents of imperial mas-
tery. The turn against the utopian promise of technology as such, and in par-
tic u lar the tendency in the US to conflate technological innovation with the 
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enlargement of demo cratic potential, can be seen in, for example, the growing 
public indifference to the space program and in a general suspicion of expertise 
and bureaucratic control. For some, such as Stewart Brand, the technocratic 
model could be preserved through some inventive cross- pollination with the 
utopianism of the counterculture, but for many by the end of the 1960s, ad-
vanced science and technology had come to represent the  enemy of democ-
racy. Proj ects like E.A.T. and a&t  were not so much ill- conceived as ill- timed, 
though the striking absence of critical reflection on the politics of art- and- tech 
collaboration among the organizers and contributors, at least in the documen-
tation and in much of the work, suggests a troubling blind spot or, worse, in-
difference  toward the broader po liti cal ramifications of working with corpora-
tions and universities engaged in, and supported by, defense- related research. 
The Vietnam War made plain for many Americans, including  those working in 
universities and the arts, the extent to which creative and intellectual  labor had 
become entwined with state- sponsored military- industrial enterprise. While 
government got busy redistributing and reimagining the relation between de-
fense funding and research establishments, the kind of institutional critique 
that failed to inform the art- and- tech proj ects, though operating at least in la-
tent form in placements like John Chamberlain’s at rand, came to shape the 
politics of art in the US through much of the 1970s.
Timing and the Avant- Garde
The discourse of failure surrounding the avant- garde has been a per sis tent 
feature of critical accounts for many years, and especially since Peter Bürger’s 
influential 1974 (translated into En glish in 1984) assessment of the historical 
avant- garde and what he sees as the degraded and redundant repetitions of the 
neo- avant- garde. Bürger’s pessimistic account, as noted by Benjamin Buchloh 
(1986), Hal Foster (1994), and John Roberts (2015), among  others, is an articu-
lation of post-1968 disenchantment that sees only empty, bad faith repetitions 
of the historical avant- garde’s best moves in the art of the 1950s and 1960s. The 
retrieval of ele ments of Dada, Futurism, Surrealism, and Constructivism by the 
neo- avant- garde is, for Bürger, evidence of an exhausted proj ect. For Foster, 
however, it is precisely the relation between prewar and postwar avant- gardes, 
not least in terms of the importance of repetition for the neo- avant- garde, that 
opens up crucial questions regarding “avant- garde causality, temporality, and 
narrativity” (1994, 10).
As we have recognized  here, the ideas, and often the personnel, driving 
1960s art- and- tech initiatives shared a lineage with the early twentieth- century 
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avant- gardes, funneled through the Bauhaus, Black Mountain College, and 
Fluxus. This avant- garde underpinning brought a commitment to experimen-
tal, often process- based collaborative practice, usually uninterested in outcome- 
oriented productivity; a willingness to move beyond disciplinary bound aries 
to the point where art and the aesthetic dissolved as distinct spheres; and a 
utopian spirit in keeping with the techno- optimism characteristic of the early 
years of the de cade. Foster is right to note that, in the US context, awareness 
of the historical avant- garde often came through the very institutions of art 
the avant- garde intended to demolish— through increasingly professional-
ized university education such as mfas, and, as we have seen in the case of 
MoMA, through galleries and museums. The recovery of the avant- garde in the 
US was largely already institutionally mediated and, as such, the repetition of 
avant- garde strategies was critically and theoretically self- aware. For Foster, the 
relevance of, say, Marcel Duchamp, to modern art was to a significant degree 
retroactive inasmuch as it was the retrieval of Duchamp in the 1960s that led to 
him being anointed the key figure of twentieth- century art. Bürger’s tendency 
to read the avant- garde as an evolutionary tendency, despite his recognition 
of the historical rupture the avant- garde instantiates, blinds him, according to 
Foster, to the “deferred temporality of artistic signification” (1994, 11). In other 
words, Bürger’s linear, evolutionary model led him to identify the historical 
avant- garde as a failure (the category of art was not destroyed) and the neo- 
avant- garde as a farcical retread of that original failure (13–16).
Foster, by contrast, sees the avant- garde (especially Duchamp) and the 
neo- avant- garde (including Robert Rauschenberg and Allan Kaprow) as less 
focused on the negation of art or the romantic reconciliation of art and life and 
more concerned with the “perpetual testing of the conventions of both” (18). In 
this way, according to Foster, “rather than false, circular, and other wise affirma-
tive, avant- garde practice at its best is contradictory, mobile, and dialectical, even 
rhizomatic” (18). It is in sustaining a tension between art and life, in testing what 
constitutes aesthetic experience, that Foster locates the neo- avant- garde not as 
the farcical return of a heroic past but a proj ect enacted “for the first time— a 
first time that . . .  is theoretically endless” (20). The historical avant- garde, ac-
cording to this reading, is effective only when it is worked through by the neo- 
avant- garde; what Foster calls the “becoming- institutional of the avant- garde” 
does not “doom all subsequent art to court buffoonery” but prompts a pro cess 
of ongoing, reflexive critique of “acculturation and/or accommodation” and a 
“creative analy sis” of the limitations of precursor avant- gardes (23).
The 1960s art- and- technology initiatives explored in this book, in their 
inability or unwillingness to account for, and respond to, the challenges of a 
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militarized scientific and technological avant- garde to which they sought to 
align themselves, certainly appear to fit the narrative of failure typical of assess-
ments like Bürger’s. The narrative of collaboration that chimed with the avant- 
garde rejection of the expressive subject soon came to signify a more compliant 
collaborationist tendency as art’s position within the university or corporation 
appeared to achieve no more than provide a flimsy screen for the technocratic 
implementation of a US imperial proj ect. Yet, as Foster’s proposal for an ex-
panded temporal reading of the avant- garde proj ect and its failures suggests, 
 there are grounds for avoiding Bürger’s disenchanted outlook on the thwarted 
ambitions of once radical proj ects. An adequately historicized account of the 
avant- garde proj ect would do better to understand any moment of failure as 
a marker or an impact crater—as an indication or trace of activity the signifi-
cance of which remains contested and unresolved. The avant- garde, as John 
Roberts claims, “is inseparable from the absences and discontinuities that it 
carries with it” (2015, 15, original emphasis).
The complex temporalities at work in the art- and- tech proj ects of the 
1960s therefore require some consideration, not only to avoid the enticing 
but inadequate temptation to dismiss them out of hand as inevitably com-
plicit with the institutions of power they appeared to court and redeem, but 
 because  these very proj ects have, in recent years, themselves been subject to the 
pro cesses of retrieval and recuperation. cavs, E.A.T., and a&t are currently 
reanimated and have come to represent impor tant precursor proj ects in a re-
vitalized art- and- technology sector. The ambitions of the 1960s proj ects, their 
desire to generate interdisciplinary, collaborative, creative research, is no longer 
perceived as a relic of the doomed utopianism of their historical moment but as 
a deferred dream the twenty- first  century can fi nally deliver. In order to under-
stand what is at stake in the recent art- and- tech reboot— beyond the obvious 
synergies between what the art- and- tech proj ects stood, and continue to stand, 
for, and the rise of ubiquitous computation and the financial and social power 
wielded by con temporary tech  giants—we would do well to approach the 
knotted histories of the artistic avant- garde, American progressive politics, and 
the military- industrial state that have been partially outlined in  these pages in 
the light of the expanded temporal horizons suggested by Foster and Roberts.
The revival of art- and- tech collaboration as a concern among universities, 
galleries, museums, and other institutions has been, like the neo- avant- garde, a 
return that relies upon recognition of pre de ces sors. In 2013, lacma launched 
the Art + Technology (a + t) Lab (a plus sign substituted for the ampersand of 
the 1960s version), intended to provide, as the museum explained, “grants, in- 
kind support, and facilities at the museum to help artists take purposeful risks 
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in order to explore new bound aries in both art and science” (quoted in Chang 
2013). Sponsored by Hyundai, the program drew on staff and facilities from 
big tech companies Accenture, Daqri, Nvidia, Gensler, Google, and SpaceX. 
Artists  were promised “access to robotics, eeg, sensors, big data- crunching 
machines, and even SpaceX flight information” (Savov 2013). In 2015, mit’s 
Center for Art, Science, and Technology (cast) received a $1.5 million Mel-
lon Foundation grant to further promote and enable the center’s mission to 
inspire teaching, research, and programming that operate at the experimental 
intersections of art, science, and engineering. In the official news article about 
the grant, mit stressed its fifty years of pioneering work integrating the arts 
into its engineering and science programs. The news release explic itly links the 
cast proj ect of “arts on a civic scale” back to György Kepes’s cavs, which 
it identifies as the progenitor of cast’s studio/lab ambitions (cast 2015). 
In 2016, Nokia Bell Labs marked the fiftieth anniversary of Billy Klüver’s art 
and technology collaboration by introducing the E.A.T. Salon, bringing to-
gether a wide range of artists and Bell Labs researchers. In a welcoming address, 
Marcus Weldon, president of Nokia Bell Labs and chief technology officer of 
Nokia, said that E.A.T. “has been a  little dormant for the past de cades,  because 
in many ways the ideas  were so ‘avant- garde’ that they  were well ahead of their 
time.” Now, however, with the “rise of smartphones and their canonical apps, 
cloud based creative software platforms, sophisticated digital image capture de-
vices, and immersive, large scale digital displays or head- mounted vr goggles, 
art and technology are becoming truly coupled, or perhaps even symbiotic.” 
The “time to E.A.T.,” writes Weldon, “has come” (Weldon 2016).
Interest in collaborative arts- and- technology research is higher than 
it has been since the 1960s, and the lacma initiative, along with the cast 
grant and the E.A.T. Salon, are among many indicators of the trend in the arts 
 toward interdisciplinary collaboration and the notion of art as research. In-
deed,  there are over one hundred such programs and sites in the US alone at 
the time of writing (see Shanken 2005; Wisnioski and Zacharias 2014). Re-
awakened interest in art- and- tech labs is a consequence, on one hand, of the en-
largement of art’s field of operations post- Conceptual Art, and on the other, of 
the restructuring of the technology sector in the wake of the digital revolution. 
For John Roberts, since Conceptual Art, or what he calls, following Rosalind 
Krauss, “art  after art in the expanded field,” the collective, reflexive strategies of 
the avant- garde have become “the grammar of a  viable and active art produc-
tion” (2015, 23). This expansive plurality of forms has emerged as the official art 
world of global stars, blockbuster exhibits, elite institutions, and dealerships 
has increasingly rendered itself irrelevant to the concerns and interests of a 
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critical art practice, even though, as Roberts suggests,  there is no clear- cut or 
complete separation between the art world and the enlarged sector of art work-
ers he designates art’s “second economy” (23).
The vigorous growth since the 1990s of participatory and other discursive 
and pedagogic practice, often foregrounding an avant- garde lineage and explic-
itly radical aims, cannot be separated from or understood outside the deregu-
lated  labor market  under neoliberalism that has demanded increased worker 
flexibility, adaptability, and entrepreneurialism. The model  here is, of course, 
the tech sector, its countercultural bona fides shored up through the 1970s and 
1980s by the techno- utopianism of apologists like Stewart Brand and the fron-
tier ethos of what Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron (1996) called “the 
Californian ideology,” undergirded by the deregulated market and its capacity 
to create new modes of cultural production and exchange.1
The renewed interest in art- and- tech proj ects, then, may preserve the 
names and the legacies of  earlier iterations, but the historical circumstances 
within which they have arisen are radically diff er ent from the situation in the 
late 1960s. Foster’s purpose in reexamining the temporality of the avant- garde 
recognized that the “becoming- institutional” aspect of the neo- avant- garde 
marked a reflexive capacity to undertake a critique of “acculturation and/or 
accommodation”; it appears that this part of the neo- avant- garde legacy has 
itself been institutionalized in the form of art- and- tech proj ects fully capable of 
absorbing their failed histories back into themselves. Yet  there is  little mention 
of failure in the press releases and websites promoting cast, E.A.T. Salon, or 
the lacma a + t program. Not only is the criticism leveled at the 1960s proj-
ects underplayed to the point of invisibility, but the prospect that  these proj-
ects have laid “dormant” is suggested as an indication that they  were somehow 
ahead of their time, cryogenically preserved for the purpose of reheating in 
the pre sent. It is through this narrative of reanimation that mit, Nokia, and 
lacma are able to position themselves as the guardians of underestimated 
initiatives that can now be allowed to flower. A more skeptical reading might 
conclude that it is only through historical amnesia and the erasure of the cir-
cumstances through which artists came to ser vice the public relations arm of 
the defense industry and its government backers that it is pos si ble to retrieve a 
usable past from the art- and- tech adventures of the 1960s.
A navigation of the significance of the twenty- first- century art- and- tech 
revivals requires a sense of the complex forces that brought about their 1960s 
ancestors. What is hopefully clear from our account of cavs, E.A.T., and a&t 
is that  these ambitious, if flawed, initiatives themselves emerged out of, on the 
one hand, the historical avant- garde’s challenge to bourgeois art and its fixation 
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on the creativity of the autonomous individual, and, on the other, progressive 
liberalism’s claims for science as a generalized means for realizing a radically 
demo cratic community. The par tic u lar art- and- tech formations considered 
 here, while forged in the historical circumstances of an ascendant industrial 
modernity, come to fruition, however, at the point where the social, economic 
and ideological conditions that might support them  were no longer available. 
The Pax Americana may have sought to naturalize and universalize democracy, 
but the means through which democracy might be realized  were increasingly 
bureaucratic, technocratic, and hierarchical. Indeed, the Cold War liberalism 
that developed during the 1950s and 1960s had  little room for the definitions of 
science and democracy, of collectivism and creativity as they had been used dur-
ing the 1920s and 1930s, and as such art- and- tech proj ects like cavs, E.A.T., 
and a&t, despite their high- grade artistic input and high- tech apparatus,  were 
singularly out of step with the realities of the technological agenda represented 
by elite institutions and policy- makers.
The two main, interwoven stories we have outlined in this book— the 
pursuit of an emancipatory fusion of art and technology, and the emergence 
of a corporate military- industrial machine— are not simply narratives that 
converge with the triumph of a neoliberalism borne out of rand theories of 
strategic self- interest, though that is part of it. They are also stories about mis-
aligned and out- of- kilter temporalities, contested pasts, and strug gles over the 
definition of the  future. It may be, as Foster (1994) suggests in terms of the 
avant- garde proj ect, that it is only through the repetitions of new formations 
that the first iteration might be comprehended.
The Art of the Reboot
The explicit positioning of initiatives like cavs, a&t, and E.A.T. as the ger-
minal ground for twenty- first- century proj ects marks not only a recognition 
of the ways the histories of art and technology share a common, if not untrou-
bled, recent history, but it is also an indication of the ways in which the reposi-
tioning of historical legacies can legitimate current practice. This historicizing 
move is one of the ways that current art- and- tech labs significantly differ from 
their precursors, where the retrospective shoring up of the archive as evidence 
of a legitimating pre ce dent is markedly absent. In the Cold War moment of 
the 1960s art- and- tech labs, the temporal perspective was that of JFK’s New 
Frontier, a world of the  future that left  behind the traumas of the recent past 




The current retrospective move, of course, is entirely consistent with the 
retemporalized history of the avant- garde, where each iteration must reflexively 
include knowledge of its precursors. What is downplayed in the foregrounding 
of the 1960s art- and- tech legacy, though, is precisely the extent to which, and 
the reasons why,  those proj ects  were unable to deliver on their utopian col-
laborative promise. In other words, the claims made now by, respectively, mit, 
lacma, and Nokia for cavs, a&t, and E.A.T. at once retrieve and construct 
a prehistory of the art- and- tech lab that resists a full investigation of the com-
plex interplay among art, technology, institutions, and business that  shaped 
and troubled the Cold War–era labs and continues to determine, despite their 
depoliticized self- presentation, their con temporary descendants. This is akin to 
a neo- Constructivist avant- garde addressing the history of the Rus sian avant- 
garde without accounting for Stalin.
While the a&t program, for example, successfully attracted high- profile 
artists and paired them with the industrial  giants of the Southern California 
tech sector, many of the collaborations choked or fizzled out, and the resulting 
exhibition was poorly received and drew heavy fire. The current a + t initiative 
is shrewd enough to establish some distance from the original model, claiming 
it is “inspired by the spirit” of a&t but is much less wedded to the reliance on 
art stars and the climactic exhibit and more committed to facilitating open- 
ended exploration conducted by artists recruited through competitive open 
calls. What a + t has preserved of the original proj ect, aside from hooking up 
with major tech players, is the stress on documentation. It is largely through the 
report produced by Tuchman’s initiative (and which served as the cata log for 
the 1971 lacma show) that the original program has gained art historical trac-
tion and from which the current a + t proj ect derives much of its inspiration 
(Tuchman 1971). In locating a significant part of its activity in the archiving of 
its own operations, a + t almost acknowledges the fact that the 1960s proj ect 
presented itself best and most fulsomely through its documentation. It would 
not, indeed, be remarkable if it turned out that a + t is inspired more by Tuch-
man’s report than by Tuchman’s proj ect itself. The report has all the seductions 
of the archive and none of the messiness of the workshop, laboratory, or board-
room. Certainly, no small part of the function of the revived lab is, as we have 
suggested, to promote and trade on the historical value now ascribed to the 
original. The new lab has a ready- made prehistory (or, at least, a prehistory in 
the pro cess of ongoing curation by lacma), a line-up of (now, if not already at 
the time) celebrated past contributors, and an in- house archive to draw upon. 
The new lab, the lacma website explains, is “inspired by the transparency” 
of the original program and offers full digital disclosure of all the lab’s work.2
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The appeal to transparency is an oddly preemptive move, as if the mu-
seum anticipates accountability to be an issue it must address from the outset. 
Among the prob lems encountered by the 1960s labs was growing suspicion 
of the proj ects as a means of softening the public face of corporate military- 
industrial enterprise, especially as opposition to the Vietnam War intensified 
and became more widespread  toward the end of the de cade. By flagging “trans-
parency,” a + t forecloses on any charge that its intentions might be anything 
other than in the spirit of open exploration and knowledge exchange. Yet the 
very claim to transparency calls up questions of opacity and concealment, and 
draws attention to the regulation of the archive as a primary means through 
which legitimacy can be instantiated and sustained. While a + t does not ad-
dress in detail the context of the original a&t program, it does benefit from a 
prophylactic move that brackets off dissent in order to seal in the critical heat 
generated by the 1971 exhibit. In this way, lacma’s cele bration of a&t’s exem-
plary transparency operates as a firewall in at least two ways. First, it separates 
the  earlier program from the “system” it was charged, at the time, with being 
part of and beholden to, making a&t safe as a precursor. Second, that original 
transparency can be presented as part of the legacy on which the new iteration 
builds, while filtering out the malware of history that might other wise corrupt 
the archive.
The proclaimed openness of a + t is part of a broader narrative common 
among rebooted art and technology proj ects that has found a way to draw 
upon the appeal of illustrious countercultural precursors, providing a much de-
sired “edge” while capitalizing on the equally legitimizing heritage dimension 
of the new initiatives. The E.A.T. Salon v2.0 website is, inevitably, illustrated 
with Bell Labs’ archival images of Klüver and Rauschenberg’s 9 Eve nings series, 
and Weldon provides a brief history of Bell’s contributions to the expansion of 
the  human senses and perception (including hi-fi stereo recordings, sound for 
the first talkies, the first singing computer voice, and algorithm developments 
found in current  music and video production).3 He concludes by moving into 
direct second- person address in order to state that  these artistic achievements 
and tools  will be challenged by “you, as artists and creatives,” who  will further 
the aesthetic complexity available through technological interfaces and thus 
“be able to arrive at the upper levels of Maslow’s hierarchy of  human needs 
and achieve ‘transcendence’ ” (Weldon 2016). Clearly, Bell Labs customers have 
their work cut out for them, even with the assistance of the beneficent com pany. 
The goals for the E.A.T. Salon echo some of the more visionary ele ments of 
Kepes’s proselytizing, combined with Negroponte’s consumer- driven amateur- 
artist aesthetic revolution for the con temporary innovation economy. It is a 
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deft move, from the vanguardism of Cage and Rauschenberg to the supposedly 
redistributed creativity of the internet age, that purports to deliver, fi nally, the 
promised democ ratization of expertise and resources once anticipated by the 
utopian energies of the 1960s proj ects.  Those who push the kind of account-
ability inadvertently flagged by lacma’s promise of transparency, however, 
would do well to recognize the vexed relationship between the artistic and 
military- industrial avant- gardes that rendered the 1960s proj ects po liti cally 
untenable despite their often radical underpinning in movements committed 
to a restructuring of the relation between art and life. Yet this enlarged consid-
eration of what art- and- technology collaboration might look like outside its 
corporate managerial frame is hardly pos si ble when the twenty- first- century 
art- and- tech labs are as networked into the military- industrial- entertainment 
complex as their Cold War pre de ces sors, this time without the residual, and to 
an extent redemptive, vanguardism.
It is true that from the outset, the 1960s proj ects, while sharing broadly the 
same ambitions for the  union of art and technology, placed their emphasis on 
diff er ent outcomes. cavs was intended, to an extent, to redeem the research 
university through an injection of the arts into the heavi ly instrumentalized 
world of Cold War science and technology. In his pitch to the university, Kepes 
(though clearly writing to university administrators) suggested that art might 
heal what military- industrial applications of science had wrought asunder, 
arguing that “a place for the visual arts in a scientific university is imperative 
for a reunification of Man’s outlook on life’ ” (quoted in Ragain 2012). Klüver, 
more at home in the corporate world and more sympathetic to the practicali-
ties of collaboration,  imagined E.A.T. as an organ ization that, if successful, 
would dissolve along with the disciplinary distinctions it set out to challenge. 
The lacma program, among the three proj ects considered  here, was perhaps 
the most obviously interested in courting business and integrating the museum 
into the broader LA enterprise zone. To varying degrees, though, each of the 
proj ects remained wedded to a notion of arts- and- technology collaboration 
that had  little directly to say about politics and relied on a set of (already old- 
fashioned and often naive) working assumptions about objectivity and disin-
terested attention in research and artistic practice that left them unable to ad-
equately confront the Cold War contradictions of their respective enterprises. 
Not only did cavs, E.A.T., and a&t emerge just as public opinion took a 
skeptical, and often hostile, turn away from technology, but they arrived too 
early to benefit from the kind of reflexive contextualization that the social con-
structionists might have provided. The kind of institutional critique underway 
in the art world by the late 1960s certainly contributed to Jack Burnham’s read-
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ing of art- and- technology initiatives, and helped frame the critical reception 
of proj ects like the final a&t exhibition, but it is largely lacking on the inside 
of the proj ects. The absence of sustained critical friction among participants 
in the proj ects is not surprising given that the aim of art- and- tech initiatives 
was to facilitate collaborative  labor among disparate, and often mutually suspi-
cious, constituencies. The search for common ground and a common idiom 
tended to take pre ce dent over broader conceptual or ideological questions re-
garding the nature of the enterprise. Yet the baseline assumption that art and 
technology could be mutually productive nevertheless hampered the pursuit 
of a more probing investigation of the structural support required for such 
collaborations. The emerging frustration among artists critical of art- and- tech 
proj ects was largely due to this perceived collaborationist tendency, which for 
 those who remained aligned to the more overtly po liti cal ramifications of the 
avant- garde proj ect was untenable if art was to maintain its radically transfor-
mative capacity.
Retemporalizing the Avant- Garde
Con temporary art- and- technology proj ects have been able to safely reboot 
without the opprobrium heaped upon their pre de ces sors in part  because of 
the normalized relations among defense and tech sectors, made pos si ble by the 
post-1960s distribution of defense contracts more deeply among the private 
sector. Not only has US military action itself become commonplace and fre-
quent, and the spectacle of military high- tech hardware in action a staple of 
the news cycle, but the business of military- industrial research and develop-
ment is also now more integrated into American business culture. The mili-
tary is more likely to buy in innovation from ambitious private sector firms 
than to rely on Cold War corporate  giants like Lockheed or Boeing. A 2014 
 Reuters article, for example, reports that “the Pentagon has switched from tak-
ing the lead in developing technologies like gps satellites and now looks to 
commercial players for innovations like 3d printing” (Shalal 2014). Former 
Raytheon chief engineer Andy Lowery explains in the article how defense sup-
pliers are adopting virtual- reality technologies to cut costs, and smaller, more 
commercially oriented firms are quicker to utilize such technologies. Lowery 
is president of Daqri, a vr- software com pany currently marketing the “Smart 
Helmet,” promoted as the “World’s First Wearable  Human Machine Interface,” 
and one of lacma’s a + t sponsors. The example Lowery offers of a lithe new 
player in the defense business is SpaceX, Elon Musk’s com pany, which in 2015 
beat Lockheed and Boeing to win its first defense contract, a US Air Force gps 
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satellite (Isadore 2015). SpaceX is another a + t sponsor. Hyundai, the major 
sponsor of the a + t program, includes the Hyundai wia Corporation, which 
produces remote weapons systems for global markets. As part of its deal with 
lacma, Hyundai funded the acquisition of works by Robert Irwin and James 
Turrell, both of whom featured in the original a&t exhibition (Tewksbury 
2015). Similarly, Nvidia produces military- grade supercomputer chips; the 
architecture  giant Gensler’s client base,  needless to say, includes defense and 
aerospace interests. The links of high- tech to military research is as apparent 
in the pre sent as it was in the mid- twentieth  century, though the shift to fully 
neoliberal economic markets and the attendant rise of the digital revolution in 
both sectors has  shaped the nature of the relationship.
lacma’s claim of “transparency,” then and now, is not much of a claim, 
though  there is often a certain luster to be attained through overt displays of 
integrity, as in Google’s by- now notorious motto, “ don’t be evil.” The market-
place has proved an effective solvent, and the notion of tech r&d si mul ta-
neously serving defense and culture is no longer news. A similar convergence 
of interests has meant that moves  toward the interdisciplinary integration of 
the arts and sciences in universities, galleries, museums, and research institutes 
across the globe have also been met with broad ac cep tance. In order to provide 
cross- institutional support for the explosion in arts- based interdisciplinary 
programs and centers, two recent North American associations, the Alliance 
for the Arts in Research Universities (a2ru) and Science, Technology, Engi-
neering, Art, and Mathe matics Education (STEAMedu), serve as advocates 
and facilitators for what a2ru calls “arts- integrative research.”4 Despite the 
public rhe toric of support for such endeavors, which often echoes the 1960s 
idiom of creative solutions to global prob lems, the associations understand full 
well, as do the universities housing them, the dangers inherent within the in-
novation economy that demands instrumental results and often very speedy 
ones— a set of demands that Kepes and  others  were able to negotiate somewhat 
more easily than  those operative in the pre sent. Over forty US universities, as 
well as the University of Technology in Sydney, are members of a2ru, with the 
common purpose of raising the profile of, and justification for, arts- based re-
search. STEAMedu furthers  these institutional agendas through conferences 
and workshops, with the arts often positioned as a kind of public relations 
medium or visualization platform for abstruse stem research other wise be-
yond the understanding of specialist audiences. With claims often couched 
in the process- oriented discourse familiar to readers of Dewey or other mid- 
twentieth- century advocates of “learning by  doing,” the a2ru website offers an 
explanation of the steam acronym that seeks to demonstrate in common-
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sense terms the relation among the parts: “Science and Technology, interpreted 
through the Arts and Engineering, all based in Mathematical ele ments.”5 The 
role of interpretation  here conforms to the loose- limbed manner in which sci-
ence, cybernetics, systems theory, and information theory  were put to use by 
Kepes and  others, though while Klüver might have recognized and accepted 
the way engineering is conceived  here as the application of science, he would 
doubtless have been concerned about the instrumentalized deployment of the 
arts and of engineering as merely interpretive. The final phrase about the basis 
of inquiry being grounded in mathematical ele ments provides a tip of the hat to 
universal computation as the engine for global change in the current moment, 
and it is a pedagogical sentiment that would have likely had Norbert Wiener 
and Charles Eames nodding in agreement, with Gregory Bateson and Marga-
ret Mead prob ably abstaining.
Current science, engineering, art, and design (sead) collaborations and 
research, as or ga nized by a2ru and STEAMedu, face a number of challenges, 
including funding and the pressure to deliver outcomes in the form of sponsor-
ship for collaborations, “mea sur able impact, and reputable research” (Zacha-
rias and Wisnioski 2019).  These concerns are compounded by demands for 
institution- building, spinoffs, interdisciplinary research advancements and 
profitable outputs that Zacharias and Wisnioski say have been pre sent from 
the avant- garde origin stories surrounding art and technology movements. The 
runaway “success” of neoliberal enterprises such as the mit Media Lab only 
add to the burden, with researchers and artists battling institutional demands, 
research ideals, multiple and often contradictory stakeholder demands, and fi-
nancial pressures. Similarly the conflation of the digital with the technological 
generally— a conflation made in public discourse for de cades but also one in 
this instance largely resultant from the success of the Media Lab— has led to 
the inextricable entwining of art and digitally led media research, which lends 
a specific profit- driven and instrumental justification for the linkage as well as 
the institutional investment.6
From one point of view, the assault on the romantic formation of the art-
ist as a social anomaly gifted with distinctive creative powers conducted by the 
twentieth- century avant- garde has been successful. Artists are now, as organ-
izations like a2ru are happy to claim, conceived as researchers undertaking project- 
based work in a collaborative interdisciplinary environment. The prob lem, how-
ever, as the Belgian sociologist Pascal Gielen has argued (2013), is that the very 
 things once championed as putting an end to the myth of the creative genius and 
the expressive self have effectively come to serve in the reproduction of the neo-
liberal subject. Notions of the network and collaboration have redistributed 
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or erased questions of authorship and signature, and a horizontal definition 
of creativity as demo cratically accessible to all has overridden the elitism of a 
vertical model that placed the artist at the top. Problem- solving rather than 
prob lem creation (or favoring Chamberlain’s proj ect over Byars’s) has become 
the focus of temporary project- based work reliant on a mobile, interchange-
able staff tasked with completing the job. Such a model has tapped in to the 
artist’s or curator’s longstanding entrepreneurial capacities and fits comfortably 
with the competitive, ambitious environment within which arts workers vie for 
space and attention among museums and galleries, festivals and biennials, and 
with universities, cities, and nations looking to enhance their cultural capital.
Among the consequences of this new model of artistic production is the 
idea that the enterprising individual—as opposed to, say, the critical citizen or 
public servant— has “ little use for solidarity,” Gielen suggests, which is “only 
temporarily functional, usually only for the duration of a proj ect” (39–40). 
Unconnected to a permanent workplace that might provide social solidarity 
and economic security, not to mention  labor protection, and at the mercy of 
the often trend- driven time- limited proj ect, the free- floating creative individ-
ual is in many ways the model neoliberal subject, endlessly— and necessarily— 
dynamic, flexible, mobile, communicative, and resourceful. Furthermore, the 
time- limited aspect of the proj ect means that while the proj ect may demand 
total commitment and focus during its execution, the participants, well aware 
of its temporary existence,  will have to be si mul ta neously on the lookout for 
 future opportunities. This, for Gielen, produces a creative worker who is “in 
a permanent state of being alert and doubtful at the same time” (50). Within 
such a fluid situation, workers are able, on the positive side, to “accumulate 
specialized, creative and highly personalized knowledge,” but the “downside is 
that it is much harder to embed historically or institutionalize.  After all, net-
work relationships do not easily build a memory” (50–51). In other words, the 
conventional notion of the artist as nomadic bohemian is catered for  under 
the entrepreneurial model, and indeed encouraged, yet the price is any sense of 
sustained or shared commitment to anything beyond the demands of the proj-
ect. “In short,” writes Gielen, “the de- institutionalization of creativity not only 
cuts away depth and height, but also durable character building. Put simply, 
creativity becomes disengaged from faith or conviction” (51).
The stress on fluidity across sectors as a mode of facilitating innovation 
is often foregrounded as a key attribute of con temporary art- and- technology 
proj ects. For example, discussing a + t artist John Craig Freeman’s proj ect eeg 
ar:  Things We Have Lost, Brian Mullins, founder and ceo of Daqri, enthuses 
about the ease of the collaboration  because “the relationship between technol-
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ogist and artist is extremely fluid as both are constantly pushing the limits of 
what’s pos si ble in both of their mediums, which is pretty exciting. It opens up 
the possibilities for all kinds of in ter est ing innovation.”7 Freeman follows up 
by stating that such apparently easy collaborations are  really a  matter of sorting 
out transactional relations within the innovation economy, and he claims that 
“although  there is an inherent tension between the proprietary, often secret, 
profit motivation of successful technology companies and the public ser vice 
mission of large institutions like lacma, the Art + Technology Lab seems 
committed to exploring and possibly overcoming this tension.” Freeman ex-
presses his belief that the success or other wise of art and technology collabora-
tions hinges on “how fluid the roles between artists and technologist are, and 
on how willing each party is to freely share intellectual property.”
Despite Freeman’s blunt explanation of the real stumbling block in the 
current collaborative configuration, he brings the short interview around to his 
own work and its artistic lineage. The role that chance plays in the augmented 
real ity work he produced with Daqri, according to Freeman, connects to Du-
champ’s Three Standard Stoppages (1913/14) and John Cage’s experiments with 
the I Ching, thus throwing down the proj ect’s avant- garde bona fides while 
finding a place for the notion of chance in a world in which memories are 
materialized on screens through brain- wave- visualization technologies. Mul-
lins speculates on the increased interest in the tools on display as potentially 
leading to cheaper and better quality machines and software. Billy Klüver, for 
one, was never convinced that engineers should see themselves as artists, any 
more that he expected artists to be able to become engineers. The point of col-
laboration was, particularly at E.A.T., to facilitate the realization of the artist’s 
investigation into materials. In the twenty- first  century, not only has the artist 
become fluid enough to find a place within the tech sector, but also, for Mul-
lins, technology is itself conceived of as an artistic “medium” and the technolo-
gist can liken himself to Cage or Duchamp.
What is perhaps most striking about Mullins’s discussion  here, though, 
is that innovation itself has become an empty signifier of virtue and the role 
of a + t is to overcome “tension” between private enterprise and social mis-
sion. The invocation of Three Standard Stoppages in this context is revealing, 
not only in the way that Duchamp has been recruited by the tech sector, but 
 because the term “stoppage” refers to tailoring and a technique for the invisible 
repair of garments. The role of the art- and- tech proj ect as a means of stitching 
up the ragged edge between business and polis  ought to register as a veiled 
allusion to the collaborationist claims made by critics of the 1960s art- and- tech 
ventures, but  here it is delivered, post- ironically, as an achievement.
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What are at issue in current art- and- tech initiatives are the same ques-
tions that dogged their  earlier incarnations, questions surrounding, for ex-
ample, the nature of experiment and the prospect for a plausible means for 
artists and technologists to break out of the operating paradigms they usually 
work within. The institutions of art, as the narrative of failed avant- gardes sug-
gests, are capable of converting challenges into product and absorbing dissent 
as efficiently as corporate or government institutions. Part of the challenge 
 here— and this accounts to an extent for the delimiting of Dewey’s potentially 
radical conception of an experimental democracy—is the sense that, as phi los-
o pher of science Ian Hacking argues, “the bound aries of knowledge are formed 
by the direction of  actual knowledge” (1986, 239). Writing in the context of 
weapons research, Hacking suggests that “when so much knowledge is created 
by and for weaponry, it is not only our  actual facts, the content of knowledge, 
that are affected. The pos si ble facts, the nature of the (ideal) world in which 
we live itself becomes determined” (239). Massive defense spending, in other 
words, produces knowledge within the context of, and is  shaped by, military 
interests.8 An awareness that the realm of the pos si ble is constructed within 
“what is held to be thinkable” (243) at any given time is rarely evident in the 
1960s art- and- tech proj ects, and far from widespread in their twenty- first- 
century reboots. If collaboration among artists, scientists, and engineers is to 
amount to anything more than the reproduction of the status quo, where terms 
such as “innovation” serve as hollowed out references to increased efficiency 
and new product ranges, the friction, disagreement, distrust, false starts, and 
failures that collaboration brings with it— the re sis tance and strug gle within 
and between art and technology— need to be given more space. The desire in 
the 1960s proj ects for unity among collaborators understandably derived from 
the aim of bringing diverse participants together. Art- and- tech proj ects  were, 
in this way, a version of the postwar ambitions to forge a unity of science. Yet 
if Hacking is right that such a unity is “an idle pipe- dream” since “the forms of 
diff er ent bits of knowledge are brought into being by unrelated and unreliable 
chains of events” (246), a more plausible version of collaboration might require 
a stronger sense of the agonistic and incendiary. A more purposeful goal than 
ensuring that technologists and artists share a common purpose might be gen-
erating heat from their differences. John Chamberlain sensed as much during 
his time at rand, and it is the re sis tance from both sides that produced a work 
that, while to all intents and purposes a failed collaboration, gnawed a small 
hole in the largely closed worlds of art and the think tank.
Such an agonistic approach to art- and- tech proj ects would have  little 
space for invisible repairs since it would be attentive to the tears and rips. Tuch-
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man’s report on lacma’s a&t program (1971), among the 1960s proj ects, 
comes closest to embracing the re sis tance coming from both artists and busi-
nesses, and this is what gives the document weight since it accepts that a failed 
experiment is still an experiment. The notion of failure, however, in light of our 
discussion of the avant- garde,  ought to be reconsidered or at least  repositioned 
within a broader temporality that might also help to prevent the sense of fore-
closure that has attended the rise of neoliberalism as the most recent  purported 
post- ideological ideology. According to this familiar narrative, the failure of 
twentieth- century collectivist proj ects has given way to the natu ral order of the 
 free market as the inadequacy of planning and regulation has become evident. 
 Under the sign of strategic self- interest, any attempt to engineer economic and 
social prob lems outside the marketplace is to tinker with the self- regulating 
order of  things. Within such a conception of society as the mere aggregation 
of self- interested units, references to abstractions such as the “common good” 
sound not only antiquated but also fatally naive. The diminished status of a 
thinker such as Dewey during the second half of the twentieth  century, despite 
vari ous attempts to resuscitate his reputation, is indicative of the direction of 
travel.
The Deweyan model of creativity, as an active, experimental encounter 
with the world that was broadly synonymous with both democracy and the 
scientific method as unfinished proj ects could conceive of project- based  labor 
as more than narrowly instrumental  because it retained a conviction in the idea 
of collective action. The Dewey School’s occupation- driven curriculum, while 
carry ing the unfortunate connotation of being merely vocational, was reli-
ant upon a capacious interpretation of what an occupation might mean. The 
shrinkage that occurred, during the second half of the twentieth  century, in 
the definition of the terms in which Dewey outlined his philosophy— science, 
method, democracy, art— left his arguments vulnerable to adaptation and dis-
memberment, first by Cold War liberalism’s contraction of what constituted 
the meaning of science in a demo cratic society, and then by an increasingly al-
gorithmic understanding of how strategic self- interest operated. The erosion of 
faith or conviction in democracy as the constitution of a public sphere already, 
by the 1960s, meant that art- and- technology proj ects driven by a residual pro-
gressivist commitment to the enlargement of collective potentialities  were out 
of step with the broader perception of science and technology as instruments 
of elite bureaucratic control and coercion. Rebooting “dormant” art- and- tech 
initiatives in the twenty- first  century does not have to involve worrying about 
such skepticism since expectations of what a society based on the public good 
might look like have contracted so far as to be insignificant.
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It might be argued that the avant- garde and its celebrated capacity for 
creative destruction has had a hand in creating the environment in which the 
disruptions of radical innovation promoted by the convergence of art and tech-
nology have become normative, as affirmative accounts such as Weldon’s sug-
gest. Certainly, Jean- François Lyotard understood as much when he observed 
“a kind of collusion between capital and the avant- garde” due to the de pen-
dency of both on “the force of skepticism and even of destruction,” a mistrust 
of rules (and materials) and destruction of the status quo (1991, 104–105). The 
cap i tal ist economy relies on and is regulated by “an Idea” of pure wealth or 
power for which it offers no example from real ity as proof. Indeed, through 
the operations of technologies that have made “science subordinate to itself,” 
Lyotard claims that real ity has become “increasingly ungraspable, subject to 
doubt, unsteady” (105). Lyotard’s charge, though, is a familiar one that is conso-
nant with Bürger’s melancholy backward glance at the failed promise of the his-
torical avant- garde, and while it is hard to argue that vanguardist moves have not 
been more effective in the hands of economists and corporations than they  were 
with artists, the one- way street Lyotard outlines leads in the same direction as 
the collectivism- as- failed- experiment narrative and is something of a dead end.
It is  here that we need to return to Foster’s expanded temporality of the 
avant- garde, since Lyotard’s foreclosed  future presupposes the achieved con-
vergence of cap i tal ist and avant- garde destruction. Foster’s enlarged sense of 
avant- garde temporality, as we have seen, allows for the prospect that the neo- 
avant- garde may have comprehended the historical avant- garde for the first 
time (1994, 16). In other words, the idea that an avant- garde can succeed or 
fail misses the point, which is that  there is no completion or conclusion to the 
avant- garde pro cess: “in art,” Foster writes, “creative analy sis is interminable” 
(16, original emphasis). It is the sense of interminable inquiry that John Rob-
erts (2015) develops in his consideration of the “revolutionary time” of the 
avant- garde, which he conceives not merely as a series of historically locatable 
movements or tendencies but, following Imre Lakatos, as a research program. 
Broadly, the historical avant- garde outlined a set of propositions that, for Rob-
erts, constitute the ongoing avant- garde research program.  These are: that art 
is not an object or set of objects but an eventual pro cess that may or may not 
include objects; that art is determined by its social and po liti cal conditions of 
possibility; that art is a theoretically driven pro cess; that art is a collective or col-
laborative pro cess at all times and therefore comprehensible as a social practice; 
that notions of the artist and artistic skill are functions of general social practices 
and therefore interdisciplinary and pro cessual; and fi nally, that art “sets itself 
the historical and critical task of incorporating its speculative strategies and 
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practices into the advanced scientific and technological forms of general social 
technique; art participates in the advanced relations of production” (3).
As a research program, this might sound like a set of princi ples that could 
be  adopted without controversy by an art- and- tech proj ect without any of the 
utopian aspirations  toward the transvaluation of art and life more commonly 
associated with the avant- garde. However, this would be a narrow reading of 
what Lakatos means by a research program, which, for him, is closer, as Ian 
Hacking explains, to a form of knowledge than it is to a set of proposals and 
procedures to be followed (1986, 254). For Lakatos, a research program may 
last a  century or lay forgotten for de cades: “we may be frustrated by a long 
series of ‘refutations’ before ingenious and lucky content- increasing auxiliary 
hypotheses turn a chain of defeats— with hindsight— into a resounding success 
story,  either by revising some false ‘facts’ or by adding novel auxiliary hypoth-
eses” (1980, 48, original emphasis). Over time, a series of steps may constitute 
a “consistently progressive theoretical prob lem shift [but] we do not demand 
that each step produce immediately an observed new fact” (49, original empha-
sis). It is with this sense of a research program in mind that Roberts can write 
that “the function of the avant- garde  today is inseparable from the absences 
and discontinuities that it carries with it” (2015, 15, original emphasis). The 
point is that the Lakatos model allows for refutations that may be perceived 
as failures within the scope of the pre sent but which may  later be retrospec-
tively understood differently. In a sense, this is partly what Foster is claiming 
about Bürger’s premature dismissal of the neo- avant- garde. Roberts’s adoption 
of the research program model, however, is especially pertinent given the rise of 
the art- as- research paradigm and its deployment by the neoliberal university, 
global art museums, and the tech sector to instrumentalize and appropriate the 
collectivist capacities made pos si ble by ubiquitous computing but po liti cally 
uncoupled from a  viable definition of the public good.
Apertures of Hope
On the surface, the art and technology proj ects of the 1960s appeared to fit 
comfortably with the techno- utopianism of corporate liberalism. The virtues 
of creativity and interdisciplinary collaboration institutionalized through the 
embrace of systems- thinking in the sciences, business, and government did not 
seem to be out of step with advanced artistic tendencies that likewise sought to 
slough off the residual romanticism of individual authorship, medium specific-
ity, and the autonomy of the art object. The assessment, by Jack Burnham and 
 others, that the failure of the art- and- tech proj ects to adequately deliver on 
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their promise was largely one of timing also seems right. The shift in attitudes 
 toward technology and the institutional models that promoted technocratic 
solutions to the prob lems of modernity was rapid and decisive during the last 
years of the 1960s, and the art- and- technology proj ects  were too closely aligned 
with the institutions and assumptions of the technocratic proj ect to survive the 
backlash. The current willingness of artists and institutions to return to the 
1960s proj ects, furthermore, is understandable given the ways that the ubiquity 
of advanced technology in con temporary life appears to have confirmed some 
of the claims made by gurus of the previous age such as Marshall McLuhan and 
Buckminster Fuller. As Nokia boss Marcus Weldon reminds us, E.A.T. was just 
too darned avant- garde for the 1960s, but fi nally the rest of us have caught up. 
Outlined in this way, the story of art and technology is one of the gradual syn-
chronization of technological development and social real ity  after an awkward 
period when artists and technologists  were too far ahead of the curve. This is pre-
sumably,  after all, what avant- gardes are good at, but what has come before needs 
to hang around long enough so that it  will eventually be recognized as timely.
What we have wanted to stress  here, though, is the limitations of this 
Whig version of the history of art- and- technology proj ects, whereby the “fail-
ure” of the 1960s proj ects is merely a function of cultural lag that delays the 
full integration of creative tech collaboration into the pro cesses of twenty- first- 
century corporate innovation. At the same time, as tempting as it is to partition 
off proj ects like E.A.T. and a&t as naive or opportunistic boomer adventures 
in the corporate financing of the arts, this would merely plug  those proj ects back 
into their slots in twentieth- century US art history alongside the rest of the cur-
rently fash ion able “hippie modernism”  doing the international museum cir cuit.9 
The extent to which the potentially radical or utopian aspects of  earlier art- and- 
tech collaborations have been made safe for viewing is not separate from the re-
vival of some of the key proj ects by con temporary institutions and corporations. 
The techno- pastoral patina of old photos of long- haired students building geode-
sic domes on the grass at Black Mountain College is,  after all, catnip for hipsters 
dreaming of seed funding or internships. The retrieval of the 1960s art- and- tech 
proj ects in the twenty- first  century must itself also be historicized and under-
stood, not merely as an opportunity to market prior achievements, though  there 
is that, but as another indicator of art’s entanglement with advanced technology 
and its military- industrial backers. The point  here is that the stuttering narra-
tive of noble failures and bad timing does not do justice to the complex tem-
poralities across, and through which, art, technology, and politics are woven.
The re sis tance to the narrative of failure we have noted in relation to Fos-
ter and Roberts’s account of the avant- garde calls for a diff er ent conception 
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of temporality than one that mea sures “success” as a progressive shoring up of 
“developments.” It is not surprising, though, that ceos like Weldon have be-
come  adept themselves at retemporalizing the histories they wish to emulate. 
Nevertheless, the notion that “we” have caught up with the avant- garde itself 
falls back on a comforting synchronicity that cannot be allowed to stand, for 
while the apparatus of art- and- tech might currently be in alignment, what the 
retrieval of the 1960s proj ects must leave out if they are to function within the 
disruptively innovative environment of the neoliberal corporation are the ele-
ments of the precursor proj ects that  were, in the 1960s, already anachronistic. 
In other words, what must be expunged are the traces of the radical collectiv-
ist avant- garde and their fusion with the socially emancipatory, demo cratically 
participatory ele ments the art- and- tech proj ects carried with them from their 
revolutionary, progressive, or pragmatist origins. In order to do justice to the 
notion of the art and technology proj ect as a plausible model for collaborative 
interdisciplinary research that is more than r&d for the culture industry, we 
have to take account of the non- simultaneousness of the simultaneous.
Ernst Bloch developed the idea of the nonsimultaneous in his book 
Heritage of Our Times, first published in 1935.10 A complex montage of Bloch’s 
Weimar period writings, Heritage of Our Times sought to understand the rise 
of fascism in Germany through, in part, a reading of the experience of time 
 under modernity. Bloch derived his notion of the nonsimultaneous from art 
historian Wilhelm Pinder’s challenge to the convention of dating art works ac-
cording to style.11 For Pinder, such a practice did not take into account that at 
any given historical moment, an artist from one generation might be produc-
ing work at the same time as an artist from a much younger generation. The 
generational difference would, for Pinder, bring with it stylistic differences that 
historically dating the two works would not explain. The term the “nonsimul-
taneity of the simultaneous” was Pinder’s description of how one historical mo-
ment could contain ele ments that  were not consonant with each other. While 
Pinder’s method led him to develop the suspect notion of a generational  will 
or “entelechy,” it nevertheless allowed him to challenge notions of art history as 
unilinear and developmental. It is this notion of historical time as non- unified 
that Bloch develops in Heritage of Our Times.
According to Bloch, cap i tal ist modernity might define the pre sent as 
the most advanced economy, but it does not account for the entirety of con-
temporary experience. The pre sent, for Bloch, still contains modes of life that 
belong to  earlier times, such as the peasantry, who continue to exist alongside 
advanced industrial society yet experience the world in an entirely diff er ent way 
to the modern worker. Similarly, other groups, such as disgruntled white- collar 
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workers, are also nonsynchronous in that they are ideologically out of sympa-
thy with the current state of affairs. To stay with Bloch’s examples for a mo-
ment, the peasantry is “objectively” nonsynchronous since its mode of life is 
out of sync with modernity; the white- collar workers are “subjectively” non-
synchronous  because their view of the world is not confirmed in the existing 
structure. It is precisely out of the nonsynchronous— out of the sections of the 
population that do not experience the pre sent as synchronized with cap i tal-
ist modernity— that Bloch claims the Nazi Party was able to draw cultural re-
sources that should rightfully belong to the Left.12
In the context of our discussion of the history of the artistic avant- garde, 
the (bad) timing of 1960s art- and- technology proj ects, and their twenty- first- 
century reboots, Bloch’s notion of the nonsimultaneity of the simultaneous 
is a useful means of grasping the complex cultural politics that we have de-
scribed as the convergence of two avant- gardes, one artistic and one military- 
industrial. Understood according to Bloch’s model, if we take the early 1960s 
as the moment of the most advanced economy, where technology and cor-
porate liberalism are synchronous with US economic and geopo liti cal domi-
nance, the historical avant- garde and Deweyan participatory democracy 
are patently nonsynchronous even though they continue to animate the art 
world and populate the progressive educational environments that nurture 
the neo- avant- garde.
While it is therefore easy, as critics like Kozloff and Burnham did in the 
case of a&t, to identify art and tech proj ects as “corporate art,” since in many 
ways they can indeed be said to be leaning  toward a synchronization with the 
con temporary moment, this criticism misses the fact that prac ti tion ers like 
Cage, Fuller, and Rauschenberg are never properly synchronized as their poli-
tics and their understanding of key terms of the debate such as collaboration, 
experiment, and creativity, are profoundly nonsimultaneous with the meaning 
of  those terms as used by the corporate liberal institutions within which they 
are attempting to operate. Indeed, as we have seen, the public, participatory 
definition of terms like “scientific method” and “democracy” developed by 
progressives like Dewey in the early de cades of the  century, terms that reso-
nated with Eu ro pean avant- garde prac ti tion ers like the Bauhaus,  were already 
non- synchronized with the times by the end of World War II when the emi-
grant avant- garde is cultivating its relationship with American artists and in-
stitutions. Looked at this way, the inability of the art and technology proj ects 
to fully synchronize with the corporate liberalism of the military- industrial 
complex is not a failure but a mea sure of how temporally nonsynchronous the 
meaning of terms like “collaboration” and “creativity” has become.
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Not only, then, as Foster and Roberts argue, does the avant- garde not fail 
if the temporal scale is expanded and the unidirectional “development” of art 
history rejected, but the art- and- technology proj ects do not fail  either, since a 
successful synchronization of their mission with mid-1960s American capital-
ism would have constituted a disturbing fusion of radical aesthetics and cor-
porate politics. As Bloch suggests,  those ele ments that appear to be left  behind 
by history instead contain the cultural materials through which a challenge  to 
the normative synchronicity of the pre sent might be properly staged. In the 
1930s, in Bloch’s analy sis, the catastrophe was that  these nonsynchronous cul-
tural resources had been stolen by the Right. As the escalation of the Vietnam 
War raised profound questions about the legitimacy of corporate government 
expertise and its deployment of technological solutions to social and po liti cal 
prob lems, a similar missed opportunity perhaps lies at the heart of the criticism 
leveled at art- and- technology proj ects. The nonsynchronous resources they car-
ried through from the 1920s and 1930s, the emancipatory potentialities articu-
lated by Dewey and at the Bauhaus and then at Black Mountain, had indeed 
already been appropriated by the other side. The stripped down, meritocratic, 
competitive, hierarchical model of democracy  shaped in the postwar period 
by experts like James Conant and Vannevar Bush often used the same words as 
their more liberal counter parts, but the meaning was diff er ent. The kind of in-
terdisciplinary collaboration undertaken at think tanks like rand was among 
elites and not among a more generally distributed set of participants.
The notion of failure, then, is not adequate or accurate since it implies 
a one- time attempt to further the unidirectional narrative that has been 
thwarted. The capacity of the forces of reaction to identify and utilize the non-
synchronous is, for Bloch, likewise not a one- off theft but must be countered 
and challenged. In other words, the resources of the past are not exhausted 
by their appropriation but remain, in their stubborn non- synchronicity, per-
sis tent potential excess and a disruption, a contradiction, and an alternative 
to the pre sent. Nokia and the other institutions and corporations invested in 
promoting art- and- technology proj ects demand synchronization between the 
past and the pre sent, yet a diff er ent reading  ought to allow for and embrace the 
way that past proj ects, as Bloch puts it, “contradict the Now; very strangely, 
crookedly, from  behind” (1991, 97).
What glares out of the pages of Tuchman’s a&t report and the archives 
of the other 1960s art- and- tech proj ects is not just the incommensurability of 
the utopias conceived by the artistic and the corporate avant- gardes of that time, 
but the flair of a corporate world gripped by its own potentiality. It is not surpris-
ing that artists wanted access to some of that— the resources, the confidence, 
190
chApter sIx
and the sense of mission, derived from the conquest of a brutal adversary, and, 
so it seemed, responsible (though self- appointed) for solving the prob lems of 
humanity. Despite the cold instrumentality of the bureaucratic approach to 
planning a world, and regardless of the devastating foreign policy failures that 
sprang from the slide rules and mainframes of the organ ization men,  there is a 
capaciousness to the vision that, retrospectively, at least, can be breathtaking in 
its optimism, however catastrophic the consequences turned out to be. It is this 
chutzpah that wildcards like Buckminster Fuller and John Cage shared with 
institutions like rand and outrageous proj ects like the Apollo program: a 
willingness to reach a beyond that, from any other  angle, might seem ludicrous.
This is what lacma, Nokia, mit and other institutions want from that 
past, or at least the look of it— the cool, insouciant arrogance of ascendant 
power. What they do not want is the radical undertow that comes with pick-
ing Fuller or Cage or Rauschenberg for your team. The equivalent of a Jack 
Burnham or a John Chamberlain, with their awkward, contrary relation to the 
straight world, is unlikely to be welcomed, coming very strangely, crookedly, from 
 behind, into the labs of SpaceX or Nvidia. If  there is to be disruption, innovation, 
or creativity, it must speak and walk in the less strange, less crooked manner of the 
neoliberal adventurer. If  there is to be collaboration, it must be via the friction-
less transaction where all differences among art, technology, and business are 
massaged away by and through the synchronized movements of the market.
It is precisely this sense of synchronization claimed by late capitalism that 
led Fredric Jameson to draw on Bloch in his discussion of uneven development 
in his 1980s work on postmodernism. From the point of view of the postmod-
ern pre sent, writes Jameson, “Every thing has reached the same hour on the 
 great clock of development or rationalization”; we have reached “a situation in 
which the survival, the residue, the holdover, the archaic, has fi nally been swept 
away without a trace” (1991, 310). That which was incomplete, anachronistic, 
or anomalous has, fi nally, been brought into line, just as the “too avant- garde” 
work of E.A.T. has now found its correct time in the twenty- first  century. This 
is the sense, as Jameson notes, “in which we can affirm,  either that modernism is 
characterized by a situation of incomplete modernization, or that postmodern-
ism is more modern than modernism itself ” (310, original emphasis). A thorough-
going synchronization of all ele ments would, indeed, register the end of history 
and the flattening of any challenge that might be posed by the concept of the 
new or innovative, which is now evacuated of context and serves merely to sig-
nify technical adjustment or improvement within the dehistoricized pre sent.
When Jameson rightly located this postmodern move outside or beyond 
history as a function of late capitalism, whereby the “past” is synchronized as 
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a kaleidoscope of depthless and distracting styles, he follows Bloch in under-
standing that the contradictory nonsimultaneous ele ments of a “still living past” 
are most effectively deployed by capitalism “as a means of separation and combat 
against the  future dialectically giving birth to itself in the cap i tal ist antagonisms” 
(Bloch 1991, 109). In other words, the real contradictions of capitalism (what 
Bloch calls the objectively simultaneous contradictions) can be used to prevent 
the ele ments of an “unrefurbished past . . .  not yet resolved in cap i tal ist terms” 
(108) from posing a direct challenge to the maintenance of the status quo.
 There is no straightforward way in which the art- and- technology proj ects 
of the 1960s can be revived or reclaimed  unless the conflict over the meaning of 
the temporality of modernity is itself synchronized into the perpetual pre sent 
of capital. Bloch’s assessment in the 1930s that the Right stole the nonsynchro-
nous cultural resources of the Left, challenges to the narrative of the “failure” 
of the avant- garde, and Jameson’s account of the postmodern cancelation of 
history are attempts to claw back the force of the anachronistic and the anoma-
lous from aspects of cultural production all too easily streamlined into affirma-
tion. To borrow from Bloch, we might say that the terms of what once counted 
as aspects of an emancipatory collectivist model of inquiry— creativity, collab-
oration, inter- , post- , or non- disciplinary  labor— have been stolen. They have 
not been stolen by neoliberalism in the first instance, though they have become 
part of the lexicon of this latest nonideological ideology, but  were appropriated, 
and sometime gifted, from the avant- garde and put to use by corporate liberalism 
during the early postwar period as it sought to distance itself from the radical 
implications of the participatory democracy outlined in Dewey’s progressivism. 
As such, mediated through institutions and individuals (such as the Bauhaus, Al-
bers, Kepes, and  others) determined to situate themselves in meaningful oppo-
sition to the very real threat of totalitarianism, the radical modalities of terms 
like “creativity” and “collaboration” are already confiscated and redeployed by 
the time the 1960s art- and- technology proj ects seek to utilize them.
Despite the tragedy of belatedness that saturates his own diagnosis, 
Bloch’s assessment of how to move beyond the catastrophe of synchronization is 
not without purchase  here. “The task,” writes Bloch, “is to release  those ele ments 
even of the non- contemporaneous contradiction which are capable of aversion 
and transformation, namely  those hostile to capitalism, homeless in it, and to 
remount them for functioning in a diff er ent connection” (1991, 113). The power 
of the nonsynchronous resources of the past lies, for Bloch, in the fact that they 
remain incomplete, unresolved, and “hence lastingly subversive and utopian”; 
they are the “gold- bearing rubble” (116) of a “prevented  future” (110). Jameson, 
likewise, is not ready to concede capital’s victory over historical time. The prob lem 
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to be solved, he writes, is “how to jumpstart the sense of history so that it begins 
again to transmit feeble signals of time, of otherness, of change, of Utopia” (2003, 
76). The expansive temporality proposed by Foster and Roberts, a temporality 
that suspends dismissive decisions surrounding purported failures and endings, 
and which allows for the conception of an avant- garde research program of un-
disclosed duration, might be one way to jumpstart history. A retrieval of the gold- 
bearing rubble from the prevented history of the historical avant- garde and its 
fusion with American pragmatism at its most socialistic moment in the 1930s is 
another. The force of the neo- avant- garde’s commitment to art and technology 
may well lie  there, in advance of the alignment with Bell, mit and other institu-
tions of Cold War corporate liberalism, when it was still genet ically linked to the 
emancipatory promise of the original Bauhaus and progressive anti- capitalism.
 There may be other apertures through which to conceive of and act upon 
as yet prevented  futures. The neoliberal institution’s attempt to synthesize its 
own nonsynchronous ele ments into the “ great clock of development” is one 
of them. As we hope is now clear, the legacy of the 1960s art- and- technology 
proj ects is far from straightforwardly the prehistory of the pre sent. Even before 
their fall from  favor, proj ects like cavs, E.A.T., and a&t already contained 
the archives of prevented  futures, including the thwarted techno- utopias of 
postrevolutionary Rus sia, Weimar Germany, and Amer i ca’s Progressive Era. 
As modes of deformed collectivist utopianism, the 1960s art- and- tech proj ects 
marked, not so much moments of compromise or collusion between the avant- 
garde and the state, but rather moments when the contradictions of cap i tal ist 
democracy flared with a vividness that has not entirely burned out. It is the 
brightness of the art- and- tech proj ects, as well as their incompleteness, that has 
drawn the corporate sponsors, and the critics, back to stand in the afterglow. 
The reboots, though,  mistake the hearth for the flame. It is, in the end, what 
is wrong with art- and- technology proj ects— their inability to square radical 
modes of inquiry and collaborative  labor with the demands and expectations 
of corporate and military funding, institutional support, and instrumentalized 
science— that is precisely what is most impor tant about them. What art- and- 
technology proj ects of the kind discussed  here most powerfully demonstrate, 
both in their 1960s and twenty- first- century iterations, is the ongoing strug gle 
between the idea of an avant- garde and the appetite capital exhibits in its will-
ingness to feed upon it.
Notes
Introduction
1. The importance of Gestalt- era psy chol ogy as a means of bringing art and 
science together during the 1950s and 1960s is noted by Caroline Jones and Peter 
Galison, who observe that many of the key figures, including Rudolf Arnheim, 
Anton Ehrenzweig, and Ernst Mach, as recent emigrants, had brought to the US “a 
Central Eu ro pean wissenschaftlich approach to learning, where all fields of inquiry 
had been unified as one systematic investigation into vari ous products of the 
 human mind” ( Jones and Galison 1998, 3–4). The influence of Gestalt therapy on 
postwar American art, especially through Paul Goodman’s synthesis of American 
pragmatism and Gestalt during his involvement at Black Mountain College, is dis-
cussed in Belgrad (1998, 142–156). The extent to which Gestalt psy chol ogy directly 
influenced key members of the Bauhaus is debated in Boudewijnse (2012), while 
György Kepes’s debt to Gestalt theory is explored in Moszkowicz (2011).
2. Mesthene was on the staff at rand from 1953 to 1964 before joining Har-
vard as director of the Program on Technology and Society. While Mesthene was 
aware of technology’s negative potentialities and the rising anxiety surrounding 
rapid technological change, he remained confident in the capacity of experts to 
sustain a balanced approach that would allow society to fully realize the promise of 
accelerated technological innovation. See, for example, Mesthene (1965, 1968a, 
1969, 1970). The immediate target of McDermott’s (2014) response is Mesthene 
(1968b).
3. On artistic collaboration, see Green (2001), Hobbs (1984), and Kester (2011, 
2013).
4. A number of books published in the early 1970s provide useful surveys of art 
and technology proj ects of the time. See, for example, Benthall (1972), Davis (1973), 
and Kranz (1974).
5. For a wide- ranging assessment of mid- twentieth- century humanism and its 
preoccupation with the “crisis of man,” see Greif (2015).
6. For more on the continued cultural legacies of the Cold War, see the essays 
collected in Beck and Bishop (2016).
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Chapter One: Science, Art, Democracy
1. Dewey was not uninfluenced by Spencer’s application of Darwin to social evo-
lution, but he rejected what he saw as Spencer’s notion of evolution’s fixed goal and 
the way biology was used to account for and preserve social in equality. On Dewey 
and Spencer, see Pearce (2014).
2. On Dewey’s experiences in Chicago, the Laboratory School, and Dewey’s 
developing pedagogy, see Westbrook (1991, 84–113). On the history of the Dewey 
School, see Mayhew and Edwards (1936), and for a more recent assessment, see 
Tanner (1997).
3. On Dewey and Hegel, see Good (2005, 2006) and Shook and Good (2010). 
On Dewey and Bildung in par tic u lar, see Good and Garrison (2010).
4. For a detailed account of Barr’s teaching practice at Wellesley that includes a 
discussion of his time at Dessau, see Meyer (2013, 37–113).
5. On Bauhaus in Amer i ca, see Borchardt- Hume (2006), Kentgens- Craig (1999), 
and Saletnik (2009). On Dewey, German exiles, and the Bauhaus, see Füssl (2006).
6. For an early, influential account of Black Mountain College, see Duberman 
(1972). Impor tant  later assessments include Harris (1987), Katz (2003), and, most 
recently, Díaz (2015).
7. For an account of Rice’s tenure at Black Mountain, see Reynolds (1998); on 
Albers in Amer i ca, see Díaz (2008).
8. For a useful account of Dewey’s aesthetics, see Alexander (1987). See also 
Melvin (1992).
9. Given the apparent convergence of interests between artists and some scien-
tists and engineers, Jack Burnham  imagined in 1968 how the  future artist, “as part of 
a time technological elite, may find himself in the position of some of  today’s Nobel 
Prize scientists: rather than being  humble experimenters in the laboratory, some 
are executives manipulating research money and the proj ects of men  under them” 
(Burnham 2015c, 95).
10. It is revealing that among the six case studies presented on the “collabora-
tive advantage” of what they call “ Great Groups,” business writers Warren Bennis 
and Patricia Biederman (1998) include Lockheed’s secret military r&d unit Skunk 
Works, the Manhattan Proj ect, and Black Mountain College. The  others are the 
Disney organ ization, the Xerox Corporation’s Palo Alto Research Center, and the 
1992 Clinton presidential campaign.
11. As Jamie Cohen- Cole explains, the  future  imagined in Harvard University’s 
General Education in a  Free Society “was a technocracy in which each citizen was 
educated in how to appreciate, judge, and defer to expertise and in which po liti cal 
questions and even voting became technical prob lems. This technocratic vision fit 
with the emerging national security state that James Conant, in his role in aiding the 
development and deployment of the atomic bomb, helped bring into being” (2014, 
33). On the fate of Dewey’s educational theory during the Cold War, see Hartman 
(2008).
12. On Bush and postwar science policy, see Kevles (1977).
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13. On the importance of Greenberg’s formalism and its links to positivism and 
Cold War thinking, see Caroline Jones’s remarks: “Greenberg’s linkage of abstrac-
tion to positivism replaced the long tradition of a ‘spiritual’ discourse in abstract 
art. . . .  The positivist component was part of formalism’s midcentury technocratic 
appeal” (2005, 99).
14. Smith College was, of course, Friedan’s alma mater, where she had edited 
the college newspaper. Stevenson’s address, as Friedan notes, was reprinted in the 
September 1955 issue of  Women’s Home Companion, with an abridged version titled 
“A Purpose for Modern  Woman.” See Friedan (1979, 53–54) and Stevenson (1955b).
15.  There is a similar confirmation bias at work in a popu lar volume from 1960, 
The Creative Mind and Method, compiled from a series of radio broadcasts (Sum-
merfield and Thatcher 1960). Among the experts asked to discuss creativity in their 
respective fields are Frank Lloyd Wright, Aaron Copland, Ben Shahn, György 
Kepes, Edward Steichen, Robert Penn Warren, Lee Strasberg, Margaret Mead, and 
Rudolf Arnheim. As impressive as this roster is, it hardly challenges the notion of 
creativity as the domain of the exceptional.
16. On the Unity of Science movement in relation to the US, see Galison (1998).
17. The anxiety surrounding scientific specialization and a perceived ever- 
widening gap between expert scientific knowledge and public understanding, 
continued to trou ble commentators throughout the 1950s. In 1959, for example, 
anthropologist and Macy Conference participant Margaret Mead warned that the 
unpre ce dented growth in scientific knowledge and the rapid pace of change meant 
that “We are . . .  in danger of developing—as other civilizations before us have 
developed— special esoteric groups who can communicate only with each other 
and who can accept as neophytes and apprentices only  those individuals whose 
intellectual abilities, temperamental bents, and motivations are like their own. A 
schismogenic pro cess is  under way that is self- perpetuating and self- aggravating” 
(Mead 1959, 140).
Chapter Two: A Laboratory of Form and Movement
1. Powers of Ten, “sketch” version, directed by Charles and Ray Eames (1968), 8 
mins.
2. See Conway and Siegelman (2005), Dupuy (1994), Hayles (1999), Heims 
(1991), Pias (2016), and Wiener (1961).
3. Poem Field was a series of short animations made by VanDerBeek between 
1964 and 1968. Begun at Bell Labs, this work carried over to and influenced VanDer-
Beek’s time at CAVS.
4. Stan VanDerBeek: The Computer Generation!!, directed by John Musilli and 
Stan VanDerBeek (1972), 30 mins.
5. VanDerBeek’s Panels for the Walls of the World was large- scale mural, approxi-
mately 8 × 20 feet, that changed on a daily basis with images fed from diff er ent news 
sources and faxed to the Smithsonian. As such, it concentrated on pro cess, real- time 
transmission of images, and an ever- evolving collage.
196
notes to chApter three
Chapter Three: The Hands- On Pro cess
1. For a first- hand account of Bell Labs, see Noll (2015, 2016). For a corporate 
version of the com pany’s achievements, see Mabon (1975).
2. On the charisma of early nuclear weapons research, see Gusterson (2005, 78).
3. In his 1976 study, Irving Sandler retrospectively proclaimed the “triumph” of 
American painting (Sandler 1976). See also Dossin (2015).
4. For more on Pierce’s work at Stanford, see Mody and Nelson (2013).
5. The documentation of 9 Eve nings is extensive. The per for mances  were all pho-
tographed and filmed, providing copious material for a 2006 exhibition at MIT’s 
LIST Visual Arts Center, Cambridge, Mas sa chu setts, 9 Eve nings Reconsidered: Art, 
Theatre and Engineering, 1966, curated by Catherine Morris. See Morris (2006). 
For further information on the individual per for mances, see the documentation 
collected on the website of the Daniel Langlois Foundation for Art, Science, and 
Technology (http:// www . fondation - langlois . org).
6. Klüver (1967a, n.p.). All quotes in this and the next paragraph are taken from 
this source.
7. The talk, without the outline of the introductory audiovisual section, was 
published as Klüver (1967b).
8. Klüver (1967b, n.p.). Klüver’s article contains seventeen paginated and fifteen 
unnumbered pages. All quotes in this and the following three paragraphs are taken 
from the unpaginated section.
9. E.A.T. (1967b). All subsequent quotes in this paragraph are taken from this 
source. For a discussion of E.A.T. and automation, see F. Turner (2008).
10. On E.A.T. and the Pepsi pavilion, see F. Turner (2014).
Chapter Four: Feedback
1. For a discussion of the tangled relationship among expertise, democracy, and 
militarization during the Cold War, see Rohde (2013).
2. “Nowhere  else in the country,” according to Mike Davis, “did  there develop 
such a seamless continuum between the corporation, laboratory and classroom as in 
Los Angeles, where Cal Tech via continuous cloning and spinoff became the hub of 
a vast wheel of public- private research and development that eventually included the 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Hughes Aircraft (the world center of airborne electron-
ics), the Air Force’s Space Technology Laboratory, Aerojet General (a spinoff of the 
latter), TRW, the Rand Institute, and so on” (1990, 57).
3. On the impact of the protest movement against the Vietnam War on art and 
technology proj ects, with specific reference to Tuchman’s initiative, see Kahn (2012) 
and Goodyear (2008).
4. On the rand Corporation, see Abella (2008), Collins (2002), and Hounshell 
(1997, 2000). For an early, mainstream view of the organ ization, see McDonald (1951). 
On the Hudson Institute, see Pickett (1992). For a critical biography of Kahn, see 
Ghamari- Tabrizi (2005).
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5. For Life magazine’s view of rand as an “odd  little com pany” playing a “big 
role in US defense,” see McCombe (1959), a picture story that emphasizes the 
energetic, Southern California lifestyle fueling rand creativity. A similar claim for 
the dynamism of the think tankers is made in Theodore White’s (1967)  later article, 
again for Life, on so- called action intellectuals, though the photo graphs illustrat-
ing the piece predominantly feature seated men pensively staring into the  middle 
distance. For further discussion of how think tanks  were represented, see Erickson 
et al. (2013, 10–16), the description of rand in Ghamari- Tabrizi (2005, 46–60), 
Lee (2011), and the account of the early days of the Harvard Center for Cognitive 
Studies in Cohen- Cole (2007).
6. Further citations of Chamberlain’s rand memoranda refer to this source.
7. On the memo, see also Yates (1989a, 1989b). On the “papereality” of bureau-
cracies, see Dery (1998).
8. The Secret Life of Hernando Cortez, directed by John Chamberlain (1969), 69 mins.
9. The questionnaire is a two- page, undated and untitled typescript. Cham-
berlain, John. Folder 2 of 5, MOD.001.001 2(2). Modern Art Department Art and 
Technology Rec ords, 1967–2007, bulk 1967–1971, Los Angeles County Museum of 
Art, Los Angeles.
10. An unofficial recording of the broadcast can be viewed on Youtube. For more 
on the World Question Center, see Byars (2014, 69–85).
11. The discussion of politics is so muted or absent altogether in the documenta-
tion surrounding 1960s art and technology proj ects that the directness of Spark’s 
question is quite breathtaking. Tuchman’s tepid response, less so.
Chapter Five: How to Make the World Work
1. A Communications Primer, directed by Charles Eames (1953), 22 mins.
2. For more on the Eames Office displays, see F. Turner (2013) and Schuldenfrei 
(2015).
3. Eames Office. Accessed April 30, 2019. http:// www . eamesoffice . com / eames 
- office / who - we - are / .
4. Powers of Ten, “trunk version” directed by Charles and Ray Eames (1963); 
Powers of Ten, directed by Charles and Ray Eames (1968); Powers of Ten: A Film 
Dealing with the Relative Size of  Things in the Universe and the Effect of Adding 
Another Zero, directed by Charles and Ray Eames (1977), 9 mins.
5. Glimpses of the USA, directed by Charles and Ray Eames (1959), 13 mins.
6. This influence is noted by Colomina (2001), Kirkham (1995), and  others.
7. Think, directed by Charles and Ray Eames (1964), 30 mins.
8. All of  these ele ments combined with a veiled suggestion that humanity’s rifts 
might be healed by and through Le Corbusier’s architectural designs.
9. For more on  these influences, see Colomina (2001), Kirkham (1995), and 
Schuldenfrei (2015).
10. Gance’s 1919 critique of technology and war, J’accuse, includes a zombie 
moment in which the war- dead rise from their graves to admonish the society that 
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has sent them to the trenches. Gance deployed wounded soldiers as well as  those 
on leave from Verdun to play  these roles, which means they  were essentially playing 
proleptically their own ghosts. (In fact within a few weeks of shooting, 80  percent of 
 these extras had died.) In a self- reflexive moment that merged filmmaking and  battle 
preparation, for the opening credits Gance also uses troops to spell out the title of 
the film in a field. Made with collaboration from the cinematographic ser vice of the 
French army, the film featured tinted scenes, furious cross- cutting, split screens, and 
allegorical layering of images through which Gance explored the technologies of 
perception that made pos si ble his art as well as the worldwide destruction it evoked.
11. See Maciunas (1966). The piece was originally published in the winter 1966 
issue of Film Culture. All quotes in this paragraph are from this source.
12. The quote is itself taken from Ray Eames’s notes on a Hofmann lecture in 
August 1936.
13. Soviet audiences would have been more familiar with Eisensteinian montage 
than the audiences who entered Think, and thus the Moscow exhibition proved 
both effective and affective in ways that the New York installation did not manage.
14. The design department at Southern Illinois was led by Harold Cohen, who 
had been at the New Bauhaus in Chicago, where he met Fuller. Cohen not only led 
the department but he also brought Charles Eames, Moholy- Nagy, Marshall McLu-
han, and other leading thinkers to the somewhat remote land- grant university that 
gave Fuller his first full- time university post in 1959.
Chapter Six: Heritage of Our Times
1. The key figure  here is Stewart Brand. The fluid transition from social to market 
emancipation is deftly explored in F. Turner (2006). The relationship between 
participatory, pedagogic, and other discursive modes of art and new technologies 
is clear in Nicolas Bourriaud’s influential notion of “relational aesthetics,” where 
the diy, interactive promise of the internet is transferred to the production and 
reception of art: “Nowadays, modernity extends into the practices of cultural do- it- 
yourself and recycling, into the invention of the everyday and the development of 
time lived, which are not objects less deserving of attention and examination than 
Messianistic utopias and the formal ‘novelties’ that typified modernity yesterday” 
(2002, 14). For the critical response to Bourriaud, see, e.g., Bishop (2004) and 
Martin (2007).
2. lacma “Art + Tech Lab Archive.” https:// www . lacma . org / lab / archive. An 
 earlier iteration of the A + T webpage promised that it would make available all 
relevant code, data, and  legal documents as well as images and video. A pdf version 
of the 1971 report was,  until recently, also available from the lacma website. The 
most recent A + T webpages are less expansive.
3. Nokia Bell Labs E.A.T. Salon. https:// www . bell - labs . com / eat - july/
4. All quotes and information on a2ru are taken from the website of the Alli-
ance for the Arts in Research Universities. Accessed April 30, 2019. http:// a2ru . org 
/ about / who - we - are / .
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5. It is worth noting that the phrase “learning by  doing,” like many of the other 
loose terms Dewey preferred, migrated from the domain of progressive education 
to that of economics over the course of the twentieth  century. As used by Kenneth 
Arrow (1962), for example, “learning by  doing” referred to the way productivity can 
be increased through modifications made in practice and without increasing costs 
through adding workers or further investment.  Needless to say,  there is no reference 
to Dewey in Arrow’s article.
6. A current proj ect entitled “What Is a Media Lab?” is being conducted by Lori 
Emerson, Jussi Parikka, and Darren Wershler and addresses the state of play with 
current media labs globally. It also examines the Cold War influences on  these labs. 
See Emerson, Parikka, and Wershler (forthcoming).
7. Quoted from a conversation between Freeman and Mullins (lacma 2015). 
All quotes in this paragraph are taken from this source.
8. The relation among defense spending and the invention of new industries 
and areas of economic activity is noted by Markusen: “Whole new sectors of the 
economy have flourished  under the government’s research largesse and steady stream 
of procurement contracts— aerospace, communications, computing, and electronics 
owe their initial successes and much of their continued competitiveness to this closet 
industrial policy. . . .  These sectors in turn have produced technologies, which have 
radically altered the commercial sectors, particularly through the factory- automating 
counter parts to automated warfare. . . .  The distinctiveness of postwar military mis-
sions, particularly the imperatives of cold war competition, is key to this transforma-
tion” (1991, 394). She goes on to claim: “the computing industry was wholly a crea-
ture of military missions in its infancy. . . .  Not only  were many of the essential early 
developments military led, but so  were more recent innovations: minicomputers, 
software, time- sharing, data- communications protocols, and supercomputers. The 
explosion in business applications was a technology- push phenomenon— the military 
paid for companies to pioneer capabilities whose possibilities  were simply laid in 
the path of potential users. Electronics advances, too, such as the semiconductor, 
valued for their military capabilities,  were overwhelmingly dependent upon military 
markets in their crucial infant industry stages. In the late 1950s, the government ac-
counted for about 70% of the semiconductor market” (394).
9. The phrase “hippie modernism” is from Blauvelt (2015). For more on the 
combination of the 1960s counterculture and science, see Kaiser (2011) and Kaiser 
and McCray (2016).
10. The term used by Bloch, Ungleichzeitigkeit, has been variously translated as 
“nonsynchronous” (Bloch 1977), “non- contemporaneity” (Bloch 1991), and “nonsi-
multaneity” (Schwartz 2001).
11. On Pinder, see Schwartz (2001, esp. 60–64).
12. Bloch gives examples of appropriation such as the swastika imposed upon the 
red flag, the words “worker” and “worker’s party,” the street and the pro cession, and 
so on (Bloch 1991, 64–67; see also Schwartz 2001, 78–79).
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